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ABSTRACT

Author: Coly, Malick. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: Secular Discourse in Postcolonial West African Narratives: Problems and Perspectives: A
Comparative Study.
Major Professor: Shaun F.D. Hughes
The making of modern African nations and their attendant secularistic establishment have not
only altered traditional socio-political structures, this shift has equally affected the relations
between individuals as well as communities. In the process leading to modern sociocultural
transformations, tensions and discourse have arisen. Toyin Falola’s Violence in Nigeria: Crisis of
Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, and Ousman Murzik Kobo’s Unveiling Modernity in
Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reforms highlight respectively the political and
religious divide in post-Independence Nigeria and the impact of Islamic reform in Ghana and
Burkina Faso. These two historical studies show the complexity of modern West African
societies and the need to reappraise the identity question in the modern context. Although some
studies have examined different aspects of postcolonial identity within the literature, there exists
no study that examines specifically the impact and influence of secularism on postcolonial
identities, or the nature of its discourse. This study analyzes the forms and uses of the secular
discourse within postcolonial literary narratives. By conducting a comparative study of
Francophone and Anglophone texts and authors, it becomes possible to assess whether or not,
and to what degree sociocultural specificities and historical development affect the way the
discourse is fashioned, and what it seeks to achieve. More spefically, this study examines a
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variety of texts such as epics, novels, authors’ personal narratives and critical works. The
approach in this study is multidisciplinary with a strong sociological and historical emphasis.
Overall, this study comprises five chapters. Chapter one discusses the concept of power in
traditional West African societies. The objective of this chapter is to highlight how exercise of
power follows a shared social vision, one that defines its ethics and establishes its framework.
Chapter two assesses the meanings and implications of the urban space vis-à-vis the formation
and negotiation of postcolonial identity. Chapter three analyzes the impact of secular education.
Chapter four probes the stakes of West African writer on the secular question. Chapter five
examines the ramifications between secularism and religious fundamentalism. At the conclusion
of this study, it has become clear that the particular characteristics of West African societies have
influenced the way modern identities are shaped, but most importantly, they affect the form and
functioning of the modern secular society. Eventually, as this study shows, the context in which
secularism has come to be established within African societies informs in large part its complex
ramifications. Thus unlike Europe, its history and development in Africa has taken a much
different turn, which, therefore, necessitates a complete and distinctive study of the topic.

1

INTRODUCTION

The established association between European colonization and cultural, economic and
military domination has often overshadowed other consequential aspects of this historical episode.
In the African context, more specifically, the debate over secularism has often followed sharp
political divisions as was notoriously reflected during the drafting of the constitution of Nigeria’s
second republic. Nonetheless, the implications and impact of secular assumptions on African
societies certainly do have greater precedence, which transcends the political realm alone. If one
is to comparatively assess the effect of secular values and thoughts in eighteenth century Europe,
as well as the important philosophical debate that had preceded it, it proves equally necessary to
examine the role and impact of the consequences of this debate on the peoples of Africa, and to
understand to what degree the establishment of secular rule has affected these societies and to
assess the potential changes and transformations these principles have brought about. It is
important here to highlight that the African writer, unlike eighteenth-century European
philosophers, has subtly and heavily relied upon fictional genres to represent postcolonial society
and the issues with which it grapples. Thus, rather than dismissing the debate over secularism as
being non-existent in the African context, one must instead approach African literary works with
new perspectives, ones that allow for an understanding of the actual societal ramifications of
secularism, as well as its distinct expressions. Overall, however, this study aims to establish the
nature of the secular discourse in the western part of the continent and to assess both its
particularities and peculiarities.
Although limited political debate took place concerning the relevance and appropriateness
of the secular provision to the Nigerian constitution, or the rise in the 1980s of religious movements
and political parties in Senegal, post-independence literary production in West Africa had become
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acutely self-reflective of the societies it depicted, and provided equally a platform for literary
practitioners to creatively represent social realities, problems, and phenomena. By making
postcolonial West African literary works a specific object of this study, it becomes possible to
show how within these works a discourse/narrative about secularism has taken shape. The
importance of studying these texts from these new perspectives will contribute to inform literary
practitioners, as well as the general public about the nature of the secular debate among the peoples
and societies of West Africa. More importantly, conducting research on this topic constitutes a
significant step towards compensating for the dearth of documents needed for contemporary
scholarship.
In the particular context of Africa, in general, secularism could be viewed as an attempt to
uphold a new societal construct, whose primary objective is to shape and inform a new individual
type whose sense of self and identity is closely, if not solely, linked to the modern nation. In this
regard, secularism on the African continent has a great deal at stake. If the definition offered by
the“Merriam-Webster” dictionary is consulted, one can see that “secularism” clearly foregrounds
the removal or disregard of religious considerations within a particular establishment. It is worth
noting, in the African context, that secularism has had a significant historical and social dimension
and has played an important role in shaping West African identity. Thus, to fully understand the
scope of the question, as well as its broader ramifications, one must certainly avoid restricting its
evaluation to its purely religious dimension despite the fact that religion has traditionally been the
central issue as far as secular debates are concerned.
This study focuses specifically on West Africa given the region’s socio-historical
homogeneity. From a historical stand point, for instance, historians have shown how the different
empires and kingdoms in the region had remained in close touch with one another within an area
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marked with significant migration, as well as cultural and economic exchange. If Old Ghana had
been a vibrant commercial hub where northern Arab merchants had engaged in trade with their
Black counterparts, the Mali empire had remained a popular destination in the trade of gold and
other highly prized goods. This important economic activity eventually established important
trans-Saharan highways that connected cities north of the Sahara desert to those in the south, while
an ever increasing need for goods had widened these commercial networks further into the region.
The Islamic religion has certainly played an important role as it contributed to the creation
of a certain cultural uniformity and a newfound identity among peoples and societies that had
traditionally defined themselves in quite restricted ways. As a pioneering force, which had
preceded Christianity, colonialism and imperialism, Islam has had a strong impact on the region’s
numerous societies due to its long presence in the region. Additionally, the rise in the nineteenth
century of what has come to be referred to as marabout republics attests to the increasing political
dynamic of Islam, as well as the accompanying identity phenomenon that had characterized it ever
since its establishment on the continent. Important migration activities, embodied by the Muslim
merchant, have contributed to further diffuse the Islamic religion to other populations as these
merchants began to navigate towards new destinations and other rising commercial centers.
Although a significant percentage of the population were converted to Islam, it is worth
highlighting that these encounters had led to considerable cultural exchange notably through
political alliances, intermarriage, and religious affinities.
Migration of certain groups across the region had equally contributed to ethnic
intermingling and cultural harmonization in the region. In Ce que je crois: négritude, francité et
civilisation de l’universel, Leopold Sedar Senghor reveals, with much pride, indeed, his Malinke
ancestry. Holding this information from the griot (bard), Senghor explains how Malinke warriors,
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departing from the then powerful empire of Mali, had invaded and subsequently conquered the
kingdom of Sine in Mid-Eastern Senegal a few centuries ago. The presence of the Fulani across
West Africa constitutes another evidence of ethnic influence and métissage. If one is to rely on the
historian Sékéné Mody-Cissoko, this predominantly pastoral group had migrated from their
original home in north-eastern Senegal. Over the centuries, this nomadic group had come to find
homes for themselves in different places across West Africa such as Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone,
Nigeria, and Cameroon. Undoubtedly, the Islamic religion coupled with continually changing
socio-historical factors has played a fundamental role so far as the cultural identity of the region
is concerned.
Recent historical and political developments have also played a part in shaping a certain
character to the region. Colonization, in particular, has left a lasting impact on the area’s societies.
France and Britain’s colonial presence, as well as that of Portugal, continues to affect and inform
the lives of many individuals through language and cultural influence. Thus, in many countries in
West Africa, French, English, and Portuguese are not only spoken, but function as official
languages. The presence of these three languages, along with their colonial heritage does certainly
add a further layer of complexity to the construction of identity by the members element of these
societies on which these languages were imposed. This situation, rather than being problematic to
this study, constitutes a viable medium and a reason for a comparative study, although for practical
purposes, only works from Francophone and Anglophone societies are considered. Despite
significant differences between the French and British colonial administrations, both had to
administer societies that hosted a fairly large number of Muslim populations. Furthermore the
colonial boundaries often cut indigenous communities in two (sometimes more) constituencies,
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who then developed separately along Anglophone or Francophone lines. As such, commonalities
and differences cut across each other and enrich this study overall.
This study examines the secular question following a multidisciplinary approach with a
greater emphasis placed on literary, sociological and historical works. For instance, I draw heavily
on John S. Mbiti’s classical work, African Religions and Philosophy, to show how religion
permeates so deeply and meaningfully in different aspects of individual and communal life. In
sociology, however, Geert Mommersteeg’ seminal work, In the City of Marabouts: Islamic
Culture in West Africa, proves crucial in establishing the practical ramifications of the Islamic
religion among the societies of West Africa through the phenomenon of maraboutism. On the other
hand Ousman Murzik Kobo’s Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic
Reform, critically examines the changing face of the Islamic religion in West Africa with the
beginning of what has come to be viewed as a religious reform movement. Kobo’s work is critical
in my elaboration of religious fundamentalism in West Africa and in the study of its narrative.
From a literaary point of view, Wole Soyinka’s works, Myth, Literature, and the African World,
as well as, Of Africa, help better ascertain the connections between the writer’s societal beliefs and
individual intellectual posture on religion.
This study focuses primarily on literary production of the postcolonial era. More
specifically, it covers nearly a period of half a century of literary output from the 1970s to year
2015. Overall, the corpus of this study includes a variety of genres comprised mostly of novels,
epics, authors’ critical works/ personal narratives, and albeit tangentially, plays. This variety of
texts allows both for a study of the content of these works and the perspective of their respective
authors. The affirmation of the Senegalese novelist, Mame Seck Mbacké, who once said, “On nous
dit, que nous écrivains, nous sommes la conscience du peuple…” (We, the writers, are said to be
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the conscience of the people),1 certainly validates the choice to approach the work of West African
Francophone and Anglophone writers from both fictional and sociological points of view. It is in
this particular regard that the literary works under consideration constitute a rich ground for the
exploration of the secular question, as well as their authors’ individual preoccupations. The
development of literary production in West Africa in general has gone through different stages,
and the postcolonial novel, as well as the drama, have clearly emerged as powerful tools for social
representation and criticism. My reliance on authors’ personal narratives and critical works adds a
significant layer of interpretation. By adding these to the corpus, it becomes possible to show how
the writer’s personal viewpoint compares or contrasts with their fictional production, and whether
or not the West African writer continues to stand out as the conscience of the people.
So far after a careful review of published works in the subject, it has become clear that no
specific author has intensively examined the question of secularism in West African literature.
Instead, the great majority of the work which is available is that which has been conducted in the
fields of history and political science. For instance, Lamin O. Sanneh’s historical investigation,
The Crown and the Turban: Muslims and West African Pluralism, although useful and
enlightening, confines itself to documenting the conflicted relationship between West African
clerics and the European colonial powers. On the other hand, the collective work of various
scholars in the volume edited by John O. Hunwick, Religion and National Integration in Africa:
Islam, Christianity and Politics in Sudan and Nigeria, features, for the most part, politically
oriented readings with few dealing with history, and none drawing upon literature. Another major
work, and perhaps the most recently published on the subject is, Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufi
in Senegal: Religion, Culture, and Public Life, edited by Mamadou Diouf. The focus of this

Mame Seck Mbacké, Interview by Debra Boyd-Buggs. “Baraka: Maraboutism and Maraboutage in the Francophone
Senegalese Novel,” (Unpublished Dissertation, The Ohio State Universtity, 1986), p.335.
1
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volume is to show how the successful implementation of the Senegalese political model is
ingrained in the very nature of the Sufi traditions. Once again, with a sharp political orientation,
and dwelling mostly on major national events and political actors, the authors fail to show how
this successful model translates into the lives of members of Senegalese society, or their perception
of it. My study, then, constitutes a step towards providing a preliminary understanding of how
literature has a role to play in our understanding of secularism in West Africa. The common
perception that African literary works in general, and West African ones, in particular, are deeply
embedded in the reality of their own environment allows one to approach these texts as valuable
media for scholarly exploration. Furthermore, the social character of the West African novel makes
it all the more relevant for a comprehensive study of such a complex question as secularism in
modern African societies.
Overall, this study comprises five chapters. Chapter one explores the nature of traditional
power in West Africa. Here, I examine the various elements that play into the exercise of power
and attempt to establish both their symbolism and practical implications. Chapter two explores the
concept of space in West African postcolonial society. Specifically, it shows how the urban space
has become the very location where postcolonial identities collide, and where new identities are
equally negotiated. Chapter three addresses the impact of secular education in postcolonial society.
The objective, here, is to examine the existing connections between nationalism, women’s
empowerment and modern secular education. Chapter four sets the West African writer at the
center and investigates what is at stake for them in terms of the secular question. This chapter
allows one to understand the scope and implications of secularism at the writer’s personal level.
The final chapter, on the other hand, attempts to make sense of the rhetoric of religious
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fundamentalism. This chapter’s objective is to understand the ramifications of the connections
between secularism and the emergence of new religious expressions.

9

THE FRAMEWORK OF POWER IN SOUNDJATA OU
L’ÉPOPÉE MANDINGUE, THE EPIC OF KELEFAA SAANE, AND
ANCESTOR STONES

To understand the variety of African contemporary cultures, therefore, we need, first, to
recall the variety of precolonial cultures.2
Kwameh Anthony Appiah

It appears a necessary process, especially in the African context, to critically question the
past in order to get a better sense of current phenomena, developments, and transformations. Thus,
in the field of literature where this work situates itself, the epic seems the most appropriate material
given its textual complexity and the amount of valuable information it provides. It is precisely on
the latter aspect more so than the former that this chapter focuses. My objective here is to show
that the power dynamic within traditional societies is fundamentally centered on, and rooted in,
their cultural and religious values and beliefs. As such, although there exists a hierarchy, which
manifests itself through social classification,3 I contend, however, there exists an interdependency
between the ruling elite and other social entities that are a fundamental part in the exercise of
power. Thus, in my elaboration of the power phenomenon, I discuss some of the major forces that
play a significant role either in creating, maintaining, or destroying it. The vertical power hierarchy
that appears at first sight has a deeper underlying foundation, one that concurs to provide it
legitimacy, meaning and, to some extent, guarantee its survival.

Anthony Kwameh Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), p. 174.
3
See, for instance, Abdoulaye-Bara Diop, La société wolof: tradition et changement. Les systèmes d’inégalité et de
domination (Paris: Edition Karthala, 1981), esp. chapter 1, “Le système des castes et ses fondements,” pp. 33-46, and
chapter 5, “Le système des ordres et ses fondements,” pp. 115-31.
2
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The Epic of Kelefaa Saane, and Soundjata ou l’épopée mandingue pertain to different time
periods and societies. The former relates the life of Kelefaa Saane, a warrior prince in the
Senegambian kingdom of Kaabu (1650-1867), which rose to prominence after the fall of the
kingdom of Mali in 1450.4 Soundjata ou l’épopée mandingue chronicles the life of Sundiata Keita,
the founder of the empire of Mali (1250-1450). The commonality and differences between the two
epics allow for an analysis of social, political, and cultural elements. Although there appears a
temporal gap between the two events, I must contend that these two respective societies share a
number of features, as my analysis will show. Consequently, the temporal difference serves here
rather as a means to comparatively assess ideas, phenomena, and beliefs within a vast region that
appears to be once characterized by migration, cultural influence, and ethnic intermingling. 5
Aminatta Forna’s Ancestor Stones presents an interesting transition between the old traditional
society and an emerging modern one. The narrative follows the accounts of four sisters, Asana,
Mariama, Hawa, and Serah, who each tell their family story from their distinct perspective. Here,
I focus my attention particularly on the power relationships in the traditional setting, which the
present chapter deals with. I must specify here that my discussion is chiefly centered on the two
epics as their story lines, in my view, appears much richer in traditional elements.
Far from being mere fictional characters, the main protagonists in the epics are genuine
historical figures. David A. Chappell unambiguously remarks that: “Sundiata was a real king who,
from 1235-1255, ruled the empire of Mali”6 As for Kelefaa Saane, Sana Camara writes: “Kelefaa
never gained his own throne. He lived a violent life of battles and wars, only to be killed through

4

See, Sirifo Camara, The Epic of Kelefaa Saane, .ed. and trans. Sana Camara (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2010), p. xiii.
5
See, Boubacar Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, trans. Ayi Kwei Armah, African Studies 92
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1988), p. 35; and Camara, Kelefaa Saane p. xv.
6
See, Djibril Tamsir Niane, Sundiata: An Epic of Old Mali, trans. G. D. Pickett, Rev. ed., ed. David Chappell and
James A. Jones, Heinemann African Writers Series (Edinburgh Gate, Harlow: Pearson, 2006), p. vii.
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betrayal.”7 Thus, as it is, the examination of the power phenomenon in these two epics may further
inform us about the nature of West African societies during the time period these two events
occurred. In what follows, I discuss select elements and show how these encapsulate the essence
of traditional life and help us better understand the nature of traditional society. My discussion of
chieftaincy, for instance, is based on the fact that traditional African societies were led by chiefs
for the most part.
Mysticism, on the other hand, remains perhaps one of the major characteristics within
traditional society. This phenomenon has been, and continues to be widely practiced both in the
exercise of power as well as in the wider sociocultural sphere. Thus, it can only broaden our
understanding of the complexity of traditional society. My elaboration of Islam, however, is
informed by the fact this religion has had a long presence in the West African region. And, as such,
the exploration of the theme may help situate these societies vis-à-vis the Islamic religion and
perhaps inform us further about their identity.

2.1

Chieftaincy.
In southern and central Senegal amongst the Wolof and the Fulani in rural areas, the terms

“Keur” (Wolof)8 and “Saareh,” (Fulani) denote respectively both house and village. In fact, these
terms refer to small territorial units, commonly understood as, and often given no higher status
than, a village. I make specific reference to these units because the process that led to their
foundation is very revealing of a process based on ancient tradition that under different
circumstances often led to the formation of kingdoms. Furthermore, the terms “Saareh” and “Keur,”

7

See, Camara, Kelefaa Saane p. xviii.
Papa Samba Diop, Glossaire du roman sénégalais (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 303-04; and Birago Diop, Les
nouveaux contes d’Amadou Koumba (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1961), p.74.
8

12
when referring to places of communal life, are almost always followed by a specific denotation,
for the most part clan names or the name of the founder. Such examples as “ “Saareh Mansaly,”
“Saareh Soribaa;” or “ Keur Ayip,” “Keur Madiabel,” are just a few examples among many such
villages that abound depending on the geographic area.9 These villages, in the main, came to exist
through a fairly well known process whereby the head of a clan or of a large family migrates to a
different location and settles there for the purpose of acquiring a large farming or grazing land. In
this regard, the very notion of power and leadership is directly tied to community building. For, in
order for power to emerge, an entire communal apparatus has to precede and set it in motion.10 In
Soundjata ou l’épopée mandingue such seems to be the case. In addition to informing the reader
about the foreignness of the Mandingo people: (“ils viennent de l’Est,”)11 and linking them to the
Prophet’s black companion, Bilal, the narrative provides further details regarding the
establishment of the kingdom. Thus, Mamadi Kani, the great grandson of Lawalo 12 appears to be
the one who “devint roi d’un vaste pays.” 13 It is worth noting the process that caused his
ascendency to power. The following textual reference is enlightening in this regard:
C’est Mamadi Kani qui inventa le Simbon ou sifflet de chasseur, il entra en communication
avec les génies de la forêt et de la brousse; celles-ci n’avaient pas de secrets pour lui, il fut
aimé de Kondolon Ni Sané.14 Ses disciples étaient si nombreux qu’il les constitua en une

In the region of Kolda, directly south of the Gambia, the term “Saareh” is used to mean the village of so and so, that
is the name of a clan or an individual. “Keur” on the other hand appears in the area north of the Gambia, in the Wolof
region of Kaolack and Diourbel. The term means literally “house.”
10
See, Djibril T. Niane, Histoire des Mandingues de l’ouest: Le royaume du Gabou (Paris: Editions Karthala et Arsan,
1989), p. 88.
11
Djibril Tamsir Niane, Soundjata ou l’épopée mamdingue (Paris: Présence africaine, 2015 [1960]), p. 14; “…they
come from the East” (Niane, Sundiata p.2).
12
Lawalo is presented as the eldest of Bilal Bunama’s seven sons who journeyed and settled in Mali, see Niane,
Soundjata p. 14; Niane, Sundiata p. 2. The Ethiopian slave Bilaal ibn Rabaah was a Companion of the Prophet. Bilaal
was also the name of the first Muezzin. See Diop, Glossaire du roman sénégalais p. 80.
13
Niane, Soundjata p. 16; Niane, Sundiata p. 3.
14
“Kondolon Ni sané is a dual hunting deity. Kondolon is a god of the chase and has Sané as an inseparable
companion,” according to Niane, Sundiata 86.
9
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armée qui devint redoutable; il les réunissait souvent dans la brousse et leur enseignait l’art
de la chasse. … Grâce à la force de ses disciples il devint roi d’un vaste pays.15
It appears in this quote that although Mamadi’s occult powers had a significant impact on his
community and clearly contributed in his gaining kingship, the reverse process, in my view, is
more decisive. There is a strong sense that power is not isolated at all, in which case any given
community member could monopolize it and use it as they wish. Rather, power seems to lie within
the community that grants it or approves of the individual chosen. As I highlighted in the same
quote, “la force de ses disciples” is without doubt what caused his renown, and propelled him
ultimately to the throne. His newfound leadership and title, therefore, seem to be very much
premised on the society of Mandingo hunters that gathered around him, and acknowledged him as
leader of their community. In fact, it adds to his credence and merit vis-à-vis his community when
besides his mystic powers, he equally possesses the attributes of a medicine man: “C’est lui qui
révéla aux chasseurs les feuilles médicinales qui guérissent les blessures et les maladies.”16 John
Mbiti makes an interesting remark when he asserts: “To African societies, the medicine-men are
the greatest gift and the most useful source of help.”17 It then makes perfect sense that, in view of
Mamadi’s resourcefulness, the Mandingo community of hunters elects him as their king. Mbiti’s
study once again provides further insights when he notes: “Where these rulers are found, they are
not simply political heads, they are the mystical and religious heads, the divine symbol of their
people’s health and welfare.”18 Mbiti’s statement can certainly be submitted to verification. The

Niane, Soundjata pp. 15-16 (emphasis mine): “It was he who invented the hunter’s whistle; he communicated with
the jinn of the forest and bush,. These spirits had no secrets from him and he was beloved by Kondolon Ni Sané. His
followers were so numerous that he formed them into an army which became formidable; he often gathered them
together in the bush and taught them the art of hunting. … Thanks to the strength of his followers, he became king of
a vast country” (Niane, Sundiate p. 3).
16
Niane, Soundjata p. 16; “It was he who revealed to hunters the medicinal leaves which heal wounds and cure
diseases” Niane, Sundiata p. 3.
17
See, John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (New York: Praeger), p. 166.
18
Mbiti, African Religions p.182.
15
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succession issue in Sundiata has been resolved in certainly not the strangest fashion when looked
through traditional lens. Sundiata’s father, Maghan Kon Fatta, had inherited the throne and was
married to Sassouma Bérété, who is also described as the “fille d’un grand Marabout.”19 It would
have sufficed for Maghan that his progeny from this union would provide him with the right
successor when he reaches old age. For one thing, one could expect that the daughter of a “grand
Marabout” would benefit from the latter’s protection at least, and at most could inherit these
powers and pass them on to her offspring. Interestingly enough, the decision about who will
succeed king Maghan, unexpectedly does not emanate from Maghan, himself, it was rather
predicated on the hunter’s prophecy, as he proved knowledgeable in sorcery:
Or donc un jour que le roi comme à son habitude s’était installé sous le fromager20 entouré
de ses familiers, il vit venir vers lui un homme habillé en chasseur: il portait le pantalon
serré des favoris de Kondolon ni Sané, sa blouse cousue de cauris indiquait qu’il était
maître dans l’art de la Chasse.21
This is the instance that marked the encounter between king Maghan and the occult hunter. Upon
realizing the hunter’s skillful mastery in mysticism, the king’s griot Gnancouman Doua requested
that the latter share his knowledge since he had visited several lands. What follows is a stunning
revelation, one that will shape the future of the kingdom. The hunter seems clearly adamant about
his prophecy and urges the king to cooperate:

Niane, Soundjata p. 16; “daughter of a great divine” (Niane, Sundiata p. 3). A Marabout is someone deeply learned
in religious matters and often head of a Koranic school (Diop, Glossaire du roman sénégalais p. 364).
20
Possibly an anachronism. The silk Cotton or Kapok tree (Ceiba pentandra) is a native of Central and South America
and the Caribbean. Pickett says in a note that it was brought to West Africa by the Portuguese (Niane, Sundiata p. 87).
21
Niane, Soundjata p. 17; “Well now, one day when the king had taken up his usual position under the silk-cotton
tree surrounded by his kinsmen he saw a man dressed like a hunter coming towards him; he wore the tight-fitting
trousers of the favorites of Kondolon Ni Sané, and his blouse oversewn with cowries showed that he was a master of
the hunting art” (Niane, Sundiata p.4).
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Je vois venir vers ta ville deux chasseurs; ils viennent de loin et une femme les accompagne,
Oh, cette femme! Elle est laide, elle est affreuse. Elle porte sur le dos une bosse qui la
déforme, ses yeux exorbitants semblent posés sur son visage, mais, ô mystère des mystères,
cette femme, roi, tu dois l’épouser car elle sera la mère de celui qui rendra le nom de
Manding immortel à jamais…22
As I highlighted earlier with regard to Mamadi Kani’s ascent to power, it is clear, once again, that
the decision about who inherits or imparts power is not entirely in the hands of the sovereign. In
this particular case, the hunter, who is not a resident of Nianiba,23 is the one who guides the choice
of the king by telling him of the necessity to marry another woman who will give birth to the right
successor. At any rate, the fact that the prediction comes true, and that king Maghan agrees to
marry Sogolon when the two hunters bring her in, is quite telling of the power dynamic at work.
In this regard, Mbiti’s statement above proves correct since king Maghan, who is described as a
magnificent man, agrees to take Sogolon as his second wife. His concern for the growth, strength,
and prosperity of his kingdom seems to have taken precedence over his personal interest. Most
importantly, however, Maghan appears to have a strong belief in the occult sciences, referred
sometimes as traditional religions. When discussing Fulani and Bambara religious traditions,
Amadou Hampathé Bâ mentions the existence of a Supreme Being who is believed to be remotely
located in the heavens, and thus not directly accessible.

24

It follows that to establish

communication with this distant god, man in the Fulani and Bambara religious traditions must

Niane, Soundjata p. 20 (my emphasis); “I see two hunters coming to your city; they have come from afar and a
woman accompanies them. Oh, that woman! She is ugly, she is hideous, she bears on her back a disfiguring hump.
Her monstrous eyes seem to have been merely laid on her face, but, mystery of mysteries, this is the woman you must
marry, sire, for she will be the mother of him who will make the name of Mali immortal for ever” (Niane, Sundiata p.
6; my emphasis).
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(Niane, Soundjata p. 17).
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resort to intermediary agents in order to make request or send praises. In this particular context, it
seems that the hunter has entered into communication with one of those ‘intermediary agents’ in
order to receive the prophecy. It thus makes sense that king Maghan, being aware of the religious
apparatus of the Mandingo beliefs, vows to strictly follow the command.
In the Epic of Kelefaa Saane, on the other hand, the narrative provides few details regarding
the founding of the kingdom of Badoora. However a close reading points to essential clues that
inform about the nature of power in the kingdom. Sanka the great is described as the founder of,
if not, the one who began political leadership in, Quinara. Now, the question at hand is to find out
how Sanka the great became the king, and what characteristics did he demonstrate which earned
him kingship. Once again, with scarce textual information, my assessment here is based primarily
on the West African social and cultural patterns as I mentioned at the very beginning of this section,
which correlates with Barry’s assessment on the formation of Senegambian societies. In fact, he
writes: “Politically, societies here were initially organized along kinship lines. Later, they shifted
to a monarchical system based on violence and inequality.”25 One can highlight here a striking
similarity concerning the peopling of Quinara26 as the text establishes:
Bari Kelefaa mu Kaabunkóo27 le ti;
A faamaaa bota Payunku28 le.

Mu ne ye a sii Kiinara?
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Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 26.
This is the location where Sanka the great settled, though later the royal family appears to have moved to Badoora
for unspecified reasons.
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From the kingdom of Kaabu, i.e. a Mandinka (Camara, Kelefaa Saane p. 167).
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Situated in the northeast region of Guinea-Bissau (Camara, Kelefaa Saane p. 167).
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Sànka Baa!29
It is very likely, though not textually confirmed, that Sanka may have been an influential figure
typical of African traditional patriarchal figures. The fact that Kelefaa’s father, Ntubang Saane
goes to stay with him indicates, to some degree, Sanka’ social status and the importance of family
ties in this particular context.
In African traditional society man is set to fulfill important responsibilities. 30 This is
reflected in many cultural traditions 31 where he is taught important aspects of life. On other
occasions, these traditions are set out as a mandatory process through which and after which male
individuals enter into adulthood to begin a new cycle where new responsibilities await them. The
circumcision and initiation rites are common examples that show the importance traditional
societies vest in their members. During these two events, critical information is provided, and the
initiated are put under rigorous training, as I, myself recall going through the Joola initiation rite.32
Thus, Ntubang Saane’s decision to join his brother-in-law, Sanka the great, does imply a sense of
authority as well as of trust.33 For, the concept of patronage as it appears here and in general,
implies that patrons hold important credence, whether of knowledge, power, or craftsmanship.34 It
is therefore logical to assume that Sanka the great must have been an influential patriarch both in
the family and authorial sense, though both are often linked. The first refers specifically to the fact
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But Keleefaa is a Kaabunka. / His father is originally from Payunku. / Why did he come to settle in Quinara? / Sanka
the Great [is the reason.] (Camara Kelefaa Saane lines 82-85, p. 6-7) Sanka Nanki was king of Badoora birikaama and
the grandfather of Kelefaa Saane (Camara Kelefaa Saane p. xix). In the glossary, Camara Kelefaa Saane p. 184, Sanka
Nanki is listed as the maternal uncle of Kelefaa Saane. This must be a mistake as he was the uncle of his father (see
Camara Kelefaa Saane lines 156-60, pp. 10-11).
30
See Amadou Hampathé Bâ, Aspects de la civilization africaine, p. 2.
31
See Amadou Hampathé Bâ, Aspects de la civilization africaine chapter 1, p. 13; and John Mbiti, African Religions
chapter 12, p. 121.
32
Initiation is mandatory to every Joola. Men and women have separate initiation rituals The Joola or Diola people
live in the south of Senegal in the region of Bass–Casamance in the region between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.
See Diop, Glossaire du roman sénégalais pp. 168-69.
33
Ntubang Saane is Kelefaa Saane’s father (Camara Kelefaa Saane lines 156, p. 10-11).
34
See Isidore Okpewho, African Oral Literature: Background, Characters, and Continuity (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1992), p. 21.
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that Sanka may have been the head of a large family or lineage and may have eventually settled in
Quinara if he in fact did not establish the community. And keeping Barry’s assessment in mind,35
one can contend, as far as the growth of Quinara is concerned, that the population was made up
both of Sanka’s offsprings, individuals who are closely and remotely related to him, and ‘strangers’
who may have no familial ties whatsoever with him. The second, which is often related to the first,
is one by which influential individuals such as Sanka are often endowed with some form of occult
power. Far from denoting evil, the possession of occult powers seems fundamental in building a
community and ensuring its welfare.
To a great extent, African traditional societies are often reported to be replete with good
and or evil forces as Mbiti suggests in the following: “The majority of peoples hold that the spirits
dwell in the woods, bush, forest, rivers, mountains, or just around the villages.” 36 The foundation
of a human community, as a result, often presupposes the possession of some form of occult
science, which, among other things, helps determine the interactions with the type of forces in a
specific area. Concurrently, founders of a human community may also resort to offerings for these
forces in order to obtain their approval prior to establishing the proposed settlement. In fact, Mbiti
provides an interesting account.37 During the construction of a harbor at Tema, near Accra, one of
the European supervisors complained to J. H. Neal, the chief Investigations Officer about a small
tree which the working crew and their mechanical devices fail to pull up. According to the African
foreman, this was a ‘magical’ tree. Finally, a diviner was summoned, who instructed that an animal
sacrifice and offerings be made before the tree could eventually be pulled out. This small tree,
according to the foreman, was inhabited by a spirit, which made the tree impossible to remove.
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See Barry, Senegambia p. 26.
Mbiti, African Religions, p. 80.
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See Mbiti, African Religions chapter 16, p. 195.
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Thus the sacrifice and offering made to the spirit caused it to forsake the tree and move to a
different one. Thus, as I mentioned earlier, concerning the chieftaincy and authority of Sanka, the
possession of some form of mystic science seems imperative for the foundation and preservation
of communal life. Mbiti’s earlier assessment that rulers in African traditional society are “the
mystical and religious heads” of the community is very telling regarding the place and importance
of mystical knowledge and its related areas. In her study of the Mandingo kingdoms of the
Senegambia, Charlotte Quinn notes that the rulers “were the heads of lineages long-settled in the
states, lineages whose growing membership and associated ‘stranger’ groups had spread to villages
through the surrounding bush until the lineage leader had an entire district under his authority.”38
In my analysis above, I made the point that Sanka is very likely to be the founder of Quinara,
and that he gained chieftaincy as a result of his social status and the safety he is able to provide to
those around him.
In Aminatta Forna’s novel from 2006, Ancestor Stones,39 the concept of chieftaincy, as in
previous two works, follows a very similar pattern. As the founder of Rofathane, Umaru Gibril
Kholifa had become de facto its chief. The following except is quite insightful: “One day our father
informed his uncles that he had decided to leave the place where we lived to start a plantation. The
land was there, you see. And so we left to found our own village.”40 In this quote, it appears that
the motive behind Kholifa’s decision to found a village of his own is none other but his desire to
start a plantation. However, as I showed with the example of Sanka the great, here, too, a form of
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Charlotte A. Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 37.
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Aminatta Forna, Ancestor Stones (New York: Grove, 2006). Forna was born in Scotland. Her father, Mohamed
Sorie Forna, was among 14 senior army and government officials executed by the Government of Siaka Stevens in
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recounted in The Devil that Danced on Water: A Daughter’s Quest (New York: Grove Press, 2002).
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social credence precedes the ability to hold power. First of all, Asana’s narrative 41 unveils a
important detail that helps determine the status of Umaru Kholifa and the people of his community:
We were the descendants of swordsmen who came from the North. Holy men and warriors
led by a Queen who blew in with the harmattan on horseback from Futa Djallon, dreaming
of an empire that stretched from the desert to the sea. They never reached the sea. The
horses shied and started.42
It becomes apparent here that the Kholifa descended from a line of holy conquerors, who had been
seeking to expand their imperial domination. Given that this event is undated, it remains virtually
impossible to pinpoint any specific time period to which to attribute its occurring. However, textual
details are significant enough for me to fairly confidently assert that, based on their assigned or
self-assigned mission, the holy conquerors may well have built their own power or imposed their
domination over any community that had the misfortune to be on, or close to, their path. The
likelihood of this possibility is significant enough since their mounts failed them, “they were
stranded” and “they couldn’t return to their homelands,” 43 Additionally, prior to Kholifa’s
founding of his own village, he played an important role in in the community. Asana’s account is
once again critical. Prior to making their way to their new settlement, she affirms: “Every day my
father sat in the courtroom listening to the disputes of men who laid down two coins to place their
grievances before the elders. People respected him; he became chief advisor to the obai.”44 He also
often paid the debts of individuals, and in return took their sons as indentured servants. As chief
advisor to the “obai,’ or head-man, Kholifa is arguably either related to the royal family, or a
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The narrative is divided between the four daughters of Kholifa, Asana, Mariama, Hawa, and Serah, who tell their
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distinguished member of the nobility. The latter option however seems more likely since in African
traditional societies the successors to the throne are often chosen from the royal family or closest
relatives, though at other times, the choice is determined through a council of elders.45 Whatever
the case might be, it is clear that Kholifa belongs to a group of influential individuals. In fact,
Kholifa had been instrumental in electing the obai, “…because he had helped him win the
chieftaincy elections.”46 In return for his support, the chief provided Kholifa with men to help him
when time came for him to settle in his new village. It is thus fair to assume that Kholifa’s ability
to acquire land of his own to begin his plantation is facilitated by his social ranking. In a way, he
must have been certain to get support from the chief, the obai, but also to utilize his influence and
network to ensure his project comes to fruition. The magnitude of his project is such that it requires
significant resources, which he manages to gather owing primarily to his elite social status.
His influence and renown, on the other hand, equally plays an important part. As with
Sanka the great, Kholifa is also able to attract people in his sphere of influence. Besides his wives,47
other individuals follow him such as Asana’s grandmother: “Behind us came karabom, my
grandmother who had left her own house to follow her daughter to this new place”;48 and one can
further read: “Soon after we arrived, other people followed: a blacksmith, a carpenter, a herbalist,
extra hands to plant the beans we had brought, fingers to pluck the ones that would grow.”49 Thus
an entire society has ultimately taken shape where initially only few individuals lived. The fact
that Kholifa’s village populated so quickly also testifies to his power, social status, and overall
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credence as a highly ranked member of society. In this regard both Mbiti and Quinn50 are right in
their assessment of political leadership in traditional society. In this section, as I highlighted at the
very beginning, the objective was to show that the exercise of power in African traditional society
is deeply rooted in socio-cultural realities. The following section while continuing on the same
logic discusses an important element that plays an equally critical role towards the construction
and preservation of power.

2.2

Mysticism.
I shall begin with a broad, yet insightful statement by Mbiti, which helps contextualize my

discussion here. Mbiti argues: “Africans are notoriously religious, and each people has its own
religious system with a set of beliefs and practices. Religion permeates into all the departments of
life so fully that it is not easy or possible always to isolate it.”51 It is important to highlight that the
term ‘religion’ as employed here is referred elsewhere as ‘animism’ or ‘paganism’ depending on
the perceptions and views of the author toward traditional African beliefs and practices. For
instance, Arab merchants and scholars52 have repeatedly, and over a long period characterized as
paganism practices such as the worship of idols, animals, or shrines. 53 However, the purpose here
is rather to discuss select examples and assess both their symbolic and practical meaning with
regards to power and leadership within traditional society.
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In his evaluation of African belief systems, Sulayman Nyang writes: “Man, in traditional
African cosmology is caught in a triangular matrix of spiritual relationship. There are first the
unbreakable ties to the Supreme Being who created the earth and everything therein for man and
his progeny,” and, what follows next is strikingly similar to Bâ’s viewpoint54 since Nyang further
argues, “…man has to maintain correct relationship with the lesser entities within the spiritual
kingdom.”55 One can draw a clear parallel between Nyang and Bâ’s viewpoints. Both underscore
the existence of a Supreme Being as well as lesser entities, which Bâ refers to as “agents
intermédiares.” But it is crucially important to highlight the fundamental necessity for the
traditional African individual to obey these entities. For, failure to do so put their life and
environment altogether at risk and can ultimately cause major disruption.56 In both epics, power
appears to be linked to greater forces, both spirits and divinities. This phenomenon manifests in a
number of ways.
In Soundjata ou l’épopée mandingue, for instance, the connection between the ruler and
the higher power reflects through the silk-cotton tree. One can, in fact, read: “Dans sa capitale
Nianiba il aimait souvent s’asseoir au pied du grand fromager qui dominait son palais de Canco.”57
The characterization of the tree as ‘grand’ distinguishes it from other common trees both from its
physical shape and its symbolic meaning. With reference to religious attributes of trees, Mbiti
remarks: “There are sacred groves and other trees, including the sycamore and the baobab used for
religious purposes or associated with God and other spiritual beings.”58
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First of all, the silk cotton tree and the baobab are imposing in size, and have served various
purposes in African traditional societies and continue to do so to this day. In a number of societies
in the Sahel region59 of West Africa, the baobab tree60 serves as a place of gathering, especially
those that bring together the whole village. 61 Its size and magnitude seem to suggest that the
baobab can provide guidance and direction in time of crisis given its dominating height over other
smaller trees in the surroundings. Another interesting aspect of the baobab is its need for little
water, and its ability to survive in arid or semi-arid areas such as the Sahel where rainfall is scarce
and temperatures are high.
The silk-cotton tree featured in Soundjata, arguably, plays a similar role although it belongs
to a different species and bears a slightly different name. Just like the baobab, its height may also
be indicative of a place of gathering and highest authority. It is thus not surprising that the hunter
from Sangaran heads straight to the silk-cotton tree to give to king Maghan his share of game as
custom dictates: “Or donc un jour que le roi comme à son habitude s’était installé sous le fromager
entouré de ses familiers, il vit venir vers lui un homme habillé en chasseur.”62 It seems that the
hunter has a clear idea where to find the king, and thus wastes no time asking around or getting
lost. As I mentioned in reference to the baobab, the silk-cotton tree equally bears meaning here
since the king and his kinsmen are gathered there as part of their customary routine. It is thus no
false statement to maintain that king Maghan might have designated this tree as the location for
his gatherings with the inhabitants of Niani, for its height and magnitude suggest solid foundations

The word derives from the Arabic word (sāhil) meaning the shore. Here it refers to region situated on the shore of
the Sahara desert.
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and strong leadership. In fact, the analogy between giant trees and power is perfectly illustrated
through Sundiata’s awakening. After years of physical handicap, and inflicted mockery on the part
of his mother’s co-wife, Sassouma, Sundiata achieves an extraordinary feat as he gains the ability
to walk. Even more stunning is how he is able to pull out a young baobab tree and bring it in front
of his mother’s hut: “D’un tour de bras, le fils de Sogolon arracha l’arbre et le mit sur ses épaules
et s’en retourna auprès de sa mère.”63 In this instance, the metamorphosis of Sundiata is virtually
complete because he is transformed into a formidable being, whose show of force removes all
doubts over his physical prowess among his peers and society at large. His ability to tear up the
baobab tree seems to signal to everyone that nothing will stand in his way, that he is fully endowed
with such great physical force which has so far remained invisible.
On a spiritual and religious plane, however, trees are sometimes described as dwelling
places of spirits and other invisible forces. I gave earlier the example of the construction of the
harbor in Nema, near Accra, where mechanical devices failed to remove a small tree simply
because a spirit inhabited it, and would not leave until an animal sacrifice and libations were
offered. An anecdote from my own personal experience might certainly fit and further elucidate
the phenomenon. There once stood a thick old tree, leafless for the greater part of the year, near
the elementary school I attended. During my school years, I kept hearing frightening stories about
how a spirit dwelling in that tree would appear in strange shapes to individuals walking in the area.
Though I had never set eyes on this spirit, I was vigorously urged to avoid the place especially
during the night hours. Until the tree was felled a few years ago, many individuals were certain
that it hosted a malevolent spirit. Now, it is almost needless to say that my fear and that of other

Niane, Soundjata p. 47; “With all his might the son of Sogolon tore up the tree and put it on his shoulders and went
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individuals in the neighborhood is one informed by our shared belief that spirits do exist, and some
of them do indeed dwell inside of trees.
In The Epic of Kelefaa Saane, many textual references suggest a clear connection between
the power of the throne and the world of spirits. Interestingly, this connection takes place at the
Maaribantang,64 the importance of which is encapsulated in the following excerpt:
bantaóo be Badóora Birikaama,
I ka a fo jée Maaribanta.
Ni mu mansayaata,
A ka tiiña wó bantaóo le koto.
Wó le a tinna i ka a fo ñancóol ye maaróo,
Saane Balaamaóol ye maaróo.65 (Camara 164- 169)
The singularity and special character of this cotton tree is reflected in its name, referred to here as
Maaribantang. I must highlight, however, that the English translation makes it hard to perceive the
important linguistic aspect found in the Mandinka text, which establishes a direct relationship
between the cotton tree and the military authority. The word, bantaóo, which means cotton tree,
is lexically transformed because it is prefixed by the noun maaróo (warrior), and becomes thus
Maaribanta. Thus, this term is a clear combination of the two Mandinka words, and literally
stands for ‘the warrior’s cotton tree’. It then appears that the word is coined to reflect specifically
the status and function of this particular tree. As a result, its lexical significance distinguishes it
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would spend the day under that cotton tree. /That’s why they call the princes warriors, /The Saane Balaamag, warriors.
(Camara Kelefaa Saane lines 164-69, pp. 10-11))
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from other similar trees, but more importantly, its significance crystallizes its particularity and
peculiarity.
The spiritual element of this cotton tree, like the silk-cotton tree in Sundiata, appears
through its practical functions. It is by essence the place where every king of Badoora who ascends
to the throne must sit. This phenomenon, in itself, when considered from a temporal perspective,
is historical because by maintaining the tradition, the people of Badoora and the ruling cohort have
continually linked themselves to their past and to the spirit of the founders of the kingdoms who
had established this practice.
The connection to the past equally manifests itself through the spiritual medium. I
highlighted above the special character of the tree. Further textual indications do corroborate as in
the following:
Wó bantaóo koto, ni i be tiiñandi jéé,
I be dolo mióo la, kàccaa be kuma la,
Keñefaylaal si keñóo fay,
Kurrufaylaal ye kuuruóo fay.
Ye jalaóol ñininkaa:66
By gathering underneath the cotton tree, king Sanka Nanki, and his entourage seem to be engaged
in a ritual act of communication with the spirits, which are referred in the quote as jalaóol
(“genies” or “spirits”). Thus, the cotton tree has become all the more symbolic, as it appears to be
the dwelling place of the spirits and the location par excellence of communion between the leading
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elite of Badoora and the higher powers. Therefore, it makes sense that king Sanka spends the day
at this particular site for it provides knowledge about the higher world of the spirits and reinforces
the link with them, which in turn ensures a sense of protection. Moreover, this is actually
exemplified on a number of occasions, as for example when Kelefaa’s father, Nfalli, sometimes
referred to as Ntubang, receives a major revelation from the soothsayers who all make the same
statement:
Jalantiyóol ni kuurufaylaal ni keneboylaal67
I si ñi fo Nfalli ye, ko,
I be dióo soto la.
Bari wó dióo, ni a wuluuta.
A la kulliyóo te i tara la i ni i niyóo la dunyaa.68
The certainty of this revelation is such that one must wonder how the soothsayers got this
information, and what convinced them that their information is absolutely correct. In order to fully
understand this actual phenomenon, one needs to look again into traditional African religions
where this practice seems well rooted. Concerning religious intermediaries, Mbiti states: “Some
societies have seers, ‘prophets’ and oracles (…) It seems that their main duties are to act as ritual
elders, to give advice on religious matters (…) to receive messages from divinities and spirits.”69
Mbiti’s statement helps clarify the ways and means through which the soothsayers are able to
obtain such critical information since the communication channels with spirits and other higher

67

These are three different classes of soothsayer. One consults directly with the spirits, one reads the cowrie shells,
and the third interprets marks in the sand.
68
The three soothsayers / Would say this to Nfalli / “You will have a child. / “But after the birth of this child, / “You
will die before the day of his naming ceremony.” (Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 221-24, pp. 12-13). Kulliyóo is a
ceremony which takes place seven days after the child’s birth when it is given its first haircut (Camara, Kelefaa Saane
p. 167).
69
Mbiti, African Religions p. 68 (my emphasis).

29
powers also involves receiving information from them. The keñefaylaal with his lines in the sand
and the kurrufaylaal with his cowry shells are part and parcel of the divination process whereby
the religious practitioner, who has gone through rigorous training, is able to decipher messages,
events, and other information pertaining to both the present and future. As strange as it may seem,
the “lines drawn in the sand” and the “cowry shells” are the vehicles through which spirits and
other minor divinities communicate to the intermediary agent, the soothsayers in this case.
Consequently, as this quotation encapsulates it perfectly: “Oracles are generally the mouthpieces
of divinities and spirits.”70 This statement makes complete sense since intermediary agents are the
only ones capable of understanding messages from these divinities before they are further relayed
to their communities.
The idea that the exercise of power needs a connection to and support of a higher entity
such as divinities and spirits seems all too common in African traditional context.71 The kingship
of Badoora in the Epic of Kelefaa Saane appears to have achieved that through the cotton tree, the
Maaribantang. Elsewhere, the necessity of establishing one’s own symbolic site is most visible
through the actions of the protagonist himself, Kelefaa. It is essential, however, to underscore the
social construction of power in this particular kingdom before delving further into the analysis. In
this regard the text informs us:
Kaabunkóol ko tiyadióo
Ni tiyafatóo ni tiyakesóo
Ni ye a móy tiyadióo wól lom ñancóol ti.
Kaatu ñancóol mu sii saba le ti, Saane ni Maane.
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Saane dóol bi jéé ñancóol lom bari i mu kamansayaa.
Maane dóol bi jéé ñancóol lom bari i mu kamansayaa.72
The information is of critical importance because as a member of the Saane family, although
related to the royal family through his mother, Kelefaa belongs to the small nut; in other words he
can never ascend to power. He holds no legitimacy as far the societal framework of political power
is concerned. Thus, he seeks to circumvent the social obstacle by charting a route of his own, which
he believes will ultimately propel him to the throne. Just as the Badoora kingship has established
Maaribantang as their symbolic site, Kelefaa also finds it imperative to set a space for himself in
order to garner legitimacy and recognition. After his young peers elect him king of the children,
he makes the following statement:
A ko i ye, al ye a lo n’te barimma, Sànka Nànki, mansa lom?
I ko a ye xaa!
A ko i ye, bii ’te fana mu mansa le ti.
Koloóo be Badóór Birikaama,
I ko a fo a ye Mansakolo,
A ko i ye, mbarimma be Maaribanta
Mansakééwóo ka tiiña wo le to.

’te noosó mbi taa ke la Mansakolo ne.73

“The people of Kaabu mention the small nut, / The nutshell and the peanut. / When you hear the small nut, it
designates the princes. / The princes are divided into three categories, Saane and Maane. / Some Saanes become
princes, but they don’t ascend to the crown. / Some Maanes become princes, but they don’t ascend to the crown”
(Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 34-39, pp. 4-5).
73
He said: “You know that my uncle, Sanka Nanki, is king?” / They responded: “Yes.” / He said to them: “Well, me
too, I am king today.” / There is a well in Badoora Birikaama, / They call it Mansakolong. / He said to them: “My
uncle is in Maaribantang. / “It’s where the king spends the day. / “I am going to have my party at Mansakolong.”
(Camara, Kelefaa Saane Lines 701-08, pp. 36-37).
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The location Kelefaa chooses to host his party, which I shall discuss briefly, deserves further
elucidation. Once again, the semantic relevance of the word Mansakolong is not addressed in the
English translation, rather tucked away in the notes at the end of the epic.74 Mansakolong, just like
Maaribantang, is a compound noun. Its first segment “Mansa” stands for king in the Mandinka and
Joola (Dyola) languages, and the second part, “kolong’ signifies a well. Thus, its complete English
translation would be “the king’s well.” It then appears that there is a deliberate attempt on the part
of Kelefaa to surpass his uncle’s authority. Because there is no doubt that between “Maaribantang”
and “Mansakolong” a difference of status is perceptible. When placed side by side and compared
linguistically, the two words yield respectively “the warriors’ cotton tree’ and “the king’s well.”
Kelefaa’s belief in his unequalled talent seems to have dictated his choice of a place of higher
status both semantically and symbolically.
The significance of Maaribantang, “The warriors’ cotton tree” suggests a collective domain,
where the king and his allies get together daily to perform what I referred to earlier as a ritual
performance. On the one hand, king Sanka Nanki and the princes are engaged in much talking and
wine drinking while, on the other hand the diviners, equipped with various tools, seem to be busy
communicating with the spirits. Thus, Maaribantang, is to a large extent, the embodiment of power
and authority within the traditional society. As such it has a similar role to that played by Nianiba
in Soundjata. King Sanka also resorts to a similar pattern of rule by which an entire body of both
visible and invisible beings come together for no other purpose than to continue a tradition that
seems to have been there ever since the foundation of the kingdom itself.
Mansakolong, where Kelefaa has established his domain is somewhat different in
comparison. Because, as its meaning suggests, it is “the king’s well,” which denotes a high degree
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of individualism and almost total self-reliance. Contrary to Maaribantang, Kelefaa’s site features
him as the prime chief, who needs no aides or assistance. And in fact, it appears an interesting
relationship of possession between, on the one hand, the object, here, the well, and on the other
hand, the owner, the king. The symbolism of the well in the traditional context of this epic can be
described, in my view, in two ways. As one of the most reliable sources of drinking water, wells
are crucially important for the survival of any community. Thus, general and continued demand
for water rendered the well a place of high traffic, where individuals would converge to supply
themselves and sometimes their animals with this essential liquid. The importance of the well
appears all too often as a trope especially within the Senegambian tales, where it symbolizes often
trials and tribulations for the protagonist.
Another point to take into account is that wells in general were scarce. It was not the type
of possession every household could afford to have for their own comfort. On the contrary, based
on its representation in the Senegambian tales and on their story lines,75 the communities featured
therein seem to possess often only a single well. On can then rightly assume that it was not the
easiest and cheapest project to undertake when one wanted to provide oneself with a well. In
southern Senegal, well diggers often come from a specific caste or group. The task of digging a
well is not common, and is therefore not open to all. I had heard, multiple times in my youth, and
these opinions continue to circulate even now, that individuals who dig wells are endowed with
mystic powers, which allow them to go deep underneath the ground. At any rate, the rarity of wells
is such that, one can imagine the power and prominence that come with its possession. Therefore,
there is also a strong social element to Kelefaa’s symbolic site. In fact, it suggests a fundamental
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relationship of dependency, which dictates that the rest of society is in desperate need of him, that
is, he who owns the well, holds actual power.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind, as I highlighted earlier, that Kelefaa’s site is
intrinsically individualistic and self-relying, whereupon it differs greatly from the traditional
authority of the Badoora Kingship that king Sanka symbolizes. Moreover, one can go even further
to characterize Kelefaa’s site as a mere replica, a total fabrication that holds little if any historical
credence except that of giving his rule a semblance of legitimacy. This, however, should not signify
that the protagonist is deprived of might and extraordinary power. In fact, a number of facts
indicate the opposite. His birth, which was predicted by the soothsayers, turned out to be a major
event. The death of his father and the animal visits from Koose,76 following his birth testifies
indeed to the unusualness of his coming into the world. Even more stunning and extraordinary is
his ability to interact with beasts and spirits such as the Jinn girl with whom he enters into a
marriage contract.77 Despite his characteristics and feats, Kelefaa’s domain of power and prowess
do not entitle him to, and cannot fit him within, the traditional scheme of power. However, his
understanding of the Badoora political system and its requirements seems to have guided him
aright towards erecting the pillars of his counter-authority. Thus, structurally speaking,
Mansakolong is a near perfect replica of Maaribantang, although being connected with an
individual rather than a community renders it more individualistic, and, to some degree, selfserving than its rival. From a functional standpoint, Mansakolong is undoubtedly a failure in that
it does not lead to the establishment of a recognizable, socially acceptable, and permanent power
structure.

76

It is a location now in Guinea-Bissau situated north of Badoora, as shown in Map 2 in the introduction Camara,
Kelefaa Saane p. xvii.
77
Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 858-949, pp. 44-49.

34
The first and most visible element missing at Mansakolong is religious entity and the
performance of any rituals which could have indicated a sense of the holiness of the site and its
linkage with the higher powers. Instead, what filters through is a complete fiasco since Kelefaa
and his army of young boys can find no satisfaction except in destruction and causing anxiety and
anger. The following lines show the scope of their ill-intentioned project:
A ko i ye ’na Mansakolo ja,
Siiséé te domo la ja koteke.
I ko a ye, saayi Kelefaa, mu ka mu ne domo la?
A ko i ye baa mutóo le siita ni saaji mutóo.78
It appears in this excerpt that Mansakolong serves no greater purpose than that of slaughterhouse.
After satiating themselves with chicken, Kelefaa and his friends upgrade their food choice and turn
toward meat of cattle which will have to be taken by force. Thus, rather than actively seeking
commonsensical alternative ways to redefine and possibly reshape power, which could influence
the perspectives of the Badoora society, Kelefaa and his cohort seem to have chosen the anti-social
approach to impose their authority. Consequently, though not the least surprising, their actions
produced the following effect:
Cóócóo wilita saatewóo kono.
Xaa, saayi Kelefaa ye siiséél bula le,
A ni wandi baal lel be ñóo la a ni saajiyóol.
Cubulu cabalóo siyaata saate kono.79

He said: “Here in Mansakolong, / “No one will eat chicken again.” / They asked him: “So what are we going to eat
now, Kelefaa?” / He responded: “It is high time we captured goats and sheep. (Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 776-79,
pp. 40-41).
79
The gossiping began in town: / “Well, Kelefaa has abandoned the chickens. / Now he has taken to the goats and
sheep of the people. / The gossip started from all sides” (Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 784-87, pp. 40-41, my
emphasis).
78
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Such a reaction from the society may seem banal, especially when the individuals involved here
are only children, and thus arguably not fully aware of the social laws and restrictions. Even though
this reasoning makes sense, it is worth noting in most African traditional societies80 children are
taught through various means, and are expected to abide by the laws, social norms and to adopt
good conduct. In this particular regard, the response of the Badoora society to the doings of Kelefaa
and his followers is one of complete awe: “Cubulu cabalóo siyaata saate kono” (The gossip started
from all sides). It seems that in their incapacitated state, they can find no better course of action
but gossip.
Gossiping in this specific instance functions as a powerful and an unambiguous response,
which is not the least effective. Mbiti, in this regard, writes: “The words of parents, for example
carry ‘power’ when spoken to children: they cause good fortune, curse, success, peace, sorrows or
blessings, especially when spoken in moments of crisis.”81 As such, and given the clear context
that caused the gossip, it is certainly not false to contend that Kelefaa’s project ultimately fails.
For, it brings down upon him and his enterprise the curse of Badoora people.
Finally, as I conclude this segment on mysticism, it is essential that I summarize central
points. The concept of power in traditional society is deeply rooted in the collective belief in
mysticism. And for any power entity to successfully rule, it needs to be anchored in a mystic
apparatus from which it can gain timely and critical information about the present and the future.
But most importantly, mysticism is fundamentally part of the religious practice and belief. As such,
based on the established scale and the method of communication between human beings and the
higher powers, mystics end up playing a key role in the transmission of messages to and from the
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divinities, hence their undisputed place in the scheme of traditional power. In Sundiata and The
Epic of Kelefaa Saane the importance of these individuals is visible, as I showed in my analysis.
Kelefaa’s failure to rise up as serious contender against his uncle, King Sanka, can be attributed in
part to his choice of a site for his “capital” that has no connection to the spirit world. At
Mansakolong, no religious rites were performed and it served as a place for feasting on the goats
and sheep taken by force from the surrounding countryside which caused great distress to the
people of Badoora. The next section attempts to discuss Islam. My objective here is to analyze its
form, use, and symbolism vis-à-vis power in traditional society.

2.3

Islam.

It is essential, right from the outset, to highlight the fact that Islam, both as a religion and a cultural
phenomenon, is foreign to the people of the continent. Thus in comparison to other local
phenomena, such as traditional religions and customs, which have been there for centuries,82 Islam
initially had little if any cultural reference among local populations south of the Sahara. This,
among other reasons made it particularly difficult for these populations to embrace it
wholeheartedly, or even follow Islamic teachings in the most rigorous fashion. In fact a look into
history and early travel accounts83 suggests that Islam was introduced in the region through the
trans-Saharan trade as early as the eighth century.
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The encounter between Arab merchants and their southern counterparts clearly suggests
that commercial and cultural exchange took place primarily among prominent members of society
while the populace had little contact with the religion. A number of popular accounts testify to this
phenomenon. For instance, according to Al-Bekri,84 the king of Mali and his people converted to
Islam after a Muslim trader and missionary, a guest to the king himself, successful prayed for rain.
Following this, Al Bekri informs, the king ordered all idols to be broken and sorcerers to be
expelled. 85 This instance in fact crystallizes the relationship between what one might call the
Islamic agents and local authority. Islam seems to have always emerged as an external entity,
something, which is not part and parcel of the social, cultural, and religious fabric. Thus, its
representation within traditional societies is for the most part contained in the figure of the foreign
trader or cleric, and sometimes to a specific site such as the mosque. In this regard, Islam seems to
have been utilized more as a commodity than something in which individuals invested themselves
fully. Mungo Park’s account first published in 1799 during his stay in Mali is quite revealing of
this phenomenon. He relates how his host, a local trader, sought to procure from him a text that
could be inserted in a saphie (an amulet) as soon as he found out that he, Park, was a Christian. 86
In this example, it appears that the local trader is unable to set the difference between a Muslim
and a Christian, although he knows that both have a powerful book whose contents are effective
against malignant forces, which in a sense speaks to the level of instruction at the time and the
trader’s relationship with the religion.
In Sundiata, the evocation of Islam begins with the griot (bard), Mamadou Kouyaté, as he
recounts the origin of the people of Mali: “[Les] habitants du Manding, ne sont pas autochtones :
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ils viennent de l’Est. Bilali Bounama, l’Ancêtre des Kéita, était le fidèle serviteur du prophète
Mohammadou (que la Paix de Dieu soit sur lui). Bilali Bounama eut sept fils, l’ainé, Lawalo, partit
de la Ville sainte et vint s’établir au Manding…” 87 There appears here a deliberate attempt on the
part of the griot to attribute the inhabitants of Mali, a close connection to the Islamic Prophet by
making their ancestor figure one who travelled west from the holy city of Mecca. Now, whether
this is verifiable or not, is not the issue. It is certainly important to highlight that within the structure
of the West African epic, the griot is usually present in that he intervenes in the performance of
his poem, distributing praise or making comments depending on the make-up of his audience and
the circumstances surrounding his performance. Sana Camara made an enlightening remark to this
effect:
Length, then, may be governed by the narrator’s own view of what is important by the
context of the performance, including who is in the audience listening, or by a variety of
other consideration, such as, in recent times, how much audiotape remains on the reel or
how the narrator feels after several hours.88
It is certainly not accurate or advisable to disregard the bard’s added segments as being an
important part of the epic, nor would it do it justice to refer to these asides as paratext. Nonetheless,
it is important to distinguish within the text the segments where the bard griot adds his own
comments, viewpoints, or simply when he praises his patron, in order to avoid conflating these
with different parts of the story. The quote from Sundiata just given, which links the people of
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Mali to the Companions of the Prophet is likely to be an addition to the narrative though it is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine when this had occurred or who could be the author of it.
The fact that this epic and its protagonist, Sundiata, have over the centuries become the
very symbol of the modern nation of Mali may have affected some areas of the text. Moreover,
Mali had become such a Islamic stronghold with prominent religious cities89 that it should not be
as surprising that Islamic elements were added to the narrative, such as positioning the origin story
of the nation within Islamic history. However, within the core text, there are significant elements
that appear more reliable, and on which I shall now focus.
Other than Djeli [griot] Mamoudou’s opening remarks at the beginning of the epic, there
is no reference to Islam until the moment when the protagonist, Sundiata and his family take to
exile as their safety came under great risk. As they enter Wagadou,90 one reads: “[I]l y avait aussi
beaucoup de mosquées dans cette ville, cela n’avait rien d’étonnant pour Soundjata car il savait
que les Cissé, [the rulers of Ghana] étaient aussi de grands marabouts; à Niani il n’y avait qu’une
mosquée.”91 The religious character of the people of Wagadou is underscored first and foremost
by the plethora of mosques. Furthermore, this seemingly intrinsic character of the city and the
people of Wagadou contrasts markedly with that of Niani and its people given that there is found
only one mosque in the whole city. Additionally, Sundiata’s acknowledgement of the rulers of
Wagadou as being “grands marabouts,” suggests an implicit comparison between the latter and
arguably his own people of Niani. It is therefore relevant to maintain that Islam in Niani was very
shallow, given the scarcity of Islamic symbols and the absence of perceptible elements within the
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society that could be associated to Islam or be acknowledged as Islamic practices. The absence of
such references in Niani is self-revealing. Unlike the narrative segment about Niani that begins the
epic, that of Wagadou though shorter in length, has comparatively more information, which
suggests the importance and prominence of Islam which seems to be everywhere prevalent. In fact,
one major detail that clearly encapsulates the centrality of Islam within the Wagadou society
appears in the following statement: “Le roi était à la prière (…) Après la prière le roi rentra dans
son palais et reçut les étrangers.”92 In this specific instance, the description of king Soumaba Cissé
of Wagadou as the highest authority fulfilling his religious duties acts very much as a metonymy
for his entire kingdom. In Niani, by contrast, and despite the statement of the griot, Djeli
Mamoudou Kouyaté recounting the Islamic genealogy of Mali, there is absolutely no evidence that
show the king’s belonging, or having any allegiance to Islam. On the contrary, the opposite seems
to prevail given that, in light of its rituals and practices, Niani society appears to follow an unfailing
and unconditional cult of the traditional divinities. In his account of the king of Mali, Al-Omari93
contends that king Mansa Musa94 was not aware of the prohibition of marrying more than four
wives at one time. This information is especially useful when considered historically. King Mansa
Musa has, most likely, been the second or third successor of Sundiata since the latter’s rule ended
in 1255 according to David A. Chappell.95 It therefore makes sense to assume that Islam had little
influence among the inhabitants of Niani and Mali as a whole during Sundiata’s lifetime. In fact,
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all the tributary kingdoms of Mali where Sundiata and his family stayed during their exile have
barely any Islamic characteristics. For instance, the kingdom of Djedeba appears to be
metonymically described through its ruler: “Partis de Niani, Sogolon et ses enfants s’étaient arrêtés
à Djedeba chez le roi Mansa Konkon le grand sorcier.”96 Later, as the family proceeds to Tabon,
one learns: “[C]ette région était alors habitée par les Kamara forgerons et les Djallonkés.”97 In
light of the religious state of these two tributary kingdoms, one can rightly posit that the impact of
Islam in Niani and its surroundings was very minimal, if at all existent. For, it figures neither in
the political scheme, nor is it culturally represented. Furthermore, by highlighting the word
‘blacksmith’ it is my intention to show how this word is culturally loaded since it goes to the heart
of the very identity of Tabon. In his annotations to the English translation, and in reference to
traditional castes, G. D. Pickett writes: “After Islamization these castes held on to many of their
pagan practices and became feared for their occult powers (…) Hence in this book smiths are
mentioned as being great sorcerers or soothsayers.”98 As shown here, then, it bears little relevance
to assume that Islam had a significant presence and impact in Niani.
The Islamic religion, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, does not appear to be
closely knitted into the social fabric of Niani. On the contrary, in my view, Islam was considered
more as an external element that could be utilized for one’s own benefit, and when it suited one
best. In fact this seems to be the case with Sundiata. When time came for him conquer Niani back
from king, Soumaoro, who had defeated his half-brother, Dankaran Touman, Sundiata understood
quickly the tremendous support he could receive by showing allegiance to Islam or showing signs
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of conversion. As he prepared to live Mema, whose king, Moussa Tounkara, had given him half
his army, one reads: “A la tête de sa petite, mais redoutable armée, Soundjata, habillé à la manière
musulmane de Mema sortit de la ville. La population entière l’accompagnait de ses vœux.”99. And
when he and his army reached Wagadou, king Soumaba Cissé “donna au fils de Sogolon la moitié
de sa cavalerie et bénit les armes.”100 The fact that Sundiata is “habillé à la manière musulmane”
is highly significant and symbolic here. For, in doing so, he sends a clear message to the inhabitants
of Mema attesting his loyalty, as well as his Muslim identity. The reaction of the inhabitants, in
return, is equally strong and revealing of their emotional state; because, in this particular context
of war, sending “ses vœux” is undoubtedly as valuable as providing logistic support. The belief
among Muslims that nothing can be achieved without divine permission compels the faithful to
seek divine intervention through a process commonly understood as du’a.101 The individual can
thus make supplications for themselves or for somebody else in order to ensure their wishes are
fulfilled. Thus, the fact that the whole of Mema came out to make supplications for Sundiata “La
population entière l’accompagnait de ses vœux” adds much weight and increases his chances for
a successful outcome in his confrontation with Soumaoro.
Sundiata’s strategy reveals a clear cultural understanding of the milieu in which he finds
himself. For, he must have been aware that wearing a Muslim outfit would send a strong and
visible message to the soldiers assigned to him. Had the army been of a different make-up, then he
could have chosen a different cultural code to serve him just as successfully. This instance is
actually very reminiscent of an anecdote Lamin O. Sanneh gave about colonial education in The

Niane, Soundjata 90; “Sundiata dressed in the Muslim fashion of Mema, left the town at the head of his small but
redoubtable army. The whole population sent their best wishes with him” (Niane, Sundiata p. 48, my emphasis).
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Gambia. He relates how a colonial education officer, a maverick Irishman “…would follow the
women to their farms and tell them in his sanitized Mandinka that if they sent their children to
school then they could retire from their drudgery with the income of their educated offspring.”102
Here, in a manner comparable to Sundiata adopting Muslim dress, the colonial education officer
has resorted to using the Mandinka language in order to create a sense of rapprochement that would
inform the local women that he is not a foreigner at all, as they might think. Because, his ability to
speak Mandinka is the ultimate sign that showcases him as a member of their society, and not an
outsider As such, these cultural elements that define each people are very likely to vary depending
on the geographic location and the history of the people itself. Thus, for the inhabitants of Mema
and Wagadou, as the narrative shows, Islam appears to be the most significant feature. Sundiata’s
perfect understanding of these two societies and their cultural codes allows him to give an Islamic
dimension to his conflict with Soumaoro, the sorcerer king. This appears all the more relevant
since the Muslim king of Ghana, king Soumaba Cissé “donna au fils de Sogolon la moitié de sa
cavalerie et bénit les armes.” Sundiata has undoubtedly figured out the symbolic import of this act.
And in order to maintain the Islamic appearance of this conflict, he emphasizes these cultural codes
even further. In the middle of his armed confrontation with Soumaoro, he seems to be proudly
wearing yet another feature of Islamic dress: “on remarquait Djata de loin à son turban blanc.”103
However, as I have maintained already, it is difficult if not irrelevant to characterize Sundiata as a
devoted Muslim hero. For, neither his upbringing, nor the behavior of his society of Niani suggests
deep rooted Islamic practices, presence, or influence. Traditional religion, so to speak, was
entrenched in Niani, both with its divinities and human intermediaries. And Sundiata’s belief in
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their might and efficacy never dwindled, which could make one believe that he attributed no
greater importance to Islam other than it was a strong and meaningful component within his host
societies that had the potential to benefit him when he needed support the most.
In The Epic of Kelefaa Saane, the representation of Islam is multifarious, and thus
necessitates a clear and distinct elaboration. First of all, I would like to discuss a few cultural
details that help situate somewhat the Islamic phenomena within the epic. The name of Kelefaa’s
mother is Maryaama104 Nanki. From this, one might reasonably suppose that she has an Islamic
background or come under Islamic influence. However, it is also a bit puzzling when one seeks to
reconcile this name with practices that point directly towards local traditional religions and rituals.
Thus, it is fair to assume that Islam had been present at some point, and in some fashion in Quinara,
where Sanka the great settled. It is equally possible that the people of Badoora and its surroundings
had come in contact with Islam through the Mande merchants, commonly known as Dyula 105 or
Wangara106. In his study of Gabou, Niane writes: “Royaume animiste, le Gabou a cependant été
très tolérant. Si les musulmans étaient exclus du pouvoir, ils circulaient librement (musulman et
dioula étaient synonymes).107 The likely encounter between Muslim merchants and the people of
Kaabu in general is one that is rendered more plausible given that already in the fifteenth century
there arose a prominent Muslim town in the region,108 from where many missionaries departed
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towards other localities where they served both as traders and royal clerics. 109 In view of the
limited power of the Muslim clerics, who were excluded from taking any political function, one
can argue that whatever these clerics were able to achieve among rulers and populations could be
easily undone, just as a Muslim convert could revert back to ancient practices or stop observing
Islamic religious rituals. Thus, it is possible that Maryaama Nanki, and the whole Nanki family in
fact had once embraced Islam. But with the inexorable working of time within a predominantly
non-Islamic environment, the Nanki family might have just abandoned the Islamic religion and
reverted back to the old traditional practices.
Although the status of Islam as described by Niane may have been weak, it is nonetheless
true that Islam provided useful services to both local courts and the inhabitants. The ability of the
Muslim clerics to read and write in the Arabic language proved crucial within societies where
orality was the dominant, if not the only, form of communication. Thus, the clerics such as those
from the wangara/ dyula group were highly courted for both their literacy skills, as well as their
ability to provide protection.110 This means that some of the populations would have approached
Islam through a clientele-based relationship. In the early days of Islam in Senegambia, this might
have proven to be case, especially when local religions were entrenched within traditional power
structures, and served as a powerful protection. Thus, for Islam to have fit in these societies, it
must have needed to prove itself more reliable, and more efficacious than its traditional rival.
Consequently, one can assume, the Muslim clerics who settled in villages and towns, as the
Jakhanke clerics111 and Mande traders did, must have willingly “offered” their services to rulers

See Niane, Histoire des Mandingues de l’ouest p. 13.
See, Sékéné Mody Cissoko, Histoire de l’Afrique ooccidentale moyen-âge et temps modernes VIIe siècle—1850
(Paris: Présence Africaine, 1966), p. 12
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See Merwyn Hiskett, The Development of Islam in West Africa (London: Longman, 1984), 45-46.
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and the populace in order to show their talent, and secure a higher spot in the social ranking. This
phenomenon has been recorded

112

among historians, travellers, and even contemporary

sociologists. 113 As such, the attitude of the “service-providing” Muslim cleric had equally
significant repercussions as to how the ruler and his people understood and responded to the
Islamic religion. The name of Kelefaa’s mother, Maryaama, could then be all that remains of the
interaction and acquaintance between the Nanki’s family and the Islamic religion. A point of
contact had undoubtedly occurred, the nature of which, if judged from the actual practices of the
Nanki family, can only be deemed weak. For, as the ruling family, which had kept their old
traditions, as exemplified by that of Maaribantang with all its accompanying rituals, it becomes
difficult if not impossible to assume let alone expect that the Nanki had once given up these
practices to follow any proposed Islamic alternative. Instead, what seems more likely, once again,
based on textual details, is the prevalence and predominance of a mercantile form of Islam, which
would seek social acceptance and financial or material gains. But Islam in Kelefaa Saane operates
also on a socio-cultural plane.
The description of Kaabu south of the Gambia River in this epic features mainly two
conflicting ethnic groups, the Mandinka and the Fulani. Their difficult and complex relationship,114
has certainly a historical background,115 which equally affects and reflects a certain image of Islam.
As rulers and landlords of Kaabu, the Mandinka had always viewed themselves as the stronger
and superior entity for they dominated politically and militarily. With waves of Muslim Fulani
coming from Macina around the sixteenth and seventeenth century116 to Futa Djallon, it is probable
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that some of these Fulani had moved northeast towards Kaabu to found the autonomous province
of Foreyaa. At any rate, it is fundamental to highlight that whatever circumstances brought them
together, the Mandinka and Fulani had, to say the least, unfriendly relationships and did not treat
each other in the most respectful manner. The following excerpt is very telling:
Wó tumóo Foreyaa Fulóol ka bó na Foreyaa bànkóo ka.
I ka nan Badóóra Birikaama bàkóo ka.
I ka biti bitióo ke silóo ka.
Ni ye Màndinka dindióol je,
I ka i muta, i ka taa i ke joóol ti
Ware ye taa i sa kidimunkóo ti.117
Because of these types of practices engaged in by the Fulani, the Mandinka of Badoora do not trust
them at all (highlighted in quote) and characterize them instead as a treacherous people.
Consequently, and although the Fulani of Foreyaa are depicted as practicing Muslims, it seems
however the moral force of their Islamic character is restricted by, and carried through their cultural
baggage. Although, oftentimes, the reference to Islam seems to indicate power, in the case of the
Fulani of Foreyaa, their minority status and their supposed “treachery” has jeopardized any moral
force Islam might have conferred. As a result of their “detestable” and ignominious cultural traits,
their Islamic stance equally seems to suffer:
I be wo fitir salóo la,
Ye daramóo si kaóo móy na

“Meanwhile the Fulas of Foreyaa used to leave their territory. / They would infiltrate into the kingdom of Badoora
Birikaama. / They would set up traps along the road. When they saw Mandinka children, / They would capture them
to make them slaves / Or trade them for gunpowder. (Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 1216-1221. pp. 60-63, my
emphasis).
117
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Sallaa ye i ñaa kuruntu duuma la,
Ye Kalefaa je na suuwóo ka, Ye a suutéé.
mu tarata almaamóo kooma, i tambita almaamóo la.
Salóo tiñaata.118
As highlighted in this quote, the invalidity of the prayer seems to implicitly suggest that the Islamic
ritual practices among the Fulas of Foreyaa are eventually unsound. It follows then, one can
imagine, that until the Fulas are able to free themselves from their malicious doings and vicious
acts, then their Islamic practices will fail to set them on a higher moral ground.. And this seems all
the more relevant because, in comparison to the Fulas, Suleyman Baa Baayo enjoys the reputation
of being a great Muslim cleric.119 It is interesting in this regard to highlight the parallels. Due to
the great and highly respected cultural position of Suleyman Baa Baayo, the same Mandinka seem
to hold him in tremendous esteem. The fact that he comes from Timbuktu adds immeasurably to
the way in which he is regarded, because the city’s reputation for learning and its importance as a
center for Islamic history and civilization project an aura of almost supernatural importance. In the
epic figure of the cleric is presented as that of a powerful man, and most importantly that of an
individual who is endowed with sound knowledge and extraordinary human character. It is
therefore not surprising that Kelefaa himself agrees fully with that view since, when seized with
anxiety, and has no idea what will become of him, he asks permission from his mother to go to
Bijiini to seek blessing:

While they were praying that night, / They heard the horse’s steps./ The people praying lowered their heads, / And
they saw Kelefaa on the horse. They recognized him. / Those who were behind the imam moved in front of him. The
prayer was ruined. (Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 1501-05, pp. 76-77, my emphasis).
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satellite kingdom of Badoora since the king, Kumbiti Nanki, is the father of king Sanka Nanki of Badoora and of
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A ko a ye ’na! Mbi taa Bijiini duwaa ñinióo la.
A baamaa ko a ye, bisimila!
A taataa, a futata Bijiini.
Jumaku woorowula i be duwaa la Kelefaa ye Bijiini saatewóo to.120
The reference to Friday, here, is clearly metonymic referring to both the location of the mosque
and the Islamic religion. Friday is also important for that is the day the Muslim faithful, both men
and women are enjoined to congregate to the mosque in accordance with the dictates of Scripture.
121

On this occasion, the faithful listen to the sermon of the Imam (religious leader), pray, and make

supplications to their Creator. The “they,” one can expect, refers to the weekly Friday gathering at
the mosque where Kelefaa received the blessing of the community.
This instance also highlights an important social transformation, at least in Bijiini, for the
presence of the mosque and the great cleric, Suleymaan Baa Baayo, appears to indicate that the
Islamic religion seems to have gained ground on traditional practices that had, up to that point,
been acknowledged as legitimizing the power of the king and his entourage. The fact that Kelefaa
goes to seek help from the people of Bijiini is very much telling, for it indicates a shift in the power
dynamic. Although the Muslim cleric, as the text indicates, appears to be on good terms with the
local authority,122 it is indeed enough to observe that a period of major change is underway, one
that will certainly influence and affect the face of society. The establishment of Islamic schools,

He said to her: “Mother, I am going to Bijiini to ask for their blessing.” / His mother said to him: “Go ahead.” / He
left for Bijiini. / For seven Fridays, they were only blessing Kelefaa in Bijiini”. (Camara, Kelefaa Saane lines 230609, pp. 116-17).
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See Sūrah 62, “Al Jumu‘ah,” verse 9: “O ye who believe! / When the call is proclaimed / To prayer on Friday /
(The Day of Assembly) / Hasten earnestly to the Remembrance / Of allah, ansd leave off / Business (and traffic): /
That is best for you / If ye but knew.” See The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, trans. ‘Abdullah Yūsuf ‘Alī, 10th ed.
(Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1999), pp. 1466-69 at 1468-69.
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See Camara, kelefaa Sanne lines 2394-407, pp. 121-22. There Suleymaan Baa Baayo offers 50 slaves to the king
as a present, and pays his respects to the king as customs dictate.
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for which Suleymaan Baa Baayo is credited, sets in motion a process of deep Islamization that will
prove to have significant impact and far-reaching consequences.
In conclusion, my elaboration of the concept of power in Soundjata ou l’épopée mandingue,
The Epic of Kelefaa Saane, and tangentially in Ancestor Stones has showed how its foundation
and formation follow socio-cultural lines. Furthermore, it has proven essential to highlight that
power is not only the greatest entity, but that its exercise involves an association of other elements,
which work together and complement each other in their common responsibility of validating, and
preserving power.
In my discussion of Soundjata ou l’épopée mandingue, for instance, this phenomenon
manifests clearly through the person of king, Mamadi Kani. As a keen-witted hunter,
knowledgable about the occult sciences, he is not only able to draw a significant crowd of hunters
with him, but most importantly, his usefulness to his community has contributed tremendously in
helping him win the title of chief. I argue, in this particular segment, that Mamadi Kani gained the
kingship because the hunting society of the Niani, based on their socio-cultural values and needs,
has considered him most fit to take on the role of leader. This, I have further exemplified with his
putting in practice his medicinal knowledge to relieve the ailments of his people. In the Epic of
Kelefaa Saane, on the other hand, power has emerged mainly through the social media. Although
there were no explicit details as to how Sanka the great founded Quinara or became its ruler, it has
become possible to ascertain his authority owing to the social role and functions he fulfilled. Sanka
the great, just like Umaru Kholifa in Ancestor Stones, is a man of influence and, without doubt, a
patriarch. The fact that Ntuban Saane went to stay with him testifies to his high social status as a
man of knowledge who can be trusted. Thus, this example helps us understand the mechanisms set
in place within Quinara, and deemed appropriate for the exercise of power. In all likelihood, the
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family network as it functions within the region has certainly contributed to granting Sanka the
great the opportunity to found a new community premised largely upon Ntuban Saane’s skills. It
is even more so since some time after he settled in Quinara, Sanka the great arranged the marriage
between his daughter, Maryaama Nanki and Ntuban Saane. Thus, it becomes evident that his
position as patriarch has allowed and facilitated his founding of Quinara, and the same mechanism
can still be seen to be in effect with Umaru Kholifa as well.
Mysticism, my analysis has shown, is first and foremost a fundamental component of
power. Its importance, as I showed through Mbiti’s work, appears through African belief in the
existence of three separate entities: god, humans, and intermediaries. On the hierarchical scale, the
belief is held that there exists a distant all-powerful god with whom man cannot communicate
directly. Thus, man must rely on intermediary agents, meaning minor divinities, to get his message
across to that distant god. As a result, and given the pervasiveness of this belief, mysticism has
become virtually the single most important pillar upholding the creation and preservation of
traditional power. Thus, it has become imperative for the ruler to be well versed in mystical matters,
or to have a solid mystical surrounding, as I showed with Sanka Nanki and king Maghan.
My discussion of Islam in this chapter has sought to highlight a couple of important points.
On the one hand, I analyzed the remarks of the bard, Djeli Mamoudou Kouyate, on the Islamic
genealogy of the Mandinka people. In this regard, I have offered a sociological interpretation of
the phenomenon. On the other hand, and relying more on textual content, I have given an
interpretation on such Islamic significance of the name, Maryaama within a society that is visibly
non-Islamic, at least in practice. I likewise discussed the role and function of Islam, especially in
Sundiata. Here, I made it clear that Islam plays a limited role in the epic and was clearly not as
defining as other social elements. Thus, as my analysis shows, Islam appears very much as foreign
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phenomenon that happened to be utilized in times of need. However, I have also been able to show
signs of a new form of Islam that appears in the Epic of Kelefaa Saane notably in the form of the
cleric, Suleymaan Baa Baayo. This marks an important landmark in the history and identity of
West African societies as they face new challenges and opportunities.
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THE POSTCOLONIAL URBAN SPACE IN XALA AND
LA GRÈVE DES BATTÙ

A la vérité, la démocratie c’est l’application à l’échelle nationale de la méthode de la palabre, du
dialogue qui guide la vie de nos villages. 123
Léopold S.Senghor
On December 14. 1962, 39 deputies in the Senegalese parliament introduced a motion of censure
in protest of the policies of the Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia,124 who had signed cooperative
agreements with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Even though Dia was a Muslim, these
moves caused anxiety among the traditional Muslim leaders in Senegal, as well as running counter
to the Francophile sympathies of the infant nation’s president, Léopold Sédar Senghor.125 Three
days later, when debate on the motion was supposed to take place, security forces at the instigation
of Mamadou Dia tried to clear the assembly chamber. Four of the deputies who had sponsored the
censure motion were arrested only to be rescued some hours later by paratroopers loyal to Senghor
who had taken control of the armed forces. The tense political episode ended with the arrest of
Mamadou Dia and his chief supporters. They were brought to trial the following year, found guilty
of attempting a coup d’état, and all sentenced to lengthy prison terms.126
The quotation in the epigraph, a segment of Senghor’s radio address to the nation in
February 1963, in which he attempted to explain to the Senegalese public the new constitution,

“In reality, democracy is the application at a national scale of the discussion approach, of dialogue, which regulates
village life.” (qtd. in Jaqueline Sorel. Leopold Sédar Senghor: L’émotion et la raison (Saint-Maur-des-Fossés: Editions
Sépia, 1995), p. 159.
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which was scheduled for a referendum vote.127 It is however important to highlight that Senghor’s
decision to submit the new constitution to a vote seems to be in keeping with his vision of a man
deeply imbued with, and highly approving of traditional life and patterns of government and
organization. As true as this proves to be, it is equally necessary to add that in light of the historical
context of the period, Senghor’s approach in assimilating a modern system of government to a
form based in principle on a village council seemed very fulfilling. For one thing, it drew public
attention to and informed the public of a new political reality: the existence of a independent state.
By addressing the nation on radio, Senghor made up for the lack of physical face to face contact
with members of the so-called “village” by establishing an effective communication with them,
which in turn would allow them to understanding the political situation.
The purpose of recounting this episode is to highlight the impact of the political transition,
which had led to the establishment of the secular state in the aftermath of political independence.
It is undeniable that major political changes, for the most part, lead to some social transformations,
and may subsequently influence society in significant ways. This chapter, therefore, attempts to
make sense, to a certain degree, of the very concept of secular thinking as it had become the model
par excellence for state formation and major guiding principle of the political elite. To a large
extent, my evaluation of the secular question, here, seeks primarily to assess how it is represented
in the fiction of the time and the social and cultural backlash it triggered further to its “practical”
implementation. In other words, I seek to show how the understanding of, as well as social
reactions to, practical secular implementation of social policy is in fact a collective attempt to
negotiate, and further shape a postcolonial identity on the premise of shared cultural identity. In
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this specific regard, this chapter focuses on select elements within the postcolonial society, as they
reveal themselves as playing a leading role in the social response.
My decision to discuss the Islamic religion and class in this regard is based on my
understanding that religion has remained perhaps one of the strongest forces that survived Europe’s
imperial and colonial domination. On account of its long presence in the Sub-Saharan region,
religion has sewn itself very tightly onto the social fabric. Consequently, then, any discussion of
social and cultural phenomena is, very likely to cross the path of religion.128 As for class, it is
crucial for the purpose of this study to draw a clear distinction between social organization and
hierarchy in traditional society and the manifestation of class division in modern period. 129 The
former is, arguably, more honorific since it is based upon blood lineage, family heritage, and
circumstantial factors.130 The latter, as is generally acknowledged, appears to be a consequence of
the industrial Revolution, which created a large body of economically disadvantaged workers and
a small group of individuals who controlled the factories and the means of production and used
the profits to their own advantage. In this study the regional, historical, and political factors are
largely restricted to the context of West Africa, and argued for the point of view of a strictly
context-based analysis. As such most references to global phenomena will here serve mainly
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historical purposes or, are used in an attempt to show the development and or alteration of the
phenomena under discussion.
In this chapter, I specifically analyze the relationship between the Sufi cleric and the
statesman in the postcolonial context. My objective is, first and foremost, to examine the cleric’s
perspective in regards with the institution of the state, and what it seeks to represent. Put differently,
the task involves evaluating the cleric’s awareness of the new political situation, and most
importantly, his response and reaction to political choices available to him. The evaluation of this
relationship also commands a close study of the political figure: the statesman. At stake here is the
assessment of the cultural conflict that arises as a result of the interaction between the colonial
heritage along with its ideology and the position adopted by local cultures. As presented here, it
appears that there are a number of factors that are clearly at play, all of which require full
consideration in order to be fully understood.
This chapter deals equally with the class phenomenon. As a direct consequence of colonial
practices, the creation of two main classes in the aftermath of political independence runs
inevitably into a dual opposition. On the one hand, the upper-class educated elite, which has clearly
opened up, and embraced much of the Western value system runs into conflict with the lower
classes, made up for the most part of individuals from the rural areas. The argument put forward
here is one that the migration of large numbers of the rural population into the urban centers is to
be seen as a critical episode in the process of crafting a postcolonial identity. There should be no
doubt, that the economic gap that separates the rich ruling elite from the poor does, to a significant
degree, affect their socio-cultural relations, which ultimately lead to tensions. Overall, however,
conflict and tension, do, in fact, appear as the manifestations of continuing negotiations over
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unresolved postcolonial issues, the sum total of which, one can fairly assume, reveals a clear social
and cultural disconnection within the postcolonial society itself.

3.1

The Cleric and the Statement in Xala and La grève des battù
The prominence of the Muslim cleric in West African society has been much discussed

from historical, sociological, and literary perspectives.131 However, my interest here transcends
the traditional view that portrays the cleric as an anti-western figure seeking to gather and defend
whatever autonomy was left after the military defeat of the traditional political powers.132 The role
of the cleric and his political engagement undoubtedly follows the overall political development,
which, in turn, affects people and society as a whole. Thus, it would not be as fulfilling and
enlightening in this study to proceed along the lines of exact analytical standards. Rather, the goal
here is to assess the role and action of the Muslim cleric within specific time periods and specific
contexts because analyzing the configuration of power in urban spaces involves taking into
consideration a number of changing factors.
The urban setting becomes self-regulating, self-governing, and self-sufficient especially in
the aftermath of independence. If political independence from Europe’s colonial powers carries
any symbolism at all, it is fair to maintain that it visibly marked the overt departure of a political
and military force which had invaded the region and subjected it to foreign rule. The formerly
European-occupied space becomes thus a discursive space, which equally symbolizes a
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fundamental component in the overall shaping of the identity of the postcolonial subject. Most
importantly, it appears to be both the embodiment of a coming together, as well as the beginning
of what could be termed a “national identity.”133
A comparison between the colonial and postcolonial Sub-Saharan novel sheds much light
vis-à-vis the colonial subject. For instance, in the novels, Karim by Ousmane Socé, and Eza Boto’s
Ville cruelle,134 the city takes the shape of a temporary dwelling in which indigenous populations
coming from the margins seek to make a living. Although, it is not uncommon for the indigenous
population to move to the city for an extended period of time, or even settle in for good, I must
highlight the fact that the colonial authorities occupy the better sections of the city, also known as
the “colonial quarters” and this without doubt sends a clear signal to the indigenous populations
about their perceived insignificance. Furthermore, the physical setup of the city, with its general
disequilibrium in means and might,135 is designed entirely for the benefit of the European colonials,
and this contributes considerably to a condition akin to a self-effacement of the colonial subject,
who eventually, proves incapable of relating to the urban space beyond its economic aspects. In
other words, there remains a deep sense of un-belonging, the cause of which is to be found in
colonial practices. Thus, the discussion of the relationship between the Muslim cleric and the
statesman in the postcolonial context must necessarily take into consideration the fact that the
formerly inaccessible space becomes suddenly the object of public attention and interest. Because,
in a sense, it had become de facto the location of nation-making and of self-affirmation, and it thus
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compels members of society to gravitate towards these urban spaces, In Sow Fall’s La grève des
bàttu ou les déchets humains (The Beggars’ Strike or the Dregs of Society), this phenomenon is
well represented.136 In fact, the cleric, Serigne Birama, who dwells in a remotely located village,
decides to go to the city to have his identity card done: “Serigne Birama était venu à la Ville pour
se faire établir une carte d’identité, car la loi obligeait désormais les citoyens à en posséder une.”137
It is important here to underscore the implication of the term “loi” (law), which directs one’s
attention towards the existence of a comprehensive legal text imposed from outside whose
influence seeps into the most remote regions of the newly independent nation. The “loi” (law) is
an abstract concept backed by military force and so is able to sustain its validity, and consequently
is able to regulate, inform and educate members of the social unit. As a result, the cleric’s decision
to fulfill the demands set forth by the law is evidence of his acknowledgement of the new political
apparatus (and his awareness of the consequences of his failure to obey the “law”). In this respect,
his decision to get an identity card is an unambiguous response vis-à-vis the power structure in
place, to which he appears to give his allegiance to the newly established government of Senegal.
As I mentioned earlier, the long-held conflicting duality between “the cleric” and
“European colonials,” almost immediately ceases to exist upon independence. Although it is
possible to argue that this opposition had become discontinued with the departure of the Europeans,
the term “loi” remains intact. The “law” is both a direct product, and a legacy of the European
colonial enterprise that represents, so as to say, the “spirit” of the West, continues to guide the
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lives of the inhabitants of the newly independent nation. In fact, this is all the more relevant, since
the secular element of the law indeed appears to be Europe’s political trademark. 138 As such, in
practice, the Muslim cleric, as noted above, does not seem to be opposed to a structured legal
framework that seeks to establish law and order in society. Thus, Serigne Birama’s trip to the city
can also be interpreted as a statement of acceptance and adherence to post-colonial rule, since the
distance covered from his village, Keur Gallo, to the city constitutes a tangible evidence of his
desire and determination to be a member of the newly formed entity. In the afore-quoted text, there
appears a sense of self-definition and self-introspection, the result of which is critical and crucial
for the postcolonial subject at this historical point. The later segment of the quote, “car la loi
obligeait désormais les citoyens à en posséder une” (my emphasis) raises a difficult question. The
status of citizenship which seems to be a prerequisite to getting an identity card has visibly no
clearly-defined basis. It seems, in all likelihood, that the definition of who is a citoyen (citizen) is
left widely open to every individual to reflect upon, and reach their own conclusion, which informs
their decision whether to accept or reject the newly-created entity. As a member of society, Serigne
Birama, appears to have no intention of withdrawing from what he possibly regards as part of his
space, a place to which, despite the significant distance, he fully claims membership, and for which
he must hold tangible evidence in the form of an identity card.
The sense of obligation that filters through the quote, “la loi obligeait les citoyens” takes,
in fact, the shape of a hurried invitation vis-à-vis the rest of society. It looks almost as though the
entire legitimacy of the state institution rests fundamentally and, perhaps, chiefly upon societal
response to its call. In other words, society’s concerted effort to categorically refute the state’s
demand could have voided its project and consequently put its legitimacy and right to exist under
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significant risk.139 Thus, the sense of obligation needs to be understood within the specific postindependence context, during which time the secular model140 inherited from the Western colonial
administration had, quite oddly, prevailed, and seems to be trusted in blindly.
It is however essential, in my view, to give greater importance to the identity factor. Given
that, historically, most clerics lived away from urban centers,141 and had practically no need that
might have necessitated any commute towards the city, the movement of clerics towards major
urban centers marks a turning point, and deserves further analysis. In order to better elaborate on
my earlier point concerning the cleric’s coming to terms with the post-independence secular state,
it is essential to highlight key episodes that must have paved the way toward his self-integration
into the broader national identity.
It is perhaps necessary before getting further into my elaboration to briefly make mention
of the conflicted relationship between the European colonial authorities and Muslim clerics in
West Africa. Several authors 142 have covered the subject, and therefore for more detailed
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information it is certainly recommended to look into their respective works. The point, as I seek
to show, is that the isolation of the Muslim cleric is not a recent phenomenon, or else one that
began with the coming of European colonials. In fact, right from the outset, the Muslim cleric
seemed quite uncomfortable and unwilling to settle in traditional societies, which appeared deeply
entrenched in old beliefs and practices.143The traditional political context, then, being unfavorable
to the cleric, for the rulers in traditional societies had an unwavering belief in traditional religious
practices and showed no sign of wanting to relinquish them. Therefore, many clerics moved to
different locations with their followers in order to distance themselves from “pagan” societies.144
If, for the most part, there had been mutual respect between Muslim and non-Muslim groups, on
other occasions, however, armed conflict had broken out, causing major disruptions and social
turmoil.145
The advent of European colonialism altered to a small degree the political dynamic. In fact,
the destruction of traditional political power had further consolidated the cleric’s influence as
members of traditional society sought guidance and direction. It is nonetheless accurate that openly
political clerics (sometimes engaged in jihad) had entered into an open conflict with the colonial
administration. 146 Overall, however, the politically disinterested and neutral cleric not only
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enjoyed territorial autonomy, he was equally, and, all too often, the recipient of colonial
largesse.147
The geographical isolation of local populations, that is, society in general from urban
centers is, in my view, a result of two factors. The first relates to the fact that traditional society
was predominately agrarian, and the second has much to do with colonial politics and practices.
The balance between these two elements has had lasting consequences especially when the
political development of the region after independence is factored in.148
Despite the touch of irony in Jean Copans’s book title, Les marabouts de l’arachide: la
confrérie mouride et les paysans du Sénégal, 149 one among other things remains irrefutable:
namely, that the Murid order had emerged and thrived among the Wolof farmers of the hinterland.
However, as indicated above, the irony here appears in the fact that the French colonial
administration itself had introduced peanut as a cash crop. In doing so, the colonial administration
had, perhaps unknowingly, kept the rural world far apart from the urban centers. In fact, the
administration could possibly foresee no benefit in accommodating rural populations within urban
centers. Quite the opposite, the rural world had provided a profitable source of labor for the
administration and, therefore, it had to continue to be kept in place for the greater benefit of the
metropolis.
To further elaborate on the cleric’s relationship with the postcolonial secular state, it is
important to highlight that the cleric’s realization of the state concept is essentially premised upon
the physical unification between the rural and the urban centers. In this lies the symbolism of
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Serigne Birama’s trip. The complexity and the implications of secular ideology has in fact not yet
dawned on him. At a certain level it does not in fact make much sense since, as mentioned above,
Serigne Birama had always confined himself within the rural world, where little of the realities of
the colonial political administration had made much of a significant impact.150 It becomes evident
that the postcolonial urban setting constitutes, from an identity viewpoint, an absolute extension
of the rural world for the cleric in particular, and for rural populations in general. In other words,
as a claimed space, the city should hold the same values as those upheld within the countryside in
order that there may emerge a cohesive national identity. From a functional and characteristic
standpoint, however, the city exhibits a clear malaise, which at this stage raises the cleric’s concern.
In La grève des bàttu, this is quite apparent especially when Serigne Birama encounters Mour
Ndiaye after much wandering around for some time. The latter, not only offers to quench the
cleric’s thirst, but Mour Ndiaye assists him further by showing him the way to the police station
which is the office in charge of issuing his identity card.
The cleric’s loss of direction is highly significant here, and should not be regarded simply
as a consequence of his unacquaintance with city life. There is clearly a lot more at stake: “C’est
étonnant la Ville. Vous passez votre temps à courir. La vie y va de complications en complications
(…) Les gens courent, courent. Ils n’ont plus le temps de s’arrêter un moment pour montrer le
chemin au villageois. Céy yalla!”151 It is important to underscore, right at this point, the fact that
the city (Ville) appears as a metonymy for the state, although it is very likely that the state
comprises more than one city. In the eyes of Serigne Birama, the general characteristics of this
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city, where major services are concentrated, fail to match those of his village. It is equally
noteworthy that Serigne Birama’s remarks about the city make no direct reference to its physical
aspect such as buildings and other major landmarks that characterize modern cities. What the cleric
unambiguously takes issue with is the attitude of the individuals he encounters and what he sees
as people’s attitudes in general, which reveals much about their current identity. His criticism:
“Vous passez votre temps à courir” (you spend your time running) appears all too pervasive, and
seems to indicate the unmistakable signs of a burgeoning society, where the inhabitants seem
subjected to the overwhelming weight of city life. Moreover, the cleric’s critical remark equally
reveals a lack of communal life, which would have placed particular emphasis on helping strangers,
and giving greater importance to individuals within society. Rather, what the cleric sees is a strong
and pervasive individualistic society, where every member is left to fare for themselves, and
therefore has practically no time to care for others, let alone the villager coming from the country.
Further comparisons and contrasts between urban and rural society may further upset the cleric..
After thanking and showing gratitude to Mour Ndiaye, Serigne Birama extends an invitation to his
Samaritan thus: “Si un jour tu peux venir à Keur Gallo, tu viendras. Le premier homme à qui tu
demanderas Serigne Birama Sidibé te conduira jusque dans ma maison”152 The fact that the first
man one might encounter in Keur Gallo, whoever the individual may be and regardless of every
other consideration, would have been able to lead Mour Ndiaye directly to the cleric’s house stands
in stark contrast to the scale and anonymity of urban society. Keur Gallo, as Serigne Birama’s
words suggest, is a society that seems to place the individual at the center, hence the implied, yet
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discernible phenomenon of communal life that allows a deep sense of belonging and commonness.
Let alone the fact that: “Keur Gallo ne compte guère plus de cinquante âmes.”153
As it is portrayed, the cleric’s trip to the city marks a symbolic moment. The journey citywards for the purposes of getting an identity card is one that opens the cleric’s eyes to what is,
henceforth, part of his extended society. By the prerogatives of his identity card, he unconditionally,
and unrestrictedly becomes an active member of the newly independent society. However, the
attitude of city folks suddenly raises concerns, as Serigne Birama senses a clear socio-cultural
disconnect. Thus, it is important to equally evaluate the ways in which the cleric seek to reconcile
himself with these two societies to which he has acquired membership, and, which, henceforth
cannot be dissociated, as they make up one inseparable unit.
So far, my analysis has essentially examined the circumstances that brought the cleric in
contact with the postcolonial state. In reality, as I mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter,
the cleric does not show any sign of opposition to, or disagreement with the postcolonial political
structure. It is in fact my view that the focus on the cleric’s relationship with the postcolonial state
should be less over the nature of ‘secularity,” but rather viewed from a socio-cultural standpoint..
Although one cannot equally deny the importance of Islamic doctrine, it is certainly accurate to
assert that the Islamic religion had had a greater impact by the way it has been able to fuse into
local cultures and occupy a central place within the belief system there.154 It remains true, however,
as discussed in chapter one, that in African traditional societies the political and spiritual entities
had remained so close that they might easily be regarded as a single unit.155
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It is, nonetheless, important to keep in mind the fact that the Islamic religion was introduced
in the West African region by Arab and Berber merchants from North Africa. 156 This remains an
important fact because, contrary to local religions, the Islamic religion was originally viewed as
something foreign by both political leaders and the society at large. There existed, consequently,
a sense of accommodation and tolerance vis-à-vis Islam in particular, and other imported traditions
in general.157 Thus, overall, precolonial traditional power had utilized a number of Islamic features
to secure and strengthen its hold, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to make sure the needs
of the growing Muslim population were met. By implication, therefore, it is inconsistent to argue
that Islam, or Muslim clerics, was able to “impose” a tight regime on precolonial political leaders.
The exercise of power in precolonial era, for the most part, followed divergent paths, wearing often
an Islamic/ spiritual coat; while inclining at other times, to the profane. Instead, the most significant
Islamic influence, undoubtedly, emanated from the cultural sphere, with the establishment of
Islamic ritual practices, which contributed significantly to what appears later as the “Muslim
identity” albeit in the broad sense.158 With this picture in view, one can fairly easily understand
that the establishment of the postcolonial secular state had eventually become a non-issue for the
clerical establishment.
To further understand the cleric’s posture vis-à-vis postcolonial institutional power, it is
important to discuss the contribution and impact of the Sufi movement. As one of the most
influential religious orders in West Africa,159 and despite its early association with military jihad,
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Sufism not only gained significant ground during the period 1500-1900, but most importantly, the
rise of local individuals to high positions in the Sufi clerisy marked a turning point. The
“indigenization” 160 of the Islamic religion with local figures in positions of authority enabled
scores of individuals to embrace the religion, as well as to “attach” themselves to a saintly figure.161
The mystic factor (comprising meditation and reflection) being a fundamental component
of Sufism, requires that the cleric withdraws as much as possible from the physical world, and
demands that the cleric remain on a spiritual plane in order to enter into communication with the
divine. 162 It then becomes obvious that the Sufi cleric maintains minimal interest, if any, in
engaging in worldly affairs. As a spiritual agent, he must keep a low profile at all time vis-à-vis
worldly matters. Consequently, it is no surprise that Serigne Birama’s home is located in the
country, far away from buzz of the city.
In La grève des bàttú although Serigne Birama acquiesces to the new political order, as
discussed above, he nonetheless refuses to abandon his village, Keur Gallo, to migrate to the city.
It is clear that his choice to remain in Keur Gallo follows his desire to maintain a fairly good
distance from the city, which primarily saves him from all political dealings, collisions, or
collusion with the political branch of society.163 On the other hand, however, and this is quite
common and indeed important in Sufism, the location where the Sufi cleric lives accumulates a
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marked aura of sanctity.164 Thus in the novel, as time approaches for the president to reshuffle his
cabinet, Mour, who himself is a member of it, and who is hoping to be nominated vice-president,
decides to pay a visit to Serigne Birama, as he faces an unsolvable dilemma. Because of his
decision to clear the city of all street beggars, Mour is now left wondering where to find them after
he received the marabout, Kifi Bokouls’s strict instructions that the beggars must be the sole
recipient of his sacrifice if he wants to see his wishes fulfilled.165 Puzzled and disoriented, Mour
decides to go seek advice from his cleric, Serigne Birama. It is important, in this regard, to note
the contrasting environment of the cleric and its holy dimension:
Il a trouvé Serigne Birama en prière et a dû attendre quelque trente minutes la fin de la
ronde des perles à travers les doigts décharnés de l’esclave de Dieu. A un moment il lui a
semblé, en voyant avec quelle passion Serigne Birama abandonne tout son être aux
invocations et aux louanges, que son vénéré marabout était en train de perdre toute
dimension matérielle pour s’envoler dans les saintes sphères du monde spiritual.166
As highlighted in the quotation, the fact that Mour Ndiaye finds Serigne Birama at prayer, and in
an absolute state of meditation and, thus, had to wait for “quelque trente minutes ” is undoubtedly
momentous. In fact the scene shows a clear paradox. Because in the height of his political concerns
and trouble within the very city he allegedly controls, Mour finds nowhere to go except to his
cleric’s dwelling place, where he hopes to find the much-needed advice he needs in order to
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ultimately get out of the deadlock he finds himself in. It is equally noteworthy that despite Mour’s
official presence, the cleric feels no pressure to interrupt his spiritual exercises. It makes certainly
sense to argue that this particular instance is a statement, albeit subtle, that makes it significantly
clear to Mour Ndiaye that despite his political responsibilities and influence, he indeed is a subject
(a disciple) of Serigne Birama, as the scene suggests. Thus his visit, and his subsequent wait for
cleric serve as a reminder of his complex ties with the cleric which have developed over the twenty
years or so since he helped him find the police station.167 It is equally important not to lose sight
of the distance factor. Although Keur Gallo is situated far from the city, and the cleric seems to
demonstrate a complete reluctance to directly involve himself in political matters, he seems clearly
more interested in shaping the individual conscience. In other words by serving as his spiritual
guide, the cleric is able to impart his blessings, which, according to general understanding, make
the enterprise ultimately successful. Eventually, the assessment of the Sufi cleric does bring up
two major facts. The first relates to the importance of holding and maintaining his own individual
dwelling place. its distance from the city is not so important as the sense of autonomy it conveys.
The site, thus, becomes a hub, where religious fervor and divine blessing are sure to be found. The
second, and equally important fact, remains that the cleric seems to perceive his role, as being the
sole guardian capable of protecting individuals and guaranteeing them success so long as they vow
allegiance to him. Whether they are in politics, or in other fields ultimately matters little. The
important fact appears to be that the cleric’s subject (his disciples) must have an unwavering belief
that their religious guide does indeed keep an eye on their affairs, and continues to provide
blessings to promote success. In this context, it is essential to highlight the continuing process of

“Depuis ce jour, une vingtaine d’années se sont écoulées. jamais n’a eu à douter de Serigne birama Sidibé” (Sow
Fall, La grève des bàttu p. 13); “Since that day twenty years have passed. never has mour had reason to doubt Serigne
Birama Sidibe” (Sow Fall, The Beggar’s Strike p. 7).
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religious guardianship and influence that rose to prominence during the colonial period at a time
when traditional political structures were destroyed. This is accompanied by firm belief that the
clerics were the only members of society who stood up to the colonial authorities, and the even
stronger belief that these holy men are representatives of a Higher power, and thus capable of
performing miracles.168 The Islamic clerisy made a serious psychological impact on traditional
society, and this influence appears to have continued into the postcolonial period. As such, the
evaluation of the cleric’s perspective vis-à-vis postcolonial secular institutions reveals among other
things that the cleric, contrary to what one may expect, is not opposed to the creation of a larger
geographical entity that directly or indirectly discards him, or denies him official and
administrative responsibilities. Rather, the analysis shows the cleric’s willingness to become a
member in the new society, since Serigne Birama has clearly expressed the need to be provided
with an identity card. Further, my analysis has sought to show the importance of where the cleric
lives. There appears a clear desire for the cleric to ensure his living situation exhales holiness and
a sense of sacredness. By clearly marking his space, the cleric is thus able to affirm and maintain
his religious domain within the greater society, where individuals of all stripes flock to him for
diverse purposes.
In order to better understand the stakes involved here, it is important to discuss the
postcolonial political figure, namely the statesman. My objective, here, is to show how
colonialism’s cultural influence has significantly shaped the views and perceptions of the
postcolonial leader despite the fact that he is part of the greater society. Thus, although the political
figure appears to associate on a number of occasions with his own society, the fact remains that he
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is deeply imbued with Western values and beliefs. Thus, his understanding and implementation of
power is equally a manifestation of the colonial heritage and influence. The secular thought,
pervading the entire colonial enterprise, albeit not in its ideal form, does equally manifest itself
through the postcolonial leader, hence the importance to analyze his actions in that light.
It is perhaps useful to return to Senghor’s statement, where he attempted to explicate his
view of democracy. His choice to compare it to the traditional village council is, without doubt,
revealing of the socio-cultural reality. In fact, as Jacqueline Sorel rightly put it, Senghor’s
traditional background played a significant role throughout his political and intellectual career. In
fact, she writes: “Lorsque le roi du Sine, Koumba Ndofène, s’annonçait dans la concession, sans
doute le petit Senghor voyait-il en lui une résurgence de ce prestigieux souverain”169 It is important
to underscore, beyond the particularity of the king’s family visit, Senghor himself spent his early
childhood in his native village, Djilor, and later, went on to study at a French missionary school
located in Joal.170 The process seems all too common among the African elite. The transition from
a traditional/rural setting to urban centers and sometimes to a European metropolis appears to be
the inevitable path. Although the passage to an urban environment may seem smooth, in
appearance, the process does involve, however, a number of transformations, which, impact
considerably the individual’s original identity.
To begin with, it is particularly important to highlight the process of cultural disconnection
that precedes, or goes hand in hand with, the exercise of power in the postcolonial context. It is
certainly not a banal phenomenon within the overall scheme of postcolonial power management.
Sorel, Leopold S. Senghor: L’émotion et la raison p. 12. “When Koumba Ndofene, the king of Sine, used to make
his presence known in the compound, young Senghor, undoubtedly saw in him the resurgence of that prestigious
sovereign” (my translation). Koumba Ndofène Diouf was was last King of Sine reigning from 1896 to 1923. The
prestigious sovereign refered to is Kaya-Maghan Cissé (c. 350), Soninke king of Wagadou, founder of a dynasty which
dominated the ancient kingdom of Ghana.
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For it constitutes a necessary process that allows the statesman to lose touch with his own society
and, consequently, to grow culturally insensitive. In Ousmane Sembene’s Xala, published in 1973,
this phenomenon is certainly perceptible early in the narrative.171 The protagonist, El Hadji Abdou
Kader Beye, a local businessman and his acolytes, have now come to control the formerly
European-managed Chamber of Commerce. In their speedy economic rise, El Hadji Abdou Kader
and his partners have clearly demarcated themselves from the bulk of society, and they have
established for themselves a lifestyle which seems to better accommodate, and reflect their socioeconomic status. This appears clearly in the narrative, as one reads: “El Hadji Abdou Kader Bèye
était un ancien instituteur, rayé du corps enseignant à cause de son action syndicale à l’époque
coloniale.”172 There appears a clear shift and a change of perspectives. First of all, as a teacher,
one can argue that El Hadji Abdou Kader Beye was in the service of society since he employed
his time, talent, and energy to educate the latter. Additionally, as a union member, he seems to
show renewed commitment towards society and its members, as he then stood to fight for socioeconomic improvement for local teachers. It is eventually arguable that his dismissal from his
occupation constitutes a proof of his firm and unshaken determination to remain rooted in the
common cause he shares with his fellow workers. This is quite significant given the colonial
context of the period, where the colonial administration ended up creating two sets of environment
poles apart; the one being the famous European quarter, which housed the colonial administrative
authorities and other European workers, and the other, a separate area where the hand local
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indigenous population. Not only physical distance served to establish socio-economic difference,
but there existed deep inequalities between European workers and their African counterparts, who,
for the most part and in all work categories, earned much less even though they might have similar
skills and qualifications.173 The creation of a teachers’ union to which El Hadji Abdou Kader had
belonged could thus have been a result of local teachers’ concern to unite and protect themselves
against injustices of an unrestricted colonial power, especially when the latter sought primarily to
maximize profit. In this regard, by standing on the opposite side of the spectrum, along with the
weak and easily exploitable, El Hadji Abdou Kader seems to affirm and confirm his social
belonging. However, in the postcolonial period, there occurs a major shift: “Les ‘Hommes
d’affaires’ s’étaient réunis pour festoyer, et marquer ce jour-là d’une pierre blanche, car
l’évènement était de taille. Jamais dans l’histoire de ce pays, le Sénégal, la Chambre de Commerce
et d’Industrie n’avait été dirigé par un Africain.”174 This particular occasion, which gathered the
local ‘businessmen’ for what they perceive to be an event to celebrate equally marks a historic
moment in the postcolonial era. Beyond the fact of political independence, local management of
the Chamber of Commerce establishes a socio-economic shift, that witnessed the dismissal of a
cohort of European managers, and the subsequent takeover of their positions by local businessmen.
The cultural factor plays a significant role, and helps understand the identity of the statesman. In
fact, where El Hadji Abdou Kader lives is quite suggestive of his current transformation. His move
away from the majority black area of settlement into the town’s luxurious residential area is indeed
telling. The following description sheds much light on his change of status:
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Chaque villa avait été baptisée du nom de l’épouse. Celle de la première, ‘Adja Awa Astou’,
se situait dans la périphérie est du quartier résidentiel (…) Un calme de premier matin du
monde enveloppait ce secteur de la ville, où, nonchalants, par paires, déambulaient les
agent de l’ordre public.175
A few elements in this description deserve comment. First of all, the fact that the residential area
is located in the town and that following the description it appears to be the only residential area,
is likely a suggestion that this was where the Europeans lived during colonial times. It is very
likely that as a “businessman” El Hadji Abdou Kader, along with other prominent figures had
moved into the old European quarters, substituting their own entitlement for the right of the
colonial authorities to enjoy the greatest tranquility, “un calme de premier matin du monde.”
Second of all, it is absolutely no coincidence that despite the quiet environment, “les agents de
l’ordre public” still maintained their presence. The entire scene is indeed reminiscent of colonial
practices since the indigenous population was strictly denied access to the European quarter, with
the exception of household servants. In this regard, Chinua Achebe makes an interesting remark,
when he writes:
Members of my generation also moved into homes in the former British quarters previously
occupied by members of the European senior civil service. The homes often came with
servants—chauffeurs, maids, cooks, gardeners, stewards—whom the British had organized
meticulously to “ease their colonial sojourn.”176
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Achebe himself notices with regard to the servant class in the former colonial households, that so
far as their lives were concerned, only one thing had changed with independence: “Their masters
were no longer European, but their own brothers and sisters.”177 And, as if to further perpetrate
colonial practices, and perhaps, celebrate a sense of pride and prestige, the new African elite went
further down the path in imitation of their former colonial masters, as Achebe further informs us:
“this bequest continued in the form of new club membership and access to previously all-white
areas of town, restaurants, and theaters.”178 There clearly appears a desire, on the part of the elite
to fully assimilate itself into the colonial identity, and to distance itself as far as possible from its
own societies. For it seems in the mind of the ruling elite that the exercise of power has to remain
as faithful as possible to the European colonial model. This is perhaps due to the belief that failure
to adopt the same approach as that practiced by the colonial authorities will result in complete
failure. Consequently, then, such individuals as El Hadji Abdou Kader and his fellow businessmen
see no alternatives to it, as they fit themselves uncompromisingly in power, except to follow in the
footsteps of colonial authorities. Frantz Fanon, in fact, highlights this phenomenon, when he
asserts:
Nous comprenons maintenant pourquoi le Noir ne peut pas se complaire dans son insularité.
Pour lui, il n’existe qu’une porte de sortie et elle donne sur le monde blanc. D’où cette
préoccupation permanente d’attirer l’attention du Blanc, ce souci d’être puissant comme le
Blanc.179
Bill Ashcroft et al. provide further insight into this phenomenon when they write:
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A valid sense of self may have been eroded by dislocation, resulting from migration, the
experience of enslavement, transportation or ‘voluntary’ removal for indentured labour. Or
it may have been destroyed by cultural denigration, the conscious or unconscious
oppression of the indigenous personality and culture by a supposedly superior racial or
cultural model.180
Cultural denigration among the educated African elite has been reported in various accounts.181
And its impact had certainly been significant, especially when colonial education made it its
fundamental mission to culturally assimilate African students as soon as they were admitted in
colonial schools. Thus, these African students were, on the one hand, taught the greatness of
European civilization, while, on the other hand, their own cultures were systematically
denigrated.182 Senghor’s personal experience is, in fact, revealing of the process:
Cela dit à côté des avantages que voilà, le Collège-Séminaire avait le grave défaut de nous
déraciner du terroir de nos valeurs, de nous faire croire que la culture française, c’est à dire,
l’esprit de la civilisation était supérieur à celle de l’Afrique noire.183
The explicit comparison that places French civilization above that of the all varieties of “Black
civilization” makes clear the desire of the colonial administration to ensure successful cultural
assimilation by all means, mindless of the veracity of facts. Thus, it certainly makes sense to view
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the statesman socio-cultural disconnection as a manifestation of the colonial impact. This is quite
significant, especially when it takes place at a symbolic time, that of independence, when entire
society might be expected to seek to rise up from the exploitation of colonial rule in order to assert
and celebrate itself anew. The statesman’s social and cultural disconnection from his society has
significant consequences that can, and do, lead up to tensions, as I shall show in the last section of
this chapter. It is equally important to emphasize that the physical disconnection from society at
large, either consciously or unconsciously, seems first and foremost to set up barriers between the
leaders and the rest of society. In fact, the use of space as an indicator or sign of power is, without
doubt, a direct consequence of European colonialism.
As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, physical space, in African traditional
society, appears to be part of the common domain, and is in fact reflective of a social vision that
seems to demand general association, rather than association by interest. In his study of Senegalese
society, Eric Ross writes: “In addition to social status and genealogical origin, individuals have a
strong sense of community.”
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He further remarks: “Local communities come together to

celebrate life-cycle events like weddings and baptisms.”185 From a structural standpoint, African
societies appear as a web of connections, where each individual does have a role to play, and
becomes, therefore, critically important. Furthermore, these societies place great emphasis on
social cohesion, and consequently, holding a low status does not result in social discrimination,
nor, does a high status signify self-exclusion from one’s peers.186 Rather, communal life is the
materialization of the desire to assemble, and also the manifestation of mutual reliance and support,
as society and individuals go through different cycles and of prosperity and hardship. Thus the
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statesman’s explicit choice to occupy an exclusive space is, without doubt, in keeping with the
colonial view, as far as power is concerned. The need to isolate himself seems to him to be a
necessary process. By placing himself on higher grounds, he sends clear signals to the rest of
society about his shift in status, signaling that he now occupies the position of absolute authority
formerly enjoyed by the colonial authorities. It is often the case, a lengthy period of exposure to
colonial influences results in a cultural brainwash along with internalization of western values.
One must also add that all the values that had been internalized are swiftly put to practice as soon
the conditions allow. The exercise of power, among other phenomena, becomes an opportunity for
the educated statesman to make manifest all that he had been fed while he was under direct colonial
influence. He seizes the opportunity, and tries his best, even to the point of ridiculing himself. And,
due to heavy cultural brainwashing, the statesman fails to appreciate his former environment, that
which he shared with his peers, and prefers, rather, the value system of the colonials, albeit in a
lifeless form, deprived of any communal aspect. The description of the environment at the place
where El Hadji Abdou Kader’s first wife lives as exuding “un calme de premier matin du
monde”187 shows, for certain, the absence of human activity and interaction. The environment
seems to suggest a strong sense of self-seclusion, and self-sufficiency, which, perhaps, accounts
for the total silence. The colonial quarter, one must add, remains, unmistakably, an attempt to
replicate the western living environment, which had seemed to be the only space capable of
ensuring well-being and comfort to the colonial authorities. In fact, the stark contrast between
western societies and African ones had been frequently chronicled in a number of African
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novels,188 where the environment itself contributed significantly to protagonists’ alienation and
sense of loss due, mostly, to a lack of social interaction, and a sense of community to which one
could integrate oneself.
The power phenomenon is equally reflected through social interactions. There seems a
clear desire for the statesman to manifestly appear different in virtually all circumstances. In almost
every encounter with individuals in society, he takes pains to draw attention to his status, to ensure
that it does not go unnoticed. Since he abhors the possibility that he might by chance be mistaken
for an ordinary member of society, he takes every precaution to make sure that does not happen,
and leaves out no detail. In Xala, the unknown reasons for El Hadji Abdou Kader’s impotence
cause him great distress. After many unsuccessful attempts to remedy his condition, he eventually
agrees to his driver’s advice to visit his village cleric, Serigne Mada. Despite the heat and the
difficulty of the trip, El Hadji Abdou Kader seems resolved to remain in his show of status in
maintaining his Western dress: “Ils furent reçus avec la courtoisie qui sied dans ce milieu, d’autant
que l’accoutrement de toubab faisait d’El Hadji un étranger et un fortuné.”189 The depiction of El
Hadji Abdou Kader as stranger, or even as a foreigner, becomes, thus, very symbolic. On the one
hand, because he is dressed in the “toubab” fashion, 190 members of the rural society make no
mistake to consider El Hadji Abdou Kader one of them. He is clearly one of those individuals who
do not respond to their socio-cultural values, and is thus considered a stranger. In fact, the word
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“toubab”191 has a strong “foreign” connotation, and can practically not be associated with anything
local. In the Senegalese society in general, the word “toubab” denotes principally a Caucasian.
Skin complexion plays a critical role, given that the term is primarily used to identify an individual
of white complexion. Thus, if worded differently, the term “toubab” can simply mean “a white
person.” The significance and weight of skin color is all the more important since the Negroid
racial group 192 is the dominant one in West Africa. Consequently, it contributes to the
identification of individuals of white complexion as being “other,” meaning that they do not belong
to those particular societies.
It is equally possible that the presence of early European merchants on the coast of West
Africa have played a role in shaping the image of the European man as other. Boubacar Barry
writes: “From the start, the Portuguese, the first European to explore the African coast, settled at
Arguin and up the estuaries of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers.”193 The isolation of the Portuguese
on the coast is also revealing as a social phenomenon. By choosing to remain on the coast, away
from the very societies with which they traded, it became clear to the local societies that the
Portuguese traders intended to remain aloof from them. In addition, the choice to settle on the coast
would equally have signified that these Portuguese merchants were not settling permanently, being
constantly on the move, therefore not showing any need to build permanent homes or to make
lasting connections with the local communities.
On the other hand, the fact that El Hadji Abdou Kader is described as “un fortuné”(a man
of wealth) reinforces his initial characterization as a “toubab.” In general, referring to someone as
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“toubab,” within Senegalese society, can have a double meaning. The first one, as I mentioned
earlier, refers to a Caucasian. However, the word may also designate an individual, often westerneducated, wealthy, therefore belonging to the upper class; someone whose life style is considered
similar to that of the Europeans. Moreover, this individual often flaunts his “fine qualities,” in
addition to the fact that he adores Western habits and imitates Western behaviors. However, it is
important to highlight the primacy of the economic aspect. In reality, it is true and possible that
such an individual might lack some of the attributes of the Westerners; however, that individual
stands no chance to be considered a “toubab” if he dwells in abject poverty. Poverty remains an
obstacle toward practicing a “European” lifestyle. Second, and equally important is that
historically, Europeans have almost always appeared to Africans as wealthy, either in a concrete
or suggestive form. Both the slave trade experience and colonialism had proven to be clear
manifestations of economic superiority.194 The fact that El Hadji Abdou Kader is here designated
a “toubab” and a “fortuné” is an indication of the degree of his self-alienation from his own society.
His decision to dress in the European fashion, in effect, shows his desire to distinguish himself
from the rest of society; in other words by his very appearance, he, unambiguously, sends a clear
message that he does not consider himself an “ordinary person.” El Hadji Abdou Kader can only
demonstrate his privileged status by mimicking European ways, demonstrating that the end of
colonialism does not mean the end of colonial influence. Thus, his wearing European clothing, just
like his decision to move away from any close connection with his society at large, suggests a
socio-cultural distancing, and is also indicative of some form of rejection. Eventually, much of
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what remains appears to be mere simulacrum because while he exploits the society at large, he is
not able to cut himself off from it completely.
In the last segment of this chapter, I seek to analyze the class phenomenon in order to show
how the coming into existence of two distinct classes feeds further into the postcolonial
sociocultural divide. On the one hand, the small western-educated elite seems to control almost all
the economic resources, while the majority of society, predominately rural in origin, lives in abject
poverty. My analysis, seeks to show that this socioeconomic gap reflects, directly or indirectly, on
the secular thought process, much of which stands in sharp contrast with societal beliefs. In fact,
as the direct inheritors of colonial power, the elite seems to have equally internalized a significant
amount of colonial values, which not only explains its overall social vision, but equally appears to
help pave the way towards legitimizing its own approach. In this regard, class tensions appear to
be another manifestation of postcolonial disruption.

3.2

The Class Factor in Xala and La grève des battù.

In his assessment of the African bourgeoisie, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o writes:
This thoroughly colonised petty bourgeoisie was the class that inherited the management
of the colonial state under new flags raised aloft at independence. It received almost
completely intact the colonial army, the police, the administrative structures and personnel,
the judiciary, and of course the entire prison system as developed and refined by
colonialism.195
The implications of the political transition that took place between the European colonials and the
African educated elites is one that consequently set a major precedence in the postcolonial period.
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One significant consequence, among many others, is the complete adoption of a societal model,
initially designed by, and for the benefit of, the colonials. With the departure of the latter, the new
ruling elite maintained the same model and barely initiated any changes. It is critical, in this regard,
to establish the direct relationship that ensued, from the colonial to the postcolonial society, since
the overall structure remains practically identical. A small privileged group of Europeans occupied
the better part of a town, often located on higher ground, and therefore least prone to flooding and
other natural ills. Moreover, this area, also known as the European quarter, housed the entire
administrative, economic and military structures. On the other hand, the indigenous populations
lived in separate areas, distantly located from the European quarter. After independence the new
ruling elites followed suit. Although it is true the use of the term class in the colonial context can
be inaccurate and misleading, the very colonial social structure contributed significantly in
determining the roles and statuses between different individuals, which had led eventually to a
sharp socio-economic class divisions. Furthermore, the gap between these two groups, which also
reflects in the physical distance that separates their respective spaces is further reinforced by the
set of values that clearly informs their beliefs and social background.
In La grève des bàttu there appear two main groups, each belonging to its own class, along
with its specific location. The community of beggars, being visibly the most destitute among the
poor, is in origin mostly from the rural areas. This becomes clear when Salla Niang, the leader of
the beggars’ community, reminisces about Gorgui Diop, himself a member of the beggars’
community, who had died in police custody:
La mort de Gorgui Diop l’a profondément atteinte, elle l’avait connu au village, où tout le
monde s’accordait à dire qu’il était l’ami intime de son père; n’ayant presque pas connu
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son père, elle avait reporté son affection sur cet homme qui était l’ami de tous les enfants
du village (…) Plus tard quand Salla le vit arriver en Ville, elle s’empressa de l’héberger.196
It is certainly correct to assume that migration of individuals from rural areas towards the “City”
marks a critical moment in a nation’s history. The journey of unskilled workers like Gorgui Diop
and his fellow beggars into the urban center coincides, historically with the degradation of rural
economies. Traditionally, decent living conditions in rural areas made it possible for many to rely
upon their seasonal income, earned mostly from the sale of agricultural produce. Additionally,
most individuals in rural areas were able to alternate different occupations through seasons’ many
cycles.
Migration during precolonial, and much of colonial times, had occurred under specific
circumstances, and was oftentimes temporary. In general, migration was, for the most part,
restricted to a select category of people, and was certainly not as common a phenomenon as it turns
out to be today.197 For instance, it was the usual practice among the youth in rural societies to
travel to different locations to compete with their peers in specific sports, deemed formative of the
individual’s overall self on reaching a certain age. In his study of Senegalese poetic language,
Senghor quotes a poem by Pathé Diop, where the wrestler mentions his year-long absence from
his peers, as he presents himself back.198 Thus, the mention of this long absence, which is part of
his psychological preparation against his rivals, is that the journey itself (a temporary migration)

Sow Fall, La grève des bàttu p. 53; “Gorgui Diop’s death has affected her deeply; she had known him in her native
village, where everyone was unanimous in saying that he had been her father’s best friend. As she had scarcely known
her father, she had transferred all her affection to this man who was the friend of all the children in the village (…)
Later, when Salla Niang saw him turn up in the City, she hastened to offer him her hospitality” (Sow Fall, The Beggar’s
Strike p. 38).
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is synonymous with the achievement of physical and mystical strength, which could consequently
guarantee the wrestler lasting invincibility. As exemplified here, migration was often a matter of
short-term displacement. Although Jeff Haynes argues that migration towards urban centers had
begun earlier than the independence years, 199 it is important to emphasize that, from a historic
viewpoint, most Sub-Saharan populations had in fact migrated due to severe economic conditions,
which, consequently made it impossible for them to rely any further upon what traditional agrarian
practices the income from which had become too meager to live on. In his discussion of urban
religious phenomenon in Nigeria, Ibrahim Gambari highlights an important fact when he writes:
“In addition, drought, or near drought conditions and serious downturns in the economy would
drive more and more rural poor into northern cities, many seeking out meager livelihoods as
koranic students or leburori (daily paid workers).”200 As undeniable as the disastrous impact of
drought proves to be in the lives of rural populations, one must also contend that economic
mismanagement and financial embezzlement within the postcolonial “nations” certainly added to
what might have already become dire conditions. In effect, Achebe notes a similar situation in
post-Independence Nigeria, when he asserts: “Within six years of tragic colonial manipulation
Nigeria was a cesspool of corruption and misrule. Public servants helped themselves freely to the
nation’s wealth.”201 It goes without saying, then, that such practices have contributed significantly
to serious degradation of the fragile economies of the postcolonial nations, heavily dependent on
cash crops,202 resulting in large-scale migration towards the major urban centers. In La grève des
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bàttu the presence of the beggars within the City appears to be the result of socioeconomic hardship
as represented in the following excerpt:
Ce jour, chez Salla Niang, il n’y a qu’un absent: c’est Madiabel le boiteux. Il était forgeron
dans son village natal. Un baay jagal.203 Mais les brèches des marmites à colmater et les
queues de vieilles casseroles à improviser devenaient de plus en plus rare; les fourneaux
ne se vendaient plus car l’intermédiaires qui venaient les prendre pour les écouler à la Ville
avait disparu un beau jour sans lui payer le produit d’un an de travail. Pour nourrir et
habiller ses deux épouses et ses huit bouts de bois, Madiabel décida à son tour de monter à
la Ville. Il se convertit au boroom bàttu204 sans bàttu.205… (Sow-Fall 27)
It is important to underscore the drastic shift here. First of all, as an active professional smith, one
can deduce that Madiabel was an active member within the village society despite his physical
disability. His transition to the City, however, means that he completely ceases to practice his skills,
as if to suggest he is inept and does not belong there. This translates into complete professional
inactivity, making him thus an outsider, and one whose survival depends henceforth on the
“generosity” of the inhabitants of the City. Madiabel’s profession in the village, just like many
other professions in traditional society, was at one time crucial and perhaps, indispensable for the
overall harmony of village society. The professional smith, typically, performed a number of tasks
that include not only manufacturing and mending cooking utensils, but also involved the making
of various tools used in farming, hunting, and other domains of human activities. In addition, it is
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certainly correct to infer from Madiabel’s migration to the City, though out of complete necessity,
that it is one that definitely marks the beginning of the dismantling of traditional society, as well
as the establishment of a completely distinct class of urban poor. For those individuals such as
Madiabel, who have received no formal education, and who appear to fit nowhere within the
postcolonial societal paradigm, the only option for them seems to be to become by default a
member of the lumpen proletariat, outcasts both socially and economically. Postcolonial society
which mirrors the colonial model, allocates no space to people such as beggars who appears
economically “unequipped,” to contribute to society, and therefore have no role to play in modern
postcolonial society.
There was a tendency, especially among French colonial authorities, to put indigenous
urban populations through some kind of formal training in order to adapt them to the structures of
a functioning colonial society. The idea behind this was to shape a new social type, one whose
skills and mindset would befit and benefit colonial society, and one who would grow to appreciate
the colonizer’s values and civilization. In his study of Islamic religion in Senegal, the French
sociologist, Paul Marty in the early twentieth century found that Koranic schools had, in
comparison to French colonial schools, by far the greater number of students.206 This situation, in
his view, posed a serious threat to the mission of the French colonial educational system. 207
However, to better understand Marty’s concerns, it is crucial to regard the colonial school not just
as a place where instruction is dispensed, but also as a human laboratory, out of which, the
educated/trained individuals come heavily burdened with western sociocultural baggage.
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Moreover, the “successful” completion of this training automatically opens the doors to positions
in colonial society, as well as access to colonial resources. Marty’s “concern” about local Koranic
schools led him to suggest to the colonial authorities to implement the 1903 and 1906
administrative decrees, which stipulated the following:
a- Nécessité d’autorisation pour tenir une école qoranique.
b- Besoin de subir un examen de connaissance devant une commission composée de
notables lettrés en arabe, et d’instituteurs français.
c- Institution d’une commission de surveillance des écoles.
d- Fermeture de l’école en cas échéant, par mesure de police générale et de salubrité
publique par le Lieutenant-Gouverneur.
e- Tenue d’un registre scolaire dans chaque école.
f- Liberté complète de rétribution au maître, mais défense d’envoyer les enfants quêter.
g- Interdiction au maître de recevoir les enfants de 6 à 16 ans pendant les heures
régulières des classes des écoles publiques, et obligation aux élèves de fournir au
marabout un certificat de scolarité française.
h- Obligation, sous peine de fermeture, d’un minimum de 20 élèves.
i- Pénalités de simple police pour toute contravention à cet arrêté.208
A close examination of this text shows the degree to which the French colonial administration had
intended to dismantle, re-structure, and control the entire Koranic school system. The need for the

Marty, Etudes sur l’Islam au Sénégal, vol. 2, pp. 97-98, my emphasis; “a- Koranic teachers must seek official
authorization to establish a Koranic school; b- Koranic teachers must take a knowledge test before a commission made
up of traditional figures literate in Arabic and French school-teachers;. c- A oversight commission for the schools
must be established; d- Closure of the school by the Lieutenant-Governor should the occasion arise as a general policy
and in the name of public health; e- Each Koranic school must keep a register; f- Individuals are free to remunerate
the Koranic teacher; however, it is strictly forbidden to send Koranic students out to beg; g- It is forbidden for the
Koranic teacher to keep children aged 6 to 16 during public schools’ regular hours; and students must provide to their
Koranic teacher a certificate of French schooling; h- Failure to maintain a minimum of 20 students will result in
closure of the Koranic school; i- Light sanctions will be applied for all breaches of this decree.”
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Koranic teacher to have “Nécessité d’autorisation.” to keep “un registre scolaire,” to discontinue
the practice of street begging, and finally, to release the students during public school hours,
constitutes a set of guidelines that, eventually, removes the Koranic school’s local and traditional
features, replacing them, instead, with that which is French and European in appearance and
function.
The sense of rapprochement the decree seeks to establish would finally harmonize the
Koranic school with the French educational system by filtering out those elements considered to
be undesirable. The successful completion of this task would thus have made the Koranic schools
nothing more than a tertiary space within the greater space of colonial education. When analyzed
well, this move appears to fall right within the paradigm of the westernization of local, African
spaces. For there should be no doubt that despite the fact that the French assimilation project
sought primarily to make indigenous populations learn about, embrace, and live by its values, it is
equally true that the local space of living was not to remain unchanged. Despite the fact that in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal appears to be the only country where colonial France had attempted
complete “official” assimilation, it is certainly safe to add that French colonization never
dissociated itself from its assimilation and civilizing mission. In their co-authored work, Catherine
Coquery-Vidrovitch and Henri Moniot give further details about France’s assimilation attempt in
Senegal:
En Afrique, 209 le seul essai d’assimilation fut ébauché dans les quatre communes libres du
Sénégal (Saint Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, Dakar) qui élisaient un député à l’Assemblée
française depuis 1848 furent dotées d’institutions municipales à l’instar de celles de

I added ‘Sub-Saharan’ in the translation for purposes of clarity. The authors’ study focuses on Francophone SubSaharan Africa, excluding North Africa. Otherwise this statement would not be accurate given that colonial Algeria
was considered an extension of France.
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France (1872-1879) et dont les habitants reçurent la faculté d’acquérir la nationalité
française à condition de se soumettre à ses lois.210
It is important to note that these four municipalities had, historically, been sites where Europeans,
had over a long period of time, chosen to settle for different reasons. 211 It is equally important to
note that most traditional African places of settlement were located in the hinterland for the most
part, where farming and grazing land was readily available.212 Thus, in general, the erection of
coastal towns and cities became much more common during the period of European imperialism
and colonialism. Their strategic maritime position allowed easy access for the shipping of good
(such as slaves) as well as providing naval mobility. Highlighting this historical fact helps one
better understand, especially in the case of African coastal cities, the fact that they had and continue
to have a European identity. Thus, it is no surprise that a lengthy, and sometimes indeed permanent,
presence of Europeans in these locations, contributed to giving them a special status. These towns,
to a large extent, became, very much, like those in the colonizers’ homeland. Additionally, the
establishment of “institutions municipales à l’instar de celles de France” and the conditional
“nationalité française” all combine towards creating a systematic westernization of these sites,
while stripping them of their local and traditional characteristics.
In Xala, the local businessmen appear to symbolize this force within the city. El Hadji
Abdou Kader, in particular, does not hide his dislike of local practices. On a number of occasions,
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in France (1872-1879). Moreover, the inhabitants of these municipalities could acquire the French citizenship
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he expresses his disdain for them, as in the following instance: “Le mendiant était très connu à ce
carrefour. Le seul qui le trouvait agaçant était El Hadji. El Hadji, maintes fois, l’avait fait rafler
par la police.”213 There appears, in this instance, a clear desire, on the part of El Hadji, to have the
beggar permanently removed from his immediate environment. It is equally remarkable that El
Hadji is “le seul” in this whole environment who abhors the beggar’s chants, while it is obvious
that “Le mendiant faisait partie du décor.”214 The outright rejection of the destitute beggar, that is
of those individuals who do not hold “conventional” professions for lack of proper training or
western education, is a clear attempt to orient society in a new direction through the exclusive
promotion of new professions. The implementation and completion of this process would,
undoubtedly, change the face of postcolonial urban society. El Hadji’s attitude vis-à-vis the beggar
shows the degree to which he has dissociated himself from his own culture. The beggar, in this
regard, does not seem to suggest anything more to him but utter nuisance and discomfort, hence
his inability to stand the latter’s presence. There is, certainly, a sharp contrast between such
individuals as El Hadji, and those who fully engage with, and are in total acceptance of, their own
culture. In fact, Modou, El Hadji own driver, is clearly his complete opposite. The beggar’s chant
seems very evocative to him. And, his reaction, unlike El Hadji’s dismissive attitude, shows a
sense of communality, recognition, and togetherness, as illustrated in the following: “Modou
goûtait avec raffinement les passages vocalisés. Le chant montait en spirale, s’élevait, puis se
rabattait au ras du talus comme pour accompagner les pieds des marcheurs.”215 Pathé Diagne is
certainly correct in his assessment of the imperial ethnocentric ideology when he notes:
Sembène Ousmane, Xala: roman p. 54-55; “He was well-known in the street. The only person who found him
irritating was El Hadji, who had had him picked up by the police on several occasions” (Sembène Ousmane, Xala p.
27).
214
Sembène Ousmane, Xala: roman p. 54; “The beggar was part of the décor” (Sembène Ousmane, Xala p. 27.
215
Sembène Ousmane, Xala: roman p. 54, my emplasis; “Modu enjoyed the beggar’s song. The chant rose in a spiral,
up and up, then fell back to the ground to accompany the feet of the pedestrians” (Sembène Ousmane, Xala p. 27, my
emphasis).
213

93
It has dictated socio-cultural models shaped from its own point of view with reference to
its own interests, its own values, its own languages, its own order; and these models have
placed a screen between the people, and their institutions, their schools, their economic
systems, their view of the world and their very idea of their own history.216
Diagne’s screen metaphor seems quite pertinent in El Hadji’s particular case. His immersion into
western values, culture and lifestyle has been too profound and complete for him to apprehend or
comprehend local phenomena, as these clearly fall outside his domain, that is, his “great” European
heritage. Thus, as Diagne suggests, for El Hadji Abdou Kader and his fellow businessmen, every
referent, emanates from, and is reflective of, the imperial project. His assessment rings even more
true in today’s context. On the occasion of the fifteenth summit of the International Organization
of Francophonie217 in Dakar, Senegal, the Senegalese President, Macky Sall gave an interview218
to three French media organizations.219 Martine Jacot, journalist at Le Monde, inquired about a
phenomenon she rightly termed a “paradox.” The following is a transcribed segment of the
interview:
Martine Jacot: Vu de l’extérieur, M. le Président, on a l’impression d’un paradoxe. Le
français est enseigné dans le pays de feu le Président Senghor, de Abdou Diouf, dans votre
pays, au primaire depuis très longtemps. Or, selon l’Observatoire de l’Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie, il y aurait seulement 30% de la population sénégalaise
qui parlerait le français. Alors ma question et mon interrogation, c’est, comment voyez-
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vous l’avenir du français dans votre pays par rapport au wolof? Et on voit bien en étant à
Dakar que, dans la rue, dans les médias, et à l’Assemblée Nationale, le wolof est de plus
en plus utilisé par rapport à l’anglais, et aussi, par rapport à l’arabe, qui est de plus en plus
enseigné dans les écoles coraniques.
Président Sall: Vous avez raison de parler de paradoxe, mais c’est ce paradoxe qui fait la
richesse de la Francophonie. La Francophonie, c’est le français en partage, mais c’est aussi
la diversité. Le français ne doit pas être en opposition avec les langues nationales. Puisque
de l’échange qui aura entre le développement de nos langues nationales, qui est une
nécessité pour nous, et l’adoption du français comme langue de travail pour ce qui concerne
le Sénégal et la plupart des pays africains francophones qui ont adopté le français comme
langue officielle de travail. A coté, vous avez plusieurs autres langues nationales qui
doivent être promues et c’est cette diversité justement qui fait l’avenir de la Francophonie.
Je pense qu’il n’ y a pas de risque en Afrique (…) L’avenir de la Francophonie, c’est
l’Afrique, mais l’Afrique dans sa diversité, l’Afrique dans son identité.220
Although there are a number of points that deserve further elaboration, it is important to emphasize
Jacot’s attempt to draw a solid parallel between French language instruction and its colloquial or
general usage within Senegalese society. Jacot’s logic, as Diagne points it out, seems to view the
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adoption of the French language as an affirmation and acceptance of the French identity. As a
result, again, following her line of thought, it makes no sense that individuals in places like Senegal
and elsewhere continue to speak their national languages everywhere, even inside the Parliament.
The only acceptable scenario, one could assume, is that those who are literate in French must speak
French exclusively, and most importantly, they must, immediately, renounce any further usage of
their national languages.
From a historical vantage point, Jacot’s statement does not seem to be very different from
the mission of French education in modern times.221 In the aftermath of the French Revolution,
education had played a significant role in reshaping and harmonizing the post-Revolution society.
Literacy in French became a necessary step, as it would contribute towards national cohesion, and
give a clear structure to the succeeding French Republics. Julie Barlow and Jean Benoît Nadeau
revisit some of these episodes, as well as some of the critical actions taken in response to them. In
particular, they mention François Guizot, who they note “was minister of public instruction
between 1832 and 1837. A historian and Protestant, he understood that reading skills were
necessary to unleash the potential of a nation in the middle of an industrial revolution. He also
understood that to build a state, the French needed a competent bureaucracy, and for that they
needed schools.”222 Another reformer was Jules Ferry, about whom they write: “ In 1880- 81, Jules
Ferry, a pillar of the newly formed Third Republic, created the Ministry of National Education and
made public school mandatory, free, and secular.”223 In reality, the respective decisions to make
public education mandatory, cost-free, and secular, show the desire and determination of postRevolution administrations to create a new kind of individual, literate in standard French, who no
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longer responded solely to a particular regional identity,224 but was rather a man of the Republic,
who primarily, if not solely, spoke French. By placing Jacot’s words in this particular perspective,
one can get a better sense of her understanding of the role of Francophonie. It is as if only the
terminology has changed, since Francophonie, if run according to Jacot will produce the same
results in Senegal as in nineteenth-century France. The particular difference, in the postcolonial
context, then, requires that such task be completed by the local elites in their positions of leadership.
The class struggle in the postcolonial state appears to be equally waged in the sociocultural
domain. Given the conflicted character of the relationship between the elite and the poor, it goes
without saying that the sociocultural dimension plays a significant role, and does indeed have
important consequences. An evaluation of sociocultural phenomenon certainly shows the power
of traditional beliefs; and most importantly how their deep entrenchment within the local
communities and society at large guarantees their lasting influence. It is equally true that
sociocultural beliefs permeate all areas of life, and as a result, whether directly or indirectly, strong
connections are thus established between these beliefs and human experiences in general. Thus, in
the context of postcolonial class struggle, it becomes evident that these beliefs equally impact the
power balance. It becomes thus, a means, among others, which can be utilized towards reaching
set goals. In my analysis, I have attempted to show how the control and transformation of the urban
space has proven critical in shaping new identities. If one admits that the elites are in possession
of the material means to attempt to bring this about, one is equally compelled to acknowledge that
traditional sociocultural beliefs, which have significant communal support, constitute a
counterforce. For, these beliefs remain strong and true within the very societies in which they have
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been formed. In this regard, the opposition between the rich urban elite and the rural poor is one
that casts a thick shadow over the very nature of postcolonial societies. In a sense, the question
remains whether or not the individual in such a society is ready to disavow his past and cultural
heritage, and start anew with a cultural identity which has been crafted elsewhere. It is indeed
possible to anticipate a response to this question since the very fact that the elite navigates both
spaces constitutes a clear failure on its part to completely disengage culturally from the society at
large to strictly follow its adopted culture, or to create one of its own. Thus this failure in turn has
significant consequences with regards to the elite’s attempts to change the face of postcolonial
society. Equally, such failure makes one wonder whether it is at all possible to completely
disengage from traditional culture, particularly when that culture continues to be within the
individual’s reach.
The prominence of traditional beliefs among most African communities is the result mostly
of the lived experiences of the community even though at times they may be proven baseless, and
other times appear to be complete superstition. In Senegal, for instance, it is a common belief
among many that Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s writings are so numerous that all together they
amount to “seven tons,” and that this mass of writings is kept in the library of the Great Mosque
of Touba.225 Individuals from outside the country and from outside the culture would probable
dismiss the possibility that anybody could write that much or might certainly ask to see a catalog
of this work. This is certainly a correct point to make, and a fair question to ask, indeed. In order
to comprehend the pervasiveness of such a belief, and whether it is accurate or not, it is necessary
to understand the social dynamic. A number of facts must be considered; the first of which is that
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Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba did indeed write religious odes 226 that are compiled/ arranged in
volumes.227 The second fact is that a large number of the members of the Murid brotherhood are
illiterate in French and for them the French word tome (volume) and tonne (ton) have eventually
born the same meaning. The third important factor is the belief among Sufi adherents that saintly
Sufi figures are capable of miracles.228 By piecing these together, one can see why and how such
affirmation came to be so widespread. The likelihood of confusing the terms tome and tonne is
indeed heightened, given that many, if not all, Murid disciples firmly believe that their saintly
figure, and founder of the order, had performed, indeed, even greater miracles.229 On this account,
then, one can perceive the connection between the magnitude of the saintly figure and his actions,
making it, thus, completely relevant, for the Murid followers, that their saint had, indeed, written
seven tons worth of material. Belief formation, as it appears here, does have a strong communal
dimension. For, it seems, in order for a phenomenon to turn into a belief, it must gain wide
acceptance in the society. Also, for beliefs to maintain their strength over a period of time, it may
require the society to find practical ways to give them material form through the use of different
media.230 Overall, it is important to highlight that these beliefs do, eventually, have a significant
impact upon individuals since their sum total makes up a good part of an individual’s cultural
identity.
In La grève des bàttu these beliefs play a central role in the novel. It emphasized the
importance and symbolism attached to the general practice of alms-giving in the society at large.
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Sana Camara has studied nine of the numerous odes written by Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba in, Sheikh Ahmadu
Bamba: Selected Poems (Leien: Brill, 2017).
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In the French language, they are referred in “tome,” which I suspect has been confounded with a word closer in
sound “tonne” (ton) by the non-literate in French.
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See, Roberts and Roberts A Saint in the City pp. 35, 36, 84, 88, 99, 101, 104, etc.
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See page references on previous footnote.
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For instance, the addiya (granting of a gift to the leader of the order) is a widespread practice among Senegalese
Murids, which is believed to guarantee the disciple’s continued blessings from their religious guide; see AbdoulayeBara Diop, La société wolof p. 300.
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The following excerpt, a discussion between the beggars about their condition, gives a good insight
into the practice of alms giving:
Pourquoi nous mendions! La réponse est facile, nous mendions parce que nous
n’avons rien!
―Mais non! nous mendions parce que nous ne pouvons pas travailler à cause des infirmités
qui nous frappent!
―Si nous mendions c’est parce que les chances ne sont pas égales pour tous les
individus, et que ceux qui sont plus nantis doivent donner une partie de leur
richesses aux plus pauvres. C’est comme ça que l’a dit la religion.231
It is important to note in this instance how the act of begging is doubly legitimized. On the one
hand, begging appears to be a result of social and physical conditions. Poverty and physical
infirmities are thus directly linked. On the other hand, additionally, the Islamic religion makes it
explicitly clear that the believer must assist those less fortunate, and it commands individuals with
excess of wealth to disperse a portion of it.232 In this regard, it seems that religion constitutes a
prime factor, which has equally contributed to establish this practice. In fact, the phenomenon of
begging is very common in West African societies,233 where young Qur’anic students habitually
roam the surrounding neighborhoods seeking a pittance. 234 Although the practice has been
considered formative, in that it is believed that the practice serves to inculcate a good deal of

Sow Fall, La grève des bàttu pp. 81-82; “‘Why were we begging? The answer’s easy, we begged because we had
nothing!’ ―‘No! I say we begged because we couldn’t work because of our physical infirmities.’ ―‘If we begged, it
was because every individual doesn’t have the same opportunities, and those people who are better off must give some
of their wealth to the poorer ones. That’s what religion says” (Sow Fall, The Beggar’s Strike p. 61).
232
See The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, Sūrah 2, Al Baqarah:43, 83, 110, 177, 270-74, 277; Sūrah 21, Al Anbiyā:73;
Sūrah 6 Al An‘ām:41; Sūrah107, Al Mā‘ūn:2-3, etc.
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For instance, in such countries as Senegal, Mali, Nigeria.
234
This it is very much the case with Samba Diallo, the protagonist in Cheikh Hamidou Kane, L’aventure ambigüe
(Paris: Juliard, 1961), pp. 23-25; Cheikh Hamidou Kane, Ambiguous Adventure, trans. Katherine Woods, African
Writers Series 119 (Oxford: Heinemann, 1972 [1963]), pp. 13-15.
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humility to Qur’anic students,235 it is equally true that most students are entrusted to clerics, who
often lack the financial means to sustain them. In La grève des bàttu even though socio-economic
conditions account for the increased presence of the beggars in the city, it is important to
underscore that their occupation of the city is a symbolic act, whereby the beggars claim the space
as theirs. The process, in this case, is, very much, the same as that in traditional society.236 Thus,
their choice to resort to this old practice is a clear manifestation of cultural attachment, as well as
a symbolic expression of their social status. Just as Qur’anic students in rural areas depend on the
generosity of society, so the beggars’ decision to bear their bàttu (traditional container) in the city
emphasizes their understanding that it is society’s duty to assist the poor and destitute. In this
regard, the beggars draw no line between rural and urban societies, hence their continued practice
of traditional mores.
The official campaign to clear the city of the beggars in La grève des bàttu marks a climax
in the class struggle. The poor are singled out not just because of their poverty and economic
dependency, but they are seen a group that is impeding the transformation process of
modernization. Not only that, the presence of the beggars is said to tarnish the image of the city.
For the leading elite, the poor are a constant reminder of the values local, traditional cultures and
the act of their removal, therefore, marks a significant step towards a complete effacement of all
cultural signs pointing to the past. In this regard, there is no ambiguity as to what constitutes the
vision and priorities of the postcolonial city. It clearly seeks to demarcate itself from the traditional
villages and towns, and to set new guidelines and objectives for a modern society. The following
passage gives a good illustration of this:

Kane, L’aventure ambigüe pp. 26-27; Kane, Ambiguous Adventure 16-17.
The process is reminiscent of the narrative in Forna’s Ancestor Stones p. 21 where different individuals join the
patriarch’s village. These individuals do not wait to be invited nor did they have any formal authorization. They just
arrived, settled in and continued on with their various professions.
235
236
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―Voilà, en rouge, les principaux points stratégiques. Cette fois-ci, il faut tenir le coup, ne
pas transiger, rafler sans arrêt. Plus de descentes hebdomadaires, mais quotidiennes. Oui,
quotidiennes. Tous les moyens sont mis à notre disposition: effectifs, voitures, carburant.
Il faut que ces gens-là dégagent la circulation.237
It appears that the presence of the beggars constitutes a major distraction to the city officials. Their
need to commit so many resources in their attempt to remove the beggars from the city also
indicates the degree of frustration they feel at the difficulties they face. In the minds of the city
officials, the continued presence of the beggars at their vantage points is a clear repudiation of the
image of the city that they want to promote, especially for foreign investors and tourists. Indeed,
the successful completion of the task would show a different city, one that would look very similar
in appearance to cites in the West, both in their function and structure. This is what Mour Ndiaye
intimates when he attempts to explain to Serigne Birama the reasons why the authorities decided
to initiate a campaign to remove the beggars from the city:
Comment vais-je t’expliquer cela? … Voilà: maintenant les gens qui habitent loin, waa
bitim rééw,238 les toubabs surtout, commencent à s’intéresser à la beauté de nos pays, ce
sont des touristes. Tu sais, avant ils venaient pour nous piller, maintenant, ils viennent se
reposer chez nous en y cherchant le bonheur. C’est pourquoi nous avons construit des
hôtels, des villages, des casinos pour les accueillir (…) Quand ces touristes visitent la Ville,
ils sont assaillis par les mendiants, et ils risquent de ne plus revenir.239

Sow Fall, La grève des bàttu p. 20; “‘Here, marked in red, are their main vantage points. This time we must keep
at it, make no concessions, keep on rounding them up. There must be daily rounds, from now on, instead of weekly.
Yes, daily! We’ve got all the necessary means at our disposal, staff, cars, petrol. These folk have got to be cleared off
all the streets in the capital’” (Sow Fall, The Beggar’s Strike p. 13).
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“Those from outside the country” (Wolof) (Diop, Glossaire du roman sénégalais p. 608). Glossed by Sow Fall as
“Ceux de l’Europe et des U.S.A.”; Those from Europe and the U.S.A. (La grève des bàttu p. 26).
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Sow Fall, La grève des bàttu p. 26; “‘How can I explain … Well, you see, nowadays, people who live a long way
away, in Europe, and the United States of America, White people, especially, are beginning to take an interest in the
beauty of our country. These people are called tourists. You know, in the old days the White people came to rob and
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The justification as to why beggars are being chased away from the city certainly reinforces the
idea that those in charge of the city are in complete denial of the important role the old traditional
mores play in society. The ban on the practice of begging within the city perimeter becomes
therefore symbolic of the city’s own identity. It is equally important to keep in mind, as I have
shown with regard to the Serigne Birama’s trip to the city to obtain an identity card, that the city
is, in fact, a metonym for the new postcolonial social structure. It becomes obvious, at this stage,
that in addition to their rejection of the traditional practice of begging, there is a clear desire, on
the part of the city authorities, to invest the city with a bourgeois appeal in accordance with what
is seen to be its status as the capital, and in accordance with the values of the West. The
construction of hotels and other luxurious spaces constitute visible signs, which indicate the city’s
orientations and preoccupations. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o has, in fact, discussed a similar phenomenon
in his assessment of Kenya postcolonial culture. To this end, he writes: “It is a culture that has
reflected the dependence of the Kenyan economy and politics on outside influence. Western
cultural dominance has been underwritten by the postcolonial political practices.” 240 Ngũgĩ’s
observation seems to suggest a direct link between cultural factors and the political vision of
postcolonial leaders. That the elite’s preference for western cultures over the local ones, has
equally determined their political choices. Thus, in La grève des bàttu the decision to ban the
practice of begging appears to be a direct consequence of western cultural influence and its effect
in the postcolonial society.
In this chapter, I have had the objective to discuss the importance of the urban space within
the postcolonial power structure. For purposes of specificity and clarity, I have chosen to base my

exploit us; now they visit our country for a rest and in search of happiness. That is why we have built hotels, and
holiday villages and casinos to welcome them (…) And when these tourists visit the City, they are accosted by the
beggars and we run the risk of their never coming back here’” (Sow Fall, The Beggar’s Strike p. 17-18).
240
Also Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, Moving the Centre p. 90.
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analysis on two important figures. The role of the Sufi cleric continues to be important in the
postcolonial context given that he embodies the past, not just the colonial past, but also to a certain
extent the precolonial past. In this regard my analysis has sought to establish the cleric’s
perspective on postcolonial secular power. Urban space, as I showed, has proven to be extremely
critical in shaping postcolonial identity. It thus becomes the central space, and the symbol, par
excellence, of power and influence in postcolonial society. In La grève des bàttu , Serigne Birama’s
journey to the city marks an important moment. His decision to get an identity card is an
acknowledgement of, and adherence to the postcolonial political structure. However, it is
necessary to emphasize that he remains, ostensibly at least, politically disengaged, as well as
disapproving of the intended social vision of the postcolonial elite. His choice to stay away from
urban centers while being fully absorbed in his religious activities appears to have set him as a
marginal yet relevant entity within the postcolonial society. consequently, it seems, the cleric’s
attitude, far from being crystallized, has actually evolved following the sociohistorical
development of his own societies. However, deep anchorage in a religious environment has kept
him away from strong political commitment, and set him, instead, as a guardian of society.
My discussion of Xala, on the other hand, has highlighted the significant impact of
European colonization. In this regard, my assessment of El Hadji Abdou Kader Beye has shown
how the colonial experience continues to impact West African societies. El Hadji Abdou Kader,
for one, is a clear manifestation of the effect of cultural assimilation. Thus, his lifestyle and social
status feature him as “other,” in other words, as an individual who fails to respond to traditional
beliefs and realities. The fact that he is described as “toubab” becomes clear proof of his selfalienation from his own society.
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Instead of marking a moment of unity and triumph for marginalized peoples, the postIndependence society shows a significant divide between the masses and the elite, which to all
intents and purposes, constitutes the postcolonial status quo.
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EDUCATION, NATIONALISM, AND WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT

My early years at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, the capital city of Senegal, marked a
major turning point in my life. For one thing, I had to leave my hometown of Kolda located some
four hundred miles to the south of Dakar. As a “southerner,” pursuing higher education was both
exciting, as well as sorrowful. The prospect of spending a good part of the year away from family
and friends, and from an environment in which I had grown attached to in every respect, was, to
say the least, overwhelming. Furthermore, my impression of the capital city, which I had visited
earlier, was not particularly positive. Being a characteristically crowded place, where violence and
insecurity prevailed, Dakar became to me, not home, but just a necessary stop on the way. My
decision to pursue higher education had made it inevitable that I go to Dakar, given that there
existed no other institute of tertiary education in the country except the University Gaston Berger,
located further north in the St Louis region.
My lack of enthusiasm in having to relocate to the capital city, although for a temporary
period, was further justified. From day one, it became evident that I and the other new students
had to battle our way through the bureaucracy and the crowds because the place looked just like a
military boot camp. I still reminisce how we students would line up for hours at the registration
office, waiting for our turn to complete our enrolment. However, the day-to-day struggle to attend
classes was even more arduous. With limited seats available in the lecture halls, those most eager
to participate had to devise various strategies to secure a spot, while those less fortunate were left
with no other option but stand outside following the lectures through the broken glass windows.
Worst of all, however, as I experienced later, were the student strikes. These were relatively short,
although, at times they did stretch to weeks, and sometimes well into months. It did not take me
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long to realize that these strikes were mostly a result of students’ various unfulfilled demands, or
manifestations of discontent with regard to important issues. It was, and is still a common practice
among students to take to Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop, located right outside the university premises
to stage a blockade by burning logs and old tires, causing thus major disruption to motorists and
other commuters. Although the effects of these strikes affected many, the purpose was to manifest
discontent right where it could be felt most. There was an implicit understanding among the
students that it is ultimately the responsibility of the state to ensure that the education institutions
were well attended and the students’ needs were adequately catered for. In this particular context,
the relationship between university student organizations and the government was for the most
part tense, if not conflictual.
I lately had a conversation with a friend about African politics, and in the course of our
exchange, he related to me what a Malian political figure once supposed while reacting to a student
strike. The event itself took place in 1994 when Ibrahima B. Keïta,241 then Prime Minister, made
it explicitly clear that while striking students were wasting valuable time, the children of the leaders,
his own included, were pursuing their studies abroad. He went on to add that the latter would surely
return to take on the same leadership positions as their parents, and continue to perpetuate
something that had become an established pattern. Finally, we both regretfully acknowledged that
most African sub-Saharan institutions of higher education were destined to serve only what might
be termed second-class citizens, that is, those who had limited finances and were therefore unable
to afford to study at institutions of higher learning overseas.
The connection between the educational institution and political power, as Keïta’s
comments suggest, shows how education is closely tied to the postcolonial power apparatus. In
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fact, one must acknowledge this phenomenon has prevailed from the beginning of the colonial era.
Education in the colonies had almost always served a set purpose, whether to promote colonial
culture and denigrate local cultures or to pursue language politics aimed at suppressing local
tongues.242 Furthermore, colonial education had, indeed, been notorious in alienating indigenous
students from their own people, languages, and cultures.243 In the postcolonial context, however,
much of the colonial educational paradigm has remained unchanged. The educational institutions
are under the control of the ruling elite, which utilizes them as a means of discriminating against,
subjugating, or controlling individuals on the premise that these individuals constitute a threat to
the ruling authorities. Thus, in its existing form, education appears to be reduced to playing a
minimalistic role, that is, to serve solely the interests of the ruling group to the detriment of society
at large. It seems, then, that the need to re-structure society in order to set it on a new direction
equally requires an urgent and drastic transformation of societal institutions in so far as they
constitute the very means through which to effect change.
This chapter thus discusses the ways in which western education and its established
institutions have become a symbolic site in postcolonial struggle for social change. The conflicted
relations between the ruling elite, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other, have carried over
into the educational realm. It is important to note, at this particular point that inherited colonial
institutions continue to operate virtually without change even after colonized nations have gained
political independence. And, as I attempted to show in the previous chapter, the unbridged gap
between rulers and the masses in postcolonial society and the maintenance of a colonial-like status
quo, inform to a large extent the status and function of postcolonial institutions. To this end, the

See Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, Decolonizing the Mind.
See Césaire, Discours sur le colonialisme pp. 7-74, in particular 58-68; Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism pp. 2978, in particular pp. 67-73.
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prospect of subverting the education system becomes part and parcel of the greater effort to
transform society, by removing its most alienating, if not divisive features. I must add, however,
that if the removal of colonial influence constitutes a main priority, it is certainly true that banning
all types of discrepancies and inequalities in society remains an even greater objective. Eventually,
what appears to be in the making is not a precipitative revival of old traditional values, nor a blind
adherence to western principles or values; rather, it is a thoughtful combination of elements, based
largely upon a temporal/epochal axis. In this respect, the social model that is projected must remain
untethered to the past, and reflective of the cultures, peoples, and the time period.
My discussion of nationalism, here, seeks to assess how the emergence of postcolonial
nationalist figure from within the intellectual circles marks a critical turning point in postcolonial
society. For nationalism among the educated in postcolonial society affirms the strong ties between
the intellectuals and the masses. Most importantly, it manifests a clear shift in leadership. Where
originally peoples and societies were ruled by traditional dignitaries, in the colonial and
postcolonial years, conversely, men and women with western education were considered the more
fit to take on administrative roles and other positions of leadership. The particularity of the
postcolonial era, however, reveals that the logic behind such a binary becomes to a large extent
blurry, in that the dividing line between educated and non-educated in society becomes barely
visible. Additionally, the once established link between educated men and women in the colonies
and European colonial society appears to be much different in the contemporary world, if not
almost completely nonexistent. This is perhaps due to the fact that direct cultural influence from
European society has waned significantly or become simply obsolete in the decades since the
former colonized nations gained political independence. It is equally possible that the ruling elite’s
self-serving move to consolidate power and maximize wealth has contributed to alienate those who
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had been historically staunch defenders and strong believers of European culture and its
institutions. At any rate, it should suffice at this point to understand that there has emerged an
atypical intellectual who clearly holds different views with regard to the inherited institutions along
with their functional structures. One can possibly argue that the postcolonial era, just as it
symbolizes the re-appropriation of land and a sense of acquired sovereignty, also constitutes a
period of social, cultural, and economic harmonization, whereby disjointed segments of society
must be united, and constructed differences be collapsed. The nationalist intellectual, in this regard,
emerges as a leading figure in the monumental work of “re-building” the nation, by means of a
process which one can rightly term collective nation-making in contrast to the postcolonial state
in its inherited form, which has clearly failed to reflect society in its diversity, and to promote
individual growth, and institutional progress. Eventually, nationalism could be viewed as a
countermovement that seeks to “de-construct” secular authority and its overall methods, and to
start a whole new process where all branches of society are included.
I must here draw an important distinction between liberation nationalism and “postindependence” nationalism. The former, which is more commonly observed, often involves a fairly
large group of individuals, sometimes indeed an entire country, that defines itself through its own
set of symbols to which the nationalists give greater value and meaning at the expense of those of
the opposing/invading force, hence the desire and determination to remove the latter.244 As for
post-independence nationalism, as it concerns this part of the chapter, the dividing line between it
and “liberation” nationalism, should one be seeking one, is not clear-cut. Given the changed

Algeria’s liberation war against imperial France is a good illustration of this type of nationalism. For further
information, see, Natalya Vince, Our Fighting Sisters: Nation, memory, and Gender in Algeria, 1954-2012
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015); there are however other examples such as the French liberation
war, when France was under German occupation, and army General, De Gaulle was seen as an embodiment of French
nationalism. For further details on this see, Robert Aron, The Vichy Regime, 1940-44 (New York: Macmillan, 1955).
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political situation, both parties can claim legitimacy on territorial or on other grounds; where there
is a difference it must instead be found in other areas such as the sociocultural and economic
domains. Ngũgĩ’s viewpoint proves crucial in this regard when he writes:
I have tried to see it in the context of the historical attempts, from colonial times to the
present by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie, in alliance with its local Kenyan
representatives, to turn Kenyans into slaves, and of the historical struggles of Kenyan
people against economic, political, cultural slavery.245
This assertion highlights significant dualities, which clearly helps clarify the complex situation
within postcolonial societies. Where difference was initially viewed in terms of race, ethnicity,
regional belonging, Ngũgĩ seems to substitute them with an economic and cultural ideology,
whereby national identity or belonging is established through one’s perceptions, sentiments, and
actions vis-à-vis host societies and cultures. In this particular context, as Ngũgĩ’s statement seems
to suggest, despite the fact that certain individuals dwell in Kenya and that they may well belong
to the same race, ethnicities, or regions, as the rest of society, yet these individuals, still, cannot be
called Kenyans in so far as they continue to work against the interests of the Kenyan people; or
simply put, the masses. In fact, Ngũgĩ seems unwilling to describe them as Kenyan, and, refers to
them, instead as ‘Kenyan representatives,’ removing, in the process, all meaningful ties to the
nation, eventually suggesting that the presence of such individuals in Kenya is solely motivated
by their exploitation of the masses.
The third part of this chapter analyses the phenomenon of women’s associations. The
objective, here, is to show how women’s social platforms in modern society are a clear attempt to
build a strong collective identity, by means of which the participants gain both agency and greater

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, Detained: A Writer’s Prison Diary, African Writers Series 240 (London: Heinemann, 1981),
Preface, p. xi, (emphasis added).
245

111
visibility, and where it also becomes possible for women to organize themselves and carry forward
their demands in a continually changing society. It is certainly important to highlight the influence
and impact of modern society upon women’s identity. The transition into the modern era along
with its established institutions has undoubtedly contributed greatly to a significant development
of women’s identity. The educational institutions, in particular, have proven critical, especially in
societies where women are expected to play secondary, as well as traditional, roles. 246 It is worth
noting, however, that the concept of women’s associations, far from suggesting mere individual
gatherings, informs a highly symbolic move towards the empowerment of African women.
Women’s associations appear to some extent as a reshaped version, an adaptation and development
of the role of African women relations in traditional societies where, despite gender discrimination
and patriarchal authoritarian power, women were able to maintain their own space. In the
postcolonial context, education plays a pivotal role since educated women seem to have developed
sharp awareness of gender differences and gender politics, which in turn, set them towards
developing new approaches to re-conceptualize gender relations in postcolonial society. Overall,
the formation of women’s associations should be analyzed within the specific context of gender
relations; most importantly, however, it is a powerful move on the part of African women to
advance the discussion on gender issues while it seems that the highest institution, the State, views
women collective movement as a threat to its survival.
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See for instance Awa Thiam, La parole aux négresses (Paris: Édition Denoël, 1978), p. 153-54; Awa Thiam, Black
Sisters, Speak Out: Feminism and Oppression in Black Africa, trans. Dorothy S. Blair (London: Pluto Press, 1986), p.
113; see also M. G. Smith, Government in Kano 1350- 1950 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 36.

112
4.1

Education and Nationalism in Ken Bugul’s La piece d’or.
The following is a transcribed portion of a recorded speech in which the current president

of Guinea, Alpha Condé, addresses an audience on the occasion of the 2017 edition of the “Forum
de l’Etudiant Guinéen.” 247 In the presence of local and foreign officials, the president, who was
visibly irritated by the students’ clamorous demand, thought it proper to ignore his campaign
promise to speak on something else quite unrelated:
Je vais devoir vous présenter mes excuses du comportement indélicat de ces gens qui ne
représentent pas la jeunesse guinéenne. J’ai été étudiant avant vous. Nous avons rendu
l’Afrique fier de nous! Vous êtes comme des cabris, tablette, tablette, tablette, comme des
cabris, mais vous êtes indignes de cela. Donc, pour le moment, on suspend les tablettes
jusqu’à nouvel ordre. Disons-nous la vérité, l’éducation en Guinée est malade. Les
étudiants qui sortent, soi-disant maitrisards sont même pas capables de faire une phrase
sans faire des fautes, même pas une phrase, ils sont là. Vous savez, j’ai été étudiant avant
vous, j’ai été syndicaliste étudiant. Donc, vous pouvez impressionner vos professeurs et
vos ministres, moi vous ne m’impressionnez pas. Vous pouvez sauter, crier jusqu’à demain.
Ça ne me fait ni chaud ni froid. Alors ceux qui crient montrent seulement qu’ils sont mal
élevés, mal éduqués, c’est tout. On va vous obliger à vous redresser, on va vous obliger à
vous redresser.248
Alpha Condé, “Alpha Condé insulte les étudiants.” Youtube, uploaded by Baldé Boubacar, 4 June 2017,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=POwXZoeZtL4&ytbChannel=Balde+Boubacar.
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like kids, yelling, tablet, tablet, tablet, just as kids do; and you are certainly undeserving. Therefore, at the moment, I
discontinue the distribution of tablets until further notice. Let’s face the truth, education in Guinea is paralyzed. Those
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straighten you out, one is going to have to straighten you out! (translation are mine).
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It is indeed remarkable that President Condé’s criticism of students expressly eschews what
appears to be both an educational and social demand for access to educational equipment. It is
even more troubling that President Condé chose, instead, to degrade the students’ language
abilities, specifically on their capability to correctly/ properly utilize the French language. It is
indeed difficult, if not impossible, to see how the students’ demand has anything to do with their
language ability. It, very much, looks like the president did not appreciate that students took
advantage of the event to voice their demand. Moreover, the fact that the president, purposely,
refused to respond to the students’ demands, to talk instead about education in general and its
failure to teach the students correct grammar, seems to suggest that the educational institution is
specifically designed for, and restricted to scholarly activities. Thus, in the eyes of the president,
it may appear that the students’ claim is purely political, and as a result does not deserve much
attention. Furthermore, the presence of university officials and local and foreign scholars further
informs the defensive, if not repulsive attitude of the president’s response, since the seemingly
non-academic issues raised within academic sphere appear as accusations levelled against the
ruling class. In fact, on a Guinea information website, the forum is described as follow: « le forum
de l’étudiant guinéen est pressenti par bon nombre d’observateurs, comme une tribune à laquelle
les acteurs du système d’enseignement et de formation, discuteront des enjeux et des problèmes
qui minent ce secteur». 249 As stated here, it is clear that the organizers of the forum expect all
discussions to be strictly centered upon the main topic. Additionally, as the main organizer of the
event, the ministry of education, therefore a government entity, certainly did not welcome any
contribution or action that might seeks to jeopardize the image of the ministry. In this context, the

“Many observers expect the Guinea Student Forum to be a platform where education and training specialists will
discuss issues that prey upon this sector” (my translation); see, Cheikh Alpha Ibrahima Camara, “Forum de l’étudiant
Guinéen: le film de la cérémonie de lancement.” Ginéenews.org, www.guineenews.org/forum-de-letudiant-guineenfilm-de-ceremonie-de-lancement. Accessed 5 July 2017.
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students’ claim may well appear to President Condé as an act of defiance that disrupts the very
environment of which he is supposed to be the ultimate manager. It is equally important to note as
I tried to show at the beginning of this chapter, that education in the postcolonial era has changed
quite significantly. Despite the fact that some segments of society still do not have access to
education, one must admit that education has ceased to be a privilege of a few, and has become
rather what could be referred to as un droit légitime. 250 This change has had a number of
implications. Where initially, beneficiaries of western education formed a highly trained unit, who
often completed their studies in the metropolis and were prepared for administrative functions
upon return; in the postcolonial era, the contrast is that now there are now entering the system
fairly large numbers of students, coming predominately from lower classes. The changed political
status quo has certainly had a significant impact upon the relationship between educated
individuals and postcolonial institutions. Colonial political dominance and its ensuing cultural
supremacy had, to a great degree, influenced the education system in general. The students of local
dignitaries were admitted as it was perceived they would become members of the colonial
administration itself. It became evident, more so in the French than in the British, that education
was to serve a fundamental role such that it would allow such projects to prosper such as French
cultural assimilation.251
It is by now clear that nationalism demands a strong sense of belonging and connection,
whereby the nationalist figure partakes directly in society’s projects and has an understanding of
people’s aspirations and ailments. Kwame Nkrumah’s assessment of Ghanaian society in the
aftermath of independence is quite evocative of nationalistic feelings. He writes thus:

“Legitimate right.”
See Jacqueline Sorel, Léopold Sédar Senghor: L’émotion et la raison,(Saint-Maur-des-Fossés: Edition Sépia,
1995), p. 34.
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Once this freedom is gained, a greater task comes into view. All dependent territories are
backward in education, in agriculture, and in industry. The economic independence that
should follow and maintain political independence demands every effort from the people,
a total mobilisation of brain and manpower resources.252
In his attack on neo-colonialism, Ngūgī seems to adopt a similar line of reasoning:
Democracy and justice can only be achieved when the various interest groups voice their
position and fight for them. Until democratic-minded Kenyans, workers, peasants, students,
progressive intellectuals and others unite on the most minimum basis of a patriotic
opposition to imperialist foreign domination of our economy, politics and culture, things
will get worse not better, no matter who sits on throne of power. 253
Both viewpoints reveal the need to achieve autonomy in one way or another. What seems implicit,
yet important, is the urge for all members of society to participate in the making of this autonomy
through which the nation can eventually sustain itself. In this regard, the call for action suggests a
drastic change in procedure. The need for all to unite and work collaboratively for the betterment
of the living conditions and welfare of the masses attests to a new approach where the existence
of classes does not hinder or oppose the formation of national identity. In fact, Ngũgĩ’s reference
to interest groups could very much include social classes. As such, a national stance, as outlined
by Nkrumah and Ngũgĩ, does certainly not disallow the creation of wealth, or perhaps, even the
existence of economically influential groups within the nation. Rather, what appears to be at stake
is the sense of fragmentation or disparity, in which most postcolonial societies have found
themselves. In this context, not only economic exploitation turns out to be acceptable, but further
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social injustices have ensued. In his definition of nationalism, Mazrui highlights some important
facts that shed light on nationalistic phenomena in postcolonial societies. He writes: “Nationalism
can be both an ideology with specific constituent ideas, or a set of sentiments, loyalties, and
emotional predispositions.” 254 The general context of postcolonial societies, however, suggests
that nationalism is rather a reaction and less an ideology. The rise of nationalist sentiments and the
immediacy of actions hardly allows for an effective and thorough ideological elaboration. Instead,
nationalism, appears to be an approach that best fits postcolonial society given its diverse
composition. The tendency for most traditional approaches to be insufficiently holistic, or to
establish exclusionary parameters places nationalism among the most efficacious media to draw
together and to organize diverse societies. Thus, the realization of the necessity to adopt a
nationalistic approach is clear evidence that postcolonial society had gone through deep
transformations as far as its identity is concerned. Moreover, the nationalistic platform and its
overall struggle for change becomes a manifest desire to design, or implement, what can be
referred to as a local version of national identity, one that differs significantly from those inherited
from the European colonizers and imposed upon indigenous societies. In this regard, nationalism
can be viewed as a furtherance of the people’s struggle towards the accomplishment of a model of
society that takes into consideration their views, values and aspirations. It becomes, therefore,
difficult, if not impossible, to speculate whether one can foresee an end to all the struggles against
those social structures that are premised upon discrepancies in place since colonial times. One is
reminded of famous statement of Sékou Touré (1922-1984), first president of Guinea-Conakry, at
the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Rome in 1959, when he said:

Ali Mazrui, “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Violence,” A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 472-482 at 472.
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Il ne suffit pas d’écrire un chant révolutionnaire pour participer à la révolution africaine.
Avec le peuple et les chants viendront seuls et d’eux-mêmes.
Pour avoir une action authentique, il faut être soi-même une part vive de l’Afrique et de sa
pensée, un élément de cette énergie populaire tout entière mobilisée pour la libération. le
progrès et le bonheur de l’Afrique. Il n’y a aucune place en dehors de ce seul combat ni
pour l’artiste, ni pour l’intellectuel qui n’est pas lui-même engagé et totalement mobilisé
avec le peuple dans le grand combat de l’Afrique et de l’humanité souffrante.255
The revolution President Touré suggests must not be mistaken for a random uprising of a
maddened crowd even though the assessment might still apply. Rather, what President Touré
seems to point towards is the need to change the postcolonial status quo in such a way that it takes
into account the demands of the masses. It is equally noteworthy that President Touré’s reference
to the artist and intellectual shows how both figures had come to symbolize leadership at a time
when political leadership, itself, has devolved to the educated at the expense of traditional rulers.
It has then become the responsibility of concerned intellectuals and artists to stand united with the
masses against a careless and alienating ruling elite.
Ken Bugul’s La pièce d’or published in 2006, 256 chronicles the tumultuous life of
Ba’Moïse. As a native of Birlane, Ba’Moïse had once enjoyed much respect from his peers.
However, political Independence (les années soixante) seems to have brought only hardship, as

Quoted in Fanon, Les damnés de la terre p. 199; “It is not enough to write a revolutionary hymn to be part of the
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resources have become scarce and arable land turned barren. As head of a family of four, including
his two sons, Moïse and Zaccaria, Ba’Moïse places ultimately much hope in his older son, Moïse,
who went to pursue higher education in the capital city, Yaakar.257 When the latter is expelled
from the university due to his involvement in politics, and left with little to survive with, Ba’Moïse
finds no other option but to journey towards the capital city to earn a livelihood and support his
ailing wife and younger son, Zaccaria. His sojourn in the capital city proves, nonetheless, harder
than expected as he became the easy target to a ruthless and exploitative Gorgui Diène.
In this novel, Bugul seems to contrast the identity of the postcolonial intellectuals with
those in the colonial period, who had been largely promoted into the colonial administration and
had further collaborated/ colluded with departing colonial powers. In fact, Bugul seems to draw a
clear line between the two periods along with their respective type of individuals. The novel’s
twenty-one chapters all begin with the name of well-known intellectual, political and religious
figures, who, for the most part, are associated with some form of struggle for sovereignty. This
particular feature of the novel seems to set it in a particular context, whereby the quoted figures
help guide the reader through a process of association. The narrator’s description of postcolonial
intellectuals in the following passage is indeed evocative: “Une nouvelle élite d’intellectuels issue
du peuple avait émergé à l’époque. Moïse en faisait partie. Ce fut avec Moïse que beaucoup de
jeunes de Birlane furent initiés à la dialectique, et pour certains, à la frime intellectuelle.”258 The
reader is provided with further insights regarding Moïse’s family background in the following:

A fictional city, but the reference is probably to Dakar, the capital of Senegal. “Yaakar” means “hope” in Wolof
and the name is not inappropriate for a place that promises someting other than the toils and restrictions which
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Ba’Moïse ne pouvait pas pavaner à la poste pour prendre son mandat, envoyé par le fils
professeur. Professeur. Dans sa famille, c’était la première fois que quelqu’un allait être
professeur. C’était une famille de cultivateurs et de commerçants, au bon vieux temps,
quand le pays marchait assez bien.259
This passage shows how crucially important education has become within societies with growing
disparities. It is important to note that education functions as a unifying factor in the sense that all
segments of society regardless of their geographic location are, or expect to be, provided this
modern tool. In particular, the educational institution fulfills, here, a fundamental role, which
should be expected to build up or consolidate national identity and cohesion. On the other hand,
especially with individuals from underprivileged classes, education serves principally a means to
improve one’s social status. In Moïse’s particular case, it is clear, as illustrated in the quote above,
that his father, Ba’Moïse, is now primarily interested in the financial benefits his son’s advanced
educational career is bound to yield. His understanding of the value of education does not now go
beyond the fact that his son’s scholarly progress should result in financial recompense from the
State to help make up for the collapse of the peanut market that had once afforded the family a
comfortable life-style. There, thus, seems to exist an underlying contract, if not an implied
agreement, between the State and members of society, whereupon adhesion to, or acceptance and
recognition of, the latter must necessarily bring benefits. It even seems that honoring this contract
would have sufficed for the state to maintain credibility and guarantee its overall integrity. In this
context, members of society must duly fulfill their part of the contract, which, consists,
fundamentally, in giving the state and its institutions a free, unobstructed hand to do as it likes.

Bugul, La pièce d’or p. 69 (my emphasis): “Ba’Moïse was no longer going to swagger to the post office to get the
money order his son, a future professor, was expected to send to him. A professor! It is the first time someone was
going to be a professor in his family. It was a family of peasants and traders in the good old days when the country
was in a fairly good shape” (my emphasis).
259

120
Jean-Jacques Rousseau gives, in this regard, an insightful assessment on this phenomenon when
he affirms: “Puisqu’aucun homme n’a une autorité naturelle sur son semblable, et puisque la force
ne produit aucun droit, restent donc les conventions pour base de toute autorité légitime parmi les
hommes.” 260 Rousseau’s convention concept proves clearly difficult, if not impossible, to apply
within societies with a colonial history where power relations have been premised upon different
standards; in other words, where the relationship consists of a small dominant group exerting its
power over a larger dominated one. Consequently, the power structure as well as its accompanying
features are in no way close to the ideal description given by Rousseau’s. If one proceeds along
the lines of Rousseau’s reasoning, the logical conclusion becomes that established authority in
former colonies lacked any legitimacy since from the beginning colonial power was simply
authoritative power and never devolved into anything else.261
Nationalism in the postcolonial context is certainly as much of a historical phenomenon as
political independence, itself, had been and it is important, in this context, to note that identity is
not defined exclusively through rigid spaces, just as presence within a specific location is no longer
sufficient to claim membership of a particular society or the identity of a particular people. It, thus,
seems that the emergence of new forms of identity have taken greater precedence over traditional
ones as if to reflect the newly formed societies. In this respect, the bourgeoisie has changed, and
is no longer just a social class, but has rather developed into a way of life, and an ideology through
which individuals from different locations and racial background can intersect and through which
they equally define themselves. It is seemingly in the particular vein that Ngũgĩ places the
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relationship between Western foreign bourgeois and their Kenyan representatives.262 Despite their
geographic remoteness, the two groups share the exact same values, rendering their collaboration,
eventually, just as natural. Additionally, the bourgeois capitalist values have become so crucially
important to both groups, that they are no longer simple life conveniences; instead, these values
have become their raison d’être.
In La pièce d’or, nationalism appears to be the result of the failure of the postcolonial
societal project, or the manifestation of significant social dysfunctions. Rousseau’s assessment of
the meaning and responsibility of the state is, once again, enlightening. He writes to this effect:
Car si l’opposition des intérêts particuliers a rendu nécessaire l’établissement des sociétés,
c’est l’accord de ces mêmes intérêts qui l’a rendu possible. C’est ce qu’il y a de commun
dans ces différents intérêts qui forme le lien social, et s’il n’y avoit pas quelque point dans
lequel tous les intérêts s’accordent, nulle société ne sauroit exister. Or c’est uniquement sur
cet intérêt commun que la société doit être gouvernée.263
Based on Rousseau’s assessment, the establishment of the State is the outcome of a communal
engagement, where all entities must be involved representing their own interests. This process, in
Rousseau’s view of a legitimate state authority, is fundamental since through it one can assume,
the sovereign can take account of the “social ties,” but more importantly, the sovereign becomes
also aware of the diverse body that makes up the society s/he is supposed to represent at the top of
the societal pyramid. It is important to precise in this regard, that the agreement to which Rousseau
refers to in no way, means that all differences are removed, or that uniformity is promoted instead.

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, Detained Preface, p. xi.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, p. 30; “For if the clashing of particular interests made the establishment
of societies necessary, the agreement of these very interests made it possible. The common element in these different
interests is what forms the social tie; and, were there no point of agreement between them all, no society could exist.
It is solely on the basis of this common interest that every society should be governed” (Jean-Jaques Rousseau, On
the Social Contract, p. 15).
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Rather the agreement here can both be real and symbolic, and its form may vary a great deal from
one society to another. The payment of taxes could exemplify this agreement, by means of which
all members of society would fulfill their duty to the state, with the possible difference that the
richer in society would pay a greater portion. In fact, Rousseau’s agreement implies to a significant
degree a form of commitment towards one’s community or society, which in turn reflects the
sentiment that one is fully and actively invested in one’s community, and committed to working
for its growth and overall progress. In this particular regard, Rousseau and Ngũgĩ seem to share
the same view since evidence of one’s belonging to a social community can no longer be
established solely on racial or ethnic affinities, but should rather be proven through one’s active
involvement and commitment to one’s community. This participative approach seems to have
become, in the postcolonial context, the only valid standard upon which members of society are
judged, and through which their true identity can be established.
In La pièce d’or, the evocation of the phenomenon of power shows a rather different
context from the one to which Rousseau refers. The postcolonial State appears here as a default
form of authority. Its formation and functioning prove indeed irregular and “unconventional,” to
use Rousseau’s language. The following passage gives a clear indication of this: “Le pays était
occupé par de nouveaux occupants sans cœur, sans âme, sans raison, sans scrupules, sans soucis,
sans ambition autre que le pouvoir.”264 Postcolonial authority, as described here, lacks legitimacy.
There is a sense of complete absence of process through which a social contract could be achieved.
Although the circumstances that allowed the ruling entity to hold on to power are not clearly
specified, it is evident however that the relationship between rulers and society is not one of

Bugul, La piêce d’or, p. 51; “The country was occupied and led by heartless individuals, who lacked reason and
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consensus. On the contrary, the very fact that the rulers are described as invaders (occupants)265 is
quite indicative of the established relationship. It appears here as if society altogether has been
alienated from communal power, making it, therefore, impossible to find any valid linkage
between the mass of the population and the ruling cohort. In this context, there is a clear absence
of any ‘social contract” which would have allowed the exercise of power to be reflective of, or in
keeping with a social agreement. The importance and weight of Rousseau’s “agreement” is such
that without it, the Sovereign, or ruling body cannot gain legitimacy, “Or c’est uniquement sur cet
intérêt commun que la société doit être gouvernée”266 Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of the legal
aspect of central authority suggests a similar phenomenon. He writes:
The theoreticians-philosophers, journalists, political parties, etc. contribute to the formal
part of this process while the mass movement contribute to the substantive part through
reciprocal actions and reactions, through ‘preventive’ actions before a phenomenon
becomes dangerous, and through repressions when the preventions have been unsuccessful,
or late, or ineffective. 267
Gramsci provides here a much clearer view of the process. Where Rousseau used the term
“interest,” Gramsci, chooses rather to exemplify it through the individuals involved in this
particular process. Thus, if “theoretician-philosophers,” journalists,” and “political parties” are
involved in designing laws, or other tasks that directly impact the way power is exercised, they
must necessarily have clear understanding of the target society for which those laws are designed.
If the legislation process is completed according to general expectations, it is very unlikely that
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the “substantive part,” meaning society at large, will need to intervene at any level, or it might just
choose to do so in order to adjust or suggest a different orientation to the law.
The use of the term “nouveaux occupants”268 is certainly symbolic of the nature of power
in the postcolonial era, and it helps one understand the nationalistic phenomenon at play in postIndependence society. Fabiola F. Irele made an interesting remark when he writes: “this
observation is based on the simple premise that, as with many other societies and cultures in the
so-called third world, the impact of Western civilization on Africa has occasioned a discontinuity
in forms of life throughout the continent.”269 Perhaps, other terms such as “European colonization”
or “Imperialism” would be more appropriate to use when referring to Europe’s subsequent
encounters with the peoples of Africa, since it is possible that the uninformed reader could confuse
this damaging experience with other events that brought the peoples of Africa and Europe in
contact. At any rate, it should suffice that historical record relates, for instance, that in the years
leading to the political “independence” of some of Britain’s West African colonies, the Asquith
Report, in keeping with what looks like its members’ vision, made the following suggestions:
His Majesty’s Government entered upon a programme of social and economic
development for the Colonies which is not merely the outcome of a desire to fulfill our
moral obligation as trustees of the welfare of Colonial peoples, but is also designed to lead
to the exercise of self-government by them. In the stage preparatory to self-government
universities have an important part to play, indeed they may be said to be indispensable.

“New invaders” (Bugul, La piêce d’or p. 50).
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To them, we must look for the production of men and women with the stands of public
service and capacity for leadership which self-rule requires. 270
It appears, here, that the process leading to political independence had been heavily orchestrated
at the very outset. Already, the mere fact of projecting its own vision of leadership for the colonized
peoples gives a good indication that the same colonial trappings are in place despite the fact that
the administration had plans to formally vacate the corridors of power. Its distrust of the ability of
the colonized societies to organize themselves must certainly have reinforced its conviction that it
would be solely up to the colonial administration to decide on how the newly independent State
should function moving forward. Thus, the view that the university is the sole institution capable
of producing skilled men and women with leadership capabilities is in itself no different from past
colonial practices for which colonial administrations had been renowned, and in which they
excelled quite remarkably. Moreover, the exclusive choice of the university informs one further
about European colonial ideology. It is important to remember, in this regard, the central role
education had played, both as a motive for colonial invasion, as well as in its critical function
within the very colonial apparatus. It was the primary medium which established the differences
between its graduates and the indigenous population leading to the divisions which resulted.271
Thus, the use of the term “nouveaux occupants” marks an important moment of self-realization,
especially when compared to the following: “Dans les années soixante, le rêve, c’était un monde
bien meilleur que celui d’avant les années soixante (…) C’était pour cela que le peuple s’était mis
debout, mobilisés sur la grande place.”272 The contrast is certainly more perceptible when one
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compares the words “rêve” and “nouveaux occupants.” An entire chain of events must have
unfolded, making society ultimately realize the true identity of their leaders. The dream for a better
society, and for a society that operates according to its own values, vision, and identities, which
equally displays both physical and social unity, seems to have simply been denied to the people.
When Moïse proves incapable of supporting his family back in Birlane, his father, Ba’Moïse, who
had placed tremendous hope in his son, decides to go to the capital city to fend for his family.
Upon arrival, however, he realizes how dire the economic conditions had become. The following
conversation between Gorgui Diène and Ba’Moïse is quite revealing:
― Bonne arrivée dans la jungle. Moi, je suis d’ici.
J’étais un pêcheur, issu d’une famille de pêcheurs.
Je ne connais que la mer. Mais je ne peux plus pêcher.
Les nouveaux occupants ont vendu la mer aux anciens occupants venus d’ailleurs.273
The societal project greeted earlier with so much hope now shows unambiguous signs of failure.
Gorgui Diène’s use of the word “jungle” reflects indeed the very nature of postcolonial society.
By choosing to attend to their personal interests over those of their society, the postcolonial leaders
have certainly distanced and alienated themselves from the masses, and have chosen, instead, to
collaborate with the former colonial powers in order to line their own pockets. In this regard, the
sale of the ocean resources appears as a distinctive act of treason, through which society
definitively discovers the true identity of its leaders, and where individuals like Gorgui Diène
become acutely aware of the new status quo.
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Nationalism among postcolonial intellectuals reflects a period of deep social
transformations. Indeed, the new generation of intellectuals seems to have become disengaged
from traditional roles and allegiances as soon as it entered in conflict with the postcolonial State.274
As such, there appears a clear desire on the part of these intellectuals to remain independent, in
other words, to stand as a free force that partakes in the discussion of critical social questions. In
this respect, the intellectual becomes what Rousseau would certainly refer to as a social entity that
fights for, or seeks to preserve its interest. Overall, however, despite the fact that the nationalist
intellectual is involved in postcolonial struggles, it is important to underscore the symbolic shift
through which the African intellectual attempts to build an identity of his/ her own.
In the Asquith Report quoted above, the reliance on university institutions to produce men
and women of high standard to replace British colonial administration suggests a strong link
between State authority, on the one hand, and the educational institution, on the other. Given that
the educational institution had been a byproduct of colonization, and had fallen, subsequently,
under the strict management of the State, it became simply an extension of the State. In this
particular context, it became clear that any entity operating under the umbrella of the Ministry of
Education must remain in total conformity with the central authority and obedient to it.
Additionally, any move intended at producing contrary effects is certainly viewed as an act of
defiance against central authority, as well as a clear political statement. Thus, nationalism as
carried by new generation of intellectuals constitutes a subversive act.
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In La pièce d’or, the appropriation by intellectuals of the demand of the masses marks a
turning point. In fact, the protagonist who had not been previously known for being an activist, or
engaged in politics in any way, feels suddenly compelled to break the silence by denouncing what
appears to be careless authority as illustrated in the following:
Une grève avait éclaté. Avec ses idées de justice sociale, Moïse n’était pas bien vu pour
les propos qu’il tenait à l’endroit des nouveaux occupants. Au cours des réunions
organisées par les étudiants qui se sentaient concernés et avait leur mot à dire, Moïse était
le plus audacieux. Il défiait le pouvoir, il écrivait des articles dans un journal que les
nouveaux occupants avaient dans le collimateur.275
It is quite remarkable that the decision to go on strike, which in itself is quite symbolic of the social
disruption occasioned by independence, is reinforced further by its social agenda. Because, one
can assume, despite the fact that the students’ strike is a nuisance to State authorities, it might have
been somewhat acceptable to the latter if the students’ demand was strictly educational. However,
the open social critique sets the students directly in conflict with the new leader. To better
understand the gravity of the move, and understand also what I mentioned earlier about the
established linkages between State institutions and other old colonial institutions, it is important
to follow up on the consequences that directly ensue:
Moïse, qui n’en pouvait plus d’accepter d’être nourri, logé par d’anciens parents d’élèves
qui n’avaient plus les moyens de faire continuer les études à leurs enfants, reprit à nouveau
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la parole. Il fut aussitôt recherché, poursuivi pour incitation à la révolte et radié alors qu’il
n’avait jamais reçu de fiche de paye.276
It is important to underscore that the act of dismissal not only signifies the end of Moïse’s
professional career, it equally symbolizes the loss of his status and standing in society. Thus, it
serves to remind other intellectuals of Moïse’s persuasion that they can only enjoy the benefits of
their status as long as they remain in good terms with State authorities. In a sense, the intellectual
is reminded here that he is wholly bound to, and dependent upon, the State and its representatives.
Thus, the sudden change in the nature of that relationship equally changes the way the State
authorities perceive Moïse. This phenomenon is indeed reminiscent of Michel Foucault’s study on
the making of the prison. He writes:
Elle s’est constituée à l’extérieur de l’appareil judiciaire, quand se sont élaborées, à travers
tout le corps social, les procédures pour répartir les individus, les fixer et les distribuer
spatialement, les classer, en tirer d’eux le maximum de temps, et le maximum de forces,
dresser leur corps, coder leur comportement continu, les maintenir dans une visibilité sans
lacune, former autour d’eux tout un appareil d’observation… 277
Foucault’s assessment helps make sense of a number of things. It appears that these old practices,
as Foucault himself shows, have been re-appropriated or adapted in modern society; the prison
being one of the more outstanding examples. When taking into consideration Foucault’s argument,
another dimension is added to the particular context of Moïse’s dismissal. For, the fact that he
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became a target of the authorities after being dismissed demonstrates that Moïse had been moved
into that category of individuals who pose a threat to the authorities, and must therefore be closely
watched and his influence made ineffectual. Furthermore, Moïse’s dismissal may also be a
demonstration of power on the part of the authorities. His removal helps maintain order, the
enforcement of which is critical to the authorities in postcolonial societies, as social discontent
remains on the rise. There is, in this regard, no coincidence between the loss of title and status, as
a result of exclusion, and the beginning of a form of victimization, which, in itself, manifests a
clear separation between the State authorities and the intellectual at this point.
Ngũgĩ’s detention in 1977 counts undoubtedly among one the most singular examples of
contemporary African intellectuals who paid a high price for siding overtly with their own people
against the nation’s leaders.278 In fact, it is interesting to compare Ngũgĩ’s novels279 and Moïse’s
militancy in La pièce d’or in the sense that they intersect on the particular point where both seem
to have committed what one may well refer to as un crime de lèse majesté.280. The intellectual’s
move towards making common cause with the affairs of society at large appears always suspicious,
if not downright dangerous to leaders and their acolytes. In his memoir, Ngũgĩ relates the
circumstances that led to his detention as follows:
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I am told, for instance, that some time in December 1977, two gentlemen very highly placed
in the government flew to Mombasa and demanded an urgent audience with Jomo
Kenyatta.281 They each held a copy of Petals of Blood in one hand, and in the other, a copy
of Ngaahika Ndeenda.282 The audience granted, they, then proceeded to read him, out of
context of course, passages and lines and words allegedly subversive as evidence of highly
suspicious intentions. The only way to thwart those intentions—whatever they were—was
to detain him who harboured such dangerous intentions, they pleaded.283
It would certainly be questionable to assert or pretend that Ngũgĩ never meant or sought to criticize
the capitalist and self-rewarding ways of Kenyan leaders. What is surprising, however, and perhaps
as well to Ngũgĩ himself, is the impossibility for the writer, to freely engage in discussions of
personal interest. In other words, Ngũgĩ’s detention is a clear reminder, once again, that the
intellectual in the postcolonial era continues to be forcefully constrained within a paradigm in
which he cannot freely identify or express himself or herself. Moreover, the major theme in I Will
Marry When I Want, is centrally focused on the issue of class difference between the rich and the
poor peasants. Ngũgĩ’s early engagement had perhaps sent a clear signal to Kenyan authorities,
especially when the take-away message in the above-mentioned play urges the poor and oppressed
to rise up against their oppressors and those who exploit them. Once again it appears here that the
intellectual is constrained within a strict disciplinary regiment where s/he must consistently remain.
It looks as though there once existed an agreement, or a contract wherein some general, yet strict,
guidelines had been clearly set, and which the intellectual had agreed to be bound by. Thus, any
breach of, or failure to abide by, this “agreement” becomes indeed consequential. And any
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discussion in any way or form by the intellectual of social or political questions that negatively
affects the authorities or hinders the good functioning of their personal businesses proves
intolerable. Ngũgĩ’s words certainly seem to concur, when he writes:
Although I have a fairly good account of those who were active in calling for the ban on
the performances of Ngaahika Ndeenda at Kamĩrĩĩthũ and also of those who fought for my
detention to “teach him a lesson in submission, silence, and obedience”, I have on the whole
avoided mentioning names.284
The idea that it is right for the State to “teach him a lesson in submission, silence, and obedience”
informs the nature of the power in place in the post-Independence era. This same implied
agreement demanding complete submission to the central authorities applies virtually to all active
agents within the society. Foucault made an important remark in this regard in his assessment of
the prison’s concept in its pre-modern form. He describes it as: “La forme générale d’un
appareillage pour rendre les individus dociles et utiles, par un travail précis sur leur corps…”285.
The desire to “teach,” the writer “a lesson in submission, silence, and obedience,” shows the extent
of the implicit status quo between the policing institutions and the administered subjects. It is
important to equally point out that nationalism, in this regard, serves a double purpose. If, on the
one hand, its primary objective is the liberation of the masses, it is certainly correct, especially
with regard to the intellectual, to view the process as one through which s/he also wages a personal
struggle in order to break away, once and for all, from State-constructed restrictions. This form of
nationalism is perhaps what Mazrui refers to when he writes: “Nationalism can sometime be
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preoccupied with the defense or revival of culture, rather with fidelity to the state.” 286 And it is
certainly correct to add to Mazrui’s remark that such nationalism may be more popular in former
colonial societies due to general economic discrepancies and the resulting social gaps. His remark
is all the more pertinent given that nationalism, despite structural differences between traditional
and postcolonial societies, aims at certain ideals, which very much reflect a general view within
these societies.
Further assessment of the nationalist figure shows how his/ her changed perspective and
understanding of the physical space challenge the very objectives and principles of the educational
institution. It is opportune, at this juncture, to be reminded again that the very establishment of
colonial educational institutions, more so with the French than the British, were an explicit attempt
to uproot young students from their original environment and confine them within some physical
and ideological space where they were expected to function as protégés of their colonial masters.287
Although it is possible to argue that the phenomenon has become less rigid than it used to be,
especially in post-Independence years, I need to emphasize that in any particular context of conflict,
any counter-movement, speech or view, is regarded inevitably as an act of subversion. Thus, the
act of linking the educational space to broader society constitutes a manifest sign of denial as well
as of revolt against the imposed status quo. In La pièce d’or, Moïse’s attitude during his militant
years in college is, in fact, clear evidence of this. His re-admission without a scholarship, following
his punitive expulsion for his involvement in a violent strike, looks very much like what Foucault
describes as a process through which the individual is rendered “docile.” One can argue that the
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suspended scholarship and Moïse’s subsequent failure to secure campus accommodation were
meant, to utilize those same words used against Ngũgĩ, “to teach him a lesson in submission,
silence and obedience.” It is, therefore, important to view his “re-admission” as an attempt to bring
the intellectual back into what is presumably a “privileged” position in the society. There appears
here a visible effort on the part of the State authorities to draw a clear line between the education
institution and broader society as being two separate and distinct spaces. And, therefore, the
maintenance of the intellectual within the educational space is contingent upon his/ her absolute
submission to the dictates of the leading authorities. Again, the connection between colonial and
postcolonial time is clearly evident, as this move would not have been out of place in colonial
times.
The linking of the two spaces, that of the educational institution and that of the society at
large, is not only symbolic of a rapprochement; in other words, an effort to unite educated and
non-educated segments of society. More importantly, it demonstrates an explicit desire on the part
of the nationalist intellectual to demystify his own personality such that it becomes possible to live
in complete unity with wider society, and where it becomes also possible for the latter to reappropriate what it had, perhaps, regarded thus far as lost generations. The following excerpt
addresses this issue “Et Moïse, avec le soutien de ses parents avaient connu les petites chambres
louées chez des particuliers. Ce qui l’arrangeait. Il vivait avec le peuple.”288 Moïse’s gravitation
towards the people is made more noticeable as he lived, whether by choice or financial constraints,
in tiny bedrooms. The ensuing contrast between the intellectual’s status, on the one hand, and his
poor living conditions, on the other, informs society, at once, of its own prejudices vis-à-vis
individuals with advanced western education. With such realization, the relationship dynamics is
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undoubtedly bound to change, whereupon the intellectual is no longer estranged, or viewed as an
outsider; rather, society understands and accepts that the intellectual can also be part and parcel of
it. Moreover, it is important to highlight that Moïse’s poor accommodation situation constitutes a
response, albeit indirect, which signifies to authorities his refusal to comply or compromise. For,
it goes without saying that the scholarship had, in all likelihood, been leveraged against Moïse to
silence him, given that the authorities must have expected him to bargain his scholarship back. The
point of view of the authorities seems to suggest that Moïse is too brilliant and distinguished an
intellectual to accept living under such “unsuitable” conditions, which lack of financial assistance
might inevitably cause. The ruling elite is not able to perceive a growing movement of change both
within the educational institution as well as a changing dynamic in society at large as exemplified
through the interactions and ties between a rising elite and the masses. Ngũgĩ’s experience
certainly exemplifies how the educational institution is utilized as an integral part of the power
apparatus, and how it, as a result, stands on its own physical and ideological site. Thus, Ngũgĩ’s
release, following to his detention for urging the poor and the peasants to rise up against their
oppressors, is followed immediately with what one can correctly describe as his exclusion from
the university, as he himself notes:
Just before my detention I was employed at the University of Nairobi. I was an Associate
Professor in Literature, employed on permanent terms because I was a Kenyan national.
Nowhere, in my terms of service was it ever mentioned that political detention would be a
factor in terminating the services of an employee.289
It seems, from what one can infer, here, Ngũgĩ did not realize that engaging in political writing,
especially against his own leaders constituted a major breach of the law. His exclusion from the
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university meant that he could no longer teach and therefore could no longer justify his presence
on the university premises. This, further, made real the separation between society as a distinct
space, and the educational institution as a separate entity. For, the objective of the nationalist
intellectual to fuse institutions with society becomes in itself a threat. And as Foucault succinctly
put it, strict categorization and classification of individuals is a proven characteristic of organizing
structures as they seek to achieve a wide range of objectives.
In the following section, I discuss the phenomenon of women’s association in an attempt
to show how changing social dynamics have contributed to the formation and emergence of new
units along with their own particular interests. Women’s associations, in this regard, reflect a
change in women’s perspective and an attempt to adjust to the realities of postcolonial society.
Additionally, it is important to highlight that the very formation of these associations shows
women’s determination to leave the marginal space they were assigned in traditional society, to
claim instead a place for themselves at the center, as they seek to play important social roles and
participate actively and, indeed, fully in the construction and maintenance of modern society.

4.2

The Women Association in Mohammed Umar’s Amina.

Sometime before my final year in elementary school I recall how my mother, every once in a while
would take a trip to the Gambia to purchase cloth and other items needed by women. Banjul, back
then was a renowned market place for imported goods from all over West Africa and even from
abroad. In part, low taxes on imported goods and proximity to my hometown were probably the
reasons why my mother found it convenient enough, and therefore, she never bothered to travel
longer distances. The best part, as far as I and my siblings were concerned, was the moment when
my mother would hand to each of us our specific gifts, which, for the most part, comprised shoes,
pairs of pants, or shirts. Of course, she did not spend days just to buy us gifts; in fact, most of the
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goods were bought by, or taken on loan by other women who either lived in the neighborhood, or
were well-known to my mother, while others were trusted acquaintances. My mother remained in
the business up until I was about to complete my Junior High School years. At that point, she
decided to stop these business trips because she could no longer bear the bad road conditions and
the days away from her family. Around the same time, she opened a shop selling household goods.
Although I don’t recall the circumstances leading up to it, I soon realized that my mother and other
women in the neighborhood, who were habitual visitors in our home, had formed an all-women’s
association. My mother was chosen to fill the position of treasurer, while that of President was
assigned to a well-known woman, whom we affectionately and respectfully called “Mère
Guèye.”290 As time went by, the association grew, opening up its membership to women from
other areas. The few times I was indirectly involved were when the rotational gatherings took place
in our home, and I and other young people were asked to prepare tea for those in the gathering
who preferred this beverage. In the course of the meeting, members paid their dues, reports were
given, future events planned, and finally the name of a person was drawn out and collected funds
were allotted to the lucky recipient. As far as I was concerned, I must confess, I did not pay much
attention as it was not unusual to see women’s gatherings of this nature in this community,291
however, the association type, and the way it functioned here , seemed quite new. There appeared
a clear sense of organization and a work agenda along with clearly set goals. There was even one
time, I remember when a Muslim scholar was invited to give a talk on a specific topic, which many,
both men and women, found beneficial, and all viewed the initiative in a positive light.
Unfortunately, disagreement and internal issues bogged down the association, which eventually
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led to its disintegration. My mother, however, did not wait until then. As treasurer, she had faced
countless unfounded rumors, which she had, each time, dismissed by giving a detailed account of
the overall expenditure of the association, and showing proof of the outstanding funds. Although
the Association did not live on, it seems that the model had inspired other women who organized
themselves in a similar fashion. There are today countless women’s associations in my hometown,
and all over Senegal which work in different areas. Interestingly, rural women have also adopted
the concept and had been quite effective in achieving a number of important changes, which have
affected significantly the lives of many rural women.292
Although the introduction by the colonial administration of new set of institutions has
significantly transformed the African landscape, it goes without saying that gender relations did
not alter as significantly. And despite the fact that women’s limited access to education does
account for the gap in women’s representation and roles in the new society, 293 the issue is also
related to the difficulty women face when it comes to maintaining their own autonomous space,
which could allow them to fully function without being subjected to patriarchal and authoritative
power. In a sense, women’s associations are an innovative approach to the problem, since in its
functional form the association is a conceptualization of physical space. By establishing an
organization women are able to circumvent traditional obstacles as well as well as those that
emerged in the modern era. In his study of colonial discourse, Homi Bhabha writes:
An important feature of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in
the ideological construction of otherness. Fixity as the sign of cultural/ historical/ racial
difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation: it
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connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic
repetition.294
In the particular context of gender differences and the power relations in postcolonial society, Awa
Thiam’s assessment is particularly vivid and to the point. She notes: “De cette humanité nous ne
retenons que l’existence de classes sociales et de deux catégories d’individus : les hommes et les
femmes, ceux-ci et celles-ci existant dans un rapport antagonique de dominants à dominés.”295
Despite difference of contexts and objects of study, it is clear that Bhabha’s concept of fixity may
well apply to gender relations within the African context. For, as Thiam shows, the power
phenomenon and the conflict of interest that underlies the relationship between men and women
also dictates a colonial-like attitude and discourse through which the male constructed status quo
can be further perpetuated. In this regard space has been very much part of the restrictive apparatus.
I should distinguish here between gender roles and the discourse on space since, I believe, they are
different and should, therefore, be kept apart. A historical perspective, in this regard, helps uncover
and explicate how appropriation of both the physical and institutional space has allowed the
establishment of a masculine authority and, subsequently, the delegitimizing of any attempt by
women to create or claim a space of their own through which they may be able to build agency
and craft an identity of their own. This is what Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako suggest in their study
of African institutions when they assert:
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While women’s role on the farm expanded, women’s land right did not necessary improve.
The number of female cultivators multiplied, but land continued to be owned by fathers,
husbands, brothers, or even more traditionally, by a clan or tribe, led by male elders. 296
The authors go even further when they assess that “Traditional gender institutions have limited
women’s role to the domestic arena. However, contemporary institutions in Africa have
empowered African women to demand and achieve participation in public decision-making.” 297
The difference may not be as clear-cut as the authors suggest. Because one has yet to establish just
how postcolonial institutions have empowered African women when the same institutions are
virtually under the complete control of male authorities. It may perhaps be more appropriate to
view postcolonial institutions as a nexus, a passageway towards complete emancipation. In a sense,
women’s “independence” can only be achieved if and when women are able to claim and maintain
authority over a space, away from men’s influence and patronage.
Women’s associations, as Philomina Steady has argued in her study on women and
collective action in Africa, must be placed within the specific context of the postcolonial power
phenomena.298 The emergence of the “modern” State, whether secular or otherwise, has de facto
maintained the same gendered view towards women and other constituent minorities as in colonial
and pre-colonial times, thus restricting further women’s margin for action as State authorities
invest themselves with both traditional and modern roles, thus widening the scope of their power
apparatuses. The phenomenon is even more intriguing, especially in the case of women, because
the State has granted itself all prerogatives, and made itself the sole legitimate possessor of
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postcolonial space. Although the comparison does not lend to strict similarity, Appadurai’
examination of predatory identities provides a significant insight into the phenomenon. He argues:
The formation of an ethnos into a modern nation often provides the basis for the emergence
of predatory identities that claim to require the extinction of another collectivity for their
own survival. Predatory identities are most always majoritarian identities. That is, they are
based on claims about, and on behalf of, a threatened majority.299
Gender differences and the struggle for gender equality might certainly represent a lesser form of
this extreme opposition, which often takes place between distinct groups or tribes such that it
happened between the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. In the context of
gender opposition and politics, however, it is certainly appropriate to regard men in general as a
predatory entity on both a societal level as well in the grand scheme of postcolonial State power.
At a society level, as Kenneth Little, for instance, shows, the newly formed nation is characterized
by an industrial economy, which, in effect, opens up employment opportunities to men and women
and by doing so allows competition to take place.300 At a State level, on the other hand, the very
characteristics of the “secular” State is an invitation to all civil members of society, including
women, to partake in the organization and administration of common affairs. In this regard, then,
the State itself is an open field aiming for inclusion, participation and expression of all. However,
as Bhabha points out in his concept of fixity, it is clear that unchanged relationship between men
and women throughout the colonial period has, resurfaced, and the postcolonial State has reinstated the traditional views on gender.301 Thus, looking through Appadurai’s lenses, one can
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perceive women’s inability to claim or create their own space as a sign of sociopolitical “extinction”
in lieu of the biological one. In Mohammed Umar’s novel, Amina, from 2005, this is the situation
educated women face.302 The novel tells Amina’s life story. Born into a poor family with limited
resources, Amina belongs to a generation of girls who had the chance to attend school. With the
support and encouragement of her mother, Amina is able to pursue her studies in college. However,
when her mother dies, she lost both support and protection, as her father sees no benefit to her
daughter’s advanced education. Soon afterwards, her father decides to marry her to Alhadji Haruna,
a politician and wealthy businessman, thus interrupting Amina’s studies. Left to fulfill the
responsibilities of a housewife, Amina cannot but engage in a mission to help organize women in
her neighborhood are she became aware of their victimization and exploitation. She, thus,
collaborates with Fatima and the university student association, who help her found the Bakaro
Women Association in order to educate women in her neighborhood and relieve them from
economic dependence. The student association is, however, banned on the campus premises, and
its members are left with no option but to hold clandestine meetings at trusted friends’ houses.
Speaking about the bourgeois leaders, Gloria, a female member of the association affirms: “It’s
difficult to find one patriotic bourgeois here. They are lazy, crafty, ignorant, dubious, arrogant,
and irresponsible. They deliberately block all avenues of progress and instead propagate backward
ideas.” 303 Gloria’s statement informs about the sentiment that the transition to an independent
nation has simply reinforced traditional ways of thinking. However, the substitution of an educated
elite for the traditional rulers certainly does not signify an end to the ideological practices of gender
discrimination as Gloria seems to believe it should. Her expectation that the leaders of the
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postcolonial nation should follow a different course with a distinct modern agenda has misguided
her concerning the reality of the situation, which perhaps might have allowed a better
understanding into the phenomenon of the postcolonial State. Clearly, the leading elite is part of
social fabric, and as such strives to find ways and means to maintain its interests and privileges, as
Rousseau once put it. Robert Fatton’s assessment seems to point towards the same direction since
he maintains “In Africa, class power is state power, the two are fused and inseparable. State power
is inseparably male power, and this in turn implies that African women have been
marginalized.”304 The situation, however, is not as contradictory or antagonistic as one may be
tempted to believe. Despite the sense of inclusion, that is, the uniting of a number of traditional
nations into one,305 the postcolonial State does not seem to have made it part of its mission to
provide women same equal chances as men have enjoyed in both the colonial and postcolonial
period. Unchallenged traditional gender discourse has emerged immediately after the departure of
the colonial authorities and society defaulted back to its precolonial status quo on this issue.
At any rate, women’s inability to hold or be part of the public space may well have been a
cultural phenomenon upon which both the “hegemonic” cultures of Europe and those of Africa
had once clearly settled. Simone De Beauvoir, in fact, notes a fairly similar situation in her
discussion of women’s condition. She notes:
… jusqu’à la loi de 1942, le code français réclamait d’elle l’obéissance à son mari ; la loi
et les mœurs confèrent encore à celui-ci une grande autorité : elle est impliquée par sa
situation même au sein de la société conjugale. Puisque c’est lui qui est producteur, c’est
lui qui dépasse l’intérêt de la famille vers celui de la société et qui lui ouvre un avenir en
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coopérant à l’édification de l’avenir collectif … La femme est vouée au maintien
de l’espèce et à l’entretien du foyer, c’est-à-dire à l’immanence.306
De Beauvoir’s remarks underscore a fundamental point concerning the gender split. Simply put,
her remarks suggest that men are perceived as makers and builders of society. They are the ones
endowed with the power and might to transform, alter, craft, legislate and organize society, while
women’s characteristic “weakness” demands that they remain care-givers, and be, overall,
dependent, and dwell in the domain of minor things. De Beauvoir, in fact, exemplifies this
phenomenon when she adds: “ Dans certains milieux bourgeois, on laisse encore la jeune fille
incapable de gagner sa vie ; elle ne peut que végéter en parasite au foyer paternel ou accepter dans
un foyer étranger quelque position subalterne”307 Interestingly, the established relationship here
shows in this particular instance how removed the woman is vis-à-vis the locus. In both instances,
(father’s home, stranger’s home) she fails to maintain any legitimate connection with her space,
and can only relate to it through the male figure. Thus, it is obvious that she is denied the
prerogative to own her space because allowing such change sets a major precedence challenging
men’s raison d’être, as well as to society’s overall direction since land, space, society,
administration, legislation become all synonyms of power and are therefore exclusively reserved
for men.
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Conceptualization of material phenomena often translates a desire and resolve to actualize,
albeit through abstract representations, the very object in ways that allow the individual to
experience the same effects as those felt in “real” life. In effect, the postcolonial State’s complete
denial of women’s unrestricted access to and participation in “building” the nation, and
concomitantly, women increasing victimization, seems to have encouraged women to seek
alternative routes towards complete emancipation. In this respect, the establishment of women’s
association, even prior to any practical implementation, sends a clear signal, because the very idea
of building an association has significant material implications, which suggest unity, agreement
and a sense of direction vis-à-vis a more or less defined object.
In Amina, even though the women’s association manages to gather on a number of
occasions, it is obvious that their ability to circumvent the physical obstacles they are presented
with and to design, instead, an abstract or virtual space proves critical. The conversation between
Fatima and the protagonist, Amina illustrates this quite well: “My suggestion to you is this: try and
organize the women in this area. Educate them in the broadest sense. Open their eyes so that they
can see the world they are living in clearly.”308 It appears that the ability to raise awareness is
premised very much upon the possibility to maintain a space, though of a different kind, since
leaders of postcolonial society categorically deny women any such right. In fact, Fatima’s
suggestion “to organize the women” does not actually have the implication that it would be
necessary to establish a headquarter or anything of that sort. The implication, rather, is to build a
body, to organize and to develop a sense of cohesion, which would be significant enough to allow
those on the other end of the spectrum to perceive the beginning of a powerful movement, one
which might prove difficult to suppress due to the fact that it is conceived of abstractly although it
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is real in substance in terms of people actively participating in it. The following description of the
association’s activity gives a glimpse into the phenomenon: “They came out on a Saturday
morning and worked hard to clear the rubbish in their houses and on the streets.” 309 The absence
of specific details about who the participants are, as well as the sensation of their suddenly
appearing which in fact leaves the reader wondering where they come from,, seems to further make
the association seem a nebulous structure. One can argue that denial of women’s rights by male
leaders had been so complete that it had become absolutely impossible for women to physically
initiate any action or to attempt to establish a permanent site from which to work out of. Instead,
the women bonding and create a space for themselves by means of the association, which proves
quite effective in the struggle for recognition and complete emancipation. Adrien Huannou’s
assessment is quite enlightening in this regard since he writes:
Pour faire aboutir leurs revendications féministes, pour garantir à la lutte de libération
féminine une efficacité certaine, les femmes doivent s’unir et rester solidaires. Sans des
actions collectives concertées, elles ne peuvent espérer changer la condition et mettre un
terme à l’oppression masculine. 310
Huannou makes an important point. His urge for African women to “unite” in response to male
oppression suggests that women vulnerability is, to a large extent, the result of solidly staked-out
societal structures, of which women must be aware, and against which they must stand. In this
context, the establishment of women’s associations become, in a sense, a materialization of this
awareness as women of all background “stick together” and work towards specific objectives.
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Furthermore, the concept of women’s associations proves all the more practical because the nonphysicality of the association increases the odds of success. Since, should one trust Foucault’s
assessment, the construction of encompassing structures such as the women’s associations might
simply be unacceptable to both individuals holding traditional views, as well as the postcolonial
patriarchal State. For, it is obvious that grouping women of different background together runs
counter to the exploitative approach of “classification,” which enables the postcolonial male ruling
class to continue to uphold traditional status quo, which maintained women in rigid social
categories.
The formation of the women’s association as a structure that embodies and reflects
women’s aspirations and demands also set a major precedence since the association represents,
without doubt, a platform whereby women are able to take on new roles outside of those
traditionally assigned to them, and are thus able to craft distinct personalities and identities. It is
important here to highlight the impact the establishment of the postcolonial State has had, and to
understand what constitutes the actual stakes vis-à-vis women and their organizations.
Despite its modern characteristics and structural functioning, which, by the way, constitute
part of its distinctive features, the postcolonial State, as I have attempted to show with reference
to Bhabha’s concept of fixity, does not seem to allow women to move outside of their traditional
roles. In other words, the very need for women to “build” an association reflects a clear failure on
the part of the postcolonial State, in particular, and society, in general, to regard women as full
citizens in their own right. Rather, the postcolonial paternalistic leadership continues to perpetuate
traditional views and other clichés, thus, turning the State institution into what one can fairly refer
to as a feudal apparatus.311 In this regard, women’s struggle for emancipation must be heavily
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predicated on new types of identities, which, despite the fact that they may not suppress old ones,
need to be promoted at once. Because, for so long as women are trapped in traditional constraints,
it is obvious that both society and the State will continue to propagate outdated and indeed
irrelevant views on women. Additionally, as Benjamin Thomas explains, the composition of
African cities and urban centers often reflects similar phenomena and practices as those witnessed
in traditional settings.312 This situation certainly explains why certain habits and views continue to
prevail within the urban centers. In Amina, in fact, such seems to be Fatima’s major preoccupation.
Her appraisal of women’s overall condition in both her neighborhood, Bakaro, and throughout
Nigeria leads her to the conclusion that it is high time that women took a stand. She, thus, advises
Amina, her former College roommate:
A whole generation expects us to do something positive because we are the privileged ones,
the ones with education. Although it’s difficult and involves a great deal of sacrifice, it’s
our task. Look at how our women live. Look at the children on the streets! Our rulers have
betrayed and failed us.313
Fatima’s statement shows how imperative it is for women to take upon themselves the task of
changing women’s lot. By placing the educated woman on the forefront of the women’s movement,
the objective is to ensure strong leadership since Fatima’s educational training has allowed her to
understand the role and responsibility of the State. Equally important is the fact that the educated
woman is able to unravel the different ramifications existing between the State and other traditional
institutions which are used to discourage, or deny, women their rights. In a sense, despite the fact
that the State represents a modern institution, it is clear that the leaders have failed to give women
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the same equal opportunities as their male counterparts and have in the process gendered the State
institutions. One can find perfect illustration when Amina, the leader of the Bakaro Women’s
Association, attempts to convince the legislature to withdraw a bill her own husband had sponsored.
Her conversation with Al Hadji Isa, the House Chairman on Social Welfare, Youth and Culture,
is very revealing of the leaders’ mentality. The conversation goes as follows:
Yes! What can I do for you? He fired.
We came to persuade you to give us a chance to speak before you pass the bill on women
into law, Amina replied politely.
You should speak to your husband who can lobby on your behalf, he contended.
But the law is against women’s interest and we want to make our voices heard, she
countered. But women have no interests, he laughed contemptuously. Amina was not
perturbed.314
It is quite remarkable that throughout their exchange, Al Hadji Isa shows absolutely no desire or
willingness to consider women as anything else than an inferior being, someone who must as a
consequence live under the complete dependence of men. Even more alarming is the sense that
women do not have the right to express their views, wishes, or claims except through their male
guardians: father, husband, or brother. It is important to note, in this instance, that Amina’s
decision to seek redress with respect to the bill departs from her acknowledged roles and
responsibility as coordinator of the Bakaro Women’s Association. By referring to members of the
association as ‘We,’ Amina seems to put forward their status as independent members of society
who deserve fair and equal treatment, and who, by the same token, refuse to be restricted within
strict social and cultural bounds. Nivedita Menon is certainly correct when she writes: “It is by
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now a phenomenon well recorded by feminist scholarship and politics that communities vest their
honor in ‘their’ women, and that cultural policing begins with first marking and then drawing
women ‘inside’ the community” 315 It seems, here, the phenomenon of cultural policing is very
much at stake. For Al Hadji Isa’s suggestion that Amina “should speak to her husband” directs her
back to, and commands that she follows, cultural codes. In a sense, Al Hadji’s statement is a
reminder that the political domain is and remains the realm of men, and women’s grievances must,
therefore, be transmitted through men, as they are the only entity allowed to engage in public
political discussions Such view is absolutely not novel, especially when M. G. Smith’ study of the
political history of the Emirate (and now State) of Kano in Northern Nigeria, reveals the following:
“Women, also, under this local mixture of custom (al’ada) and Muslim law (shari’a) remained
jural minors, subject to numerous incapacities in relation with their agnatic guardians and husbands
alike.”316 Concerning politics, Smith adds:
Finally, except for certain offices reserved to the chief’s kinswomen (…) all females were
entirely excluded from the political system. They nonetheless participated passively in this
sector of social life whether by transfer as brides to cement political alliance, to reinforce
selective kinship links, or as concubines (kuyangi, kwarakwarai, sudaku) who ranked
among the greatest rewards the system had to offer.”317
Thus, despite the historical changes in political structure, traditional views on women do not seem
to have been in any way modified. Quite the opposite, since these views continued to be reproduced,
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showing, once again, the determination of postcolonial leaders to continue a historical process of
discrimination against women. It seems that a consequential transformation process is under way,
the outcome of which will be to re-establish part, if not all, of the traditional anti-women tenets as
formal policies of the “modern” State. In fact a close look at the bill on women sponsored by
Amina’s husband suggests just that:
- All Muslim women and girls must wear veils on the streets.
- Only a certain percentage of girls will be allowed into schools.
- Street trading by women has been banned.
- All women’s organisations must be re-registered.
- All re-registered women’s organization will be under the strict control and
supervision of state officials and religious leaders.
- Women engaged in domestic industries will be taxed.
- Single women will no longer be allowed to work in the state civil service.
- Single women living in government housing estates will be evicted.
- Single women will be tried for adultery if they are pregnant.
- Maternity leave for married women has been cancelled.
- Women workers will no longer qualify for protection against dismissal.
- Vigilante groups shall be set up in every part of the state to monitor the way
women dress.
- Courts shall be empowered to penalize women for dressing immodestly.
- Women will no longer have the right to own land.
- Single mothers will be tried for having illegitimate children…318
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This portion of the bill sheds much light on the leaders’ agenda. The bill, as the excerpt shows,
aims to strip women of their remaining few rights, but the greater purpose, it seems, is to hinder
women’s actions such that they continue to live in dependency, and under the authority of men.
The assumption is that allowing women unrestricted access to resources and unmonitored activity
shall lead to disastrous transformations and the “degradation” of society, which might, eventually,
put the State under significant pressure to change. Thus, the limiting of women’s economic
initiatives combined with a strict policy of policing them, remains the surest ways to guarantee
societal stability.
The establishment of women’s associations and other empowering structures in the
postcolonial era reflects, in a certain way, upon women’s determination to play an active role in
modern society in ways that enable them to effect change both locally and on the global stage. It
is fundamental to underscore the effect and impact of the postcolonial State since its very
functioning and structure runs opposite the traditional way of life, which made it equally possible
to transcend ethnic and religious barriers. The configuration of the State and its broader
ramifications allows, in fact, women, and other entities that are traditionally isolated from one
another to unite and devise different approaches based upon their acute awareness of global
phenomena in which they are keen to play an active part. Samuel Huntington highlights an
important point in reference to modernization when he writes: “At the societal level modernization
enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the
people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive.” 319
In the African postcolonial context, modernization, as Little shows, manifests itself most notably
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through economic transformations.320 The inclusion of African farmers into the global economy
and the beginning of industrial activity has brought about significant transformations such as ruralurban migration, and the establishment of urban communities, as well as the creation of auxiliary
professions to cater to the growing urban populations.321 Most importantly, however, especially
with regard to women, the increasing number of educated women, although disproportionate when
compared to men, has allowed women to enjoy relative freedom of movement and economic
independence, as well.
It very much seems in Amina that women have experienced deep transformations. From
their traditional role as dependent entities, Amina and other members of the women’s association
have clearly moved forward to play primary roles in society. The failure of the State leaders to
promote significant economic change and ensure social welfare for an increasing destitute
population has strengthened the women’s resolve to search for alternative strategies and establish
themselves as economic agents capable of investing directly in their local communities and their
nation without the support or assistance of the authorities. Amina’s reflections on women’s selfsufficiency is quite indicative of the association’s overall objective, and the role women are to play
in their own societies henceforth: “If women could cooperate…if they could form a movement
under which resources were pooled…poor people could work independently and benefit from their
labour…cooperation was the key.”
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determination to ensure women break away from continued dependency on their male counterparts,
can be better perceived in comparison to Mazrui’s own observation when he writes: “Traditional
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gender institutions have limited women’s role to the domestic arena.”323 One major difference,
here, appears to be the transformation of African societies, and the adoption and imposition of a
western value system of economic and financial output which allows the society and its members
to connect directly to a global network of exchange. Thus, the need for women to be involved in
economic activity, as Amina reflects, and their potential for economic success and independence
clearly is a reflection on the significant changes that have taken place in modern society. In this
particular context, access to currency and the implementation of a market economy become
powerful tools that allow women to fully participate in society and expand their sphere of influence.
In her study of Muslim families in Senegal, Beth Buggenhagen shows how Senegalese women had
attempted to cope with the 1980 economic crisis by resorting to the sale of cloth through existing
women’s networks, including a Europe-based clientele. The author puts it thus:
For Senegalese women, the display and distribution of cloth were not directed at
demonstrating individual wealth and personal vanity, but rather made visible the strength
of women social networks…It was through these social ties that women made ends meet,
created enduring form of value, and engage in critical practices in tough financial
circumstances.324
These women’s networks, in the postcolonial context had, in fact, assumed a greater proportional
role in the economy, which had allowed women to widen their margin of action and impact. In
Senegal, for instance, the development of religious orders, especially in post-Independence years,
and the creation of a women’s wing within these orders made it possible for women to fully
contribute to the diffusion of their orders, and had also provided women with the opportunity to

323

Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, African Institutions p. 54, my emphasis.
Beth Buggenhagen, Muslim Families in Global Senegal: Money Takes Care of Shame (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2012), p. 26.
324

155
network beyond the religious realm. This situation had allowed those women involved in economic
activity to rely upon their peers within the order to build a clientele and promote their business
even further using other social media. Moreover, the deep transformation within these religious
orders as they moved from being originally ethnic-centered, in precolonial and colonial times, to
becoming national movements, have had a significant impact on the orders, overall, and for women,
in particular. The chance to bond across ethnic lines has, without doubt, opened a greater space for
enterprising women given the potential for women from other groups to become partners or
intermediaries. In this particular context, then, women, through their own existing networks, have
been able to fully contribute to their society despite the denial or reluctance on the part of the State
authorities to allow inclusion of women within the State apparatus, or at higher levels of decisionmaking. Jeff Haynes’s description of empowerment makes sense here:
Empowerment means acquiring the awareness and skills necessary to take charge of one’s
life chances. It is about facilitating the ability of individuals (and groups) to make their
own decision and, to a greater extent than hitherto, to shape their own destinies.325
It is certainly pertinent to highlight the role women associations and other types of women’s
network play. The associations and the nature of their agendas allow women to broaden the scope
of their activities beyond the traditional household domain and expand it to include both the
community and wider society. In Amina, this is exemplified through the participation of the women
in the project “Operation Keep Bakaro Clean” during which members of the association take on
the task of sanitizing their own neighborhood: “They came out on a Saturday morning and worked
hard to clear the rubbish in their houses and on the streets.”326 The decision to move out of their
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houses and enter the communal and public domain testify to the women’s understanding of their
new identities and expanded roles. In a sense, the association becomes the embodiment of the
existing ties between the women and the nation, and between women and society in general,
whereupon freedom of action and freedom of movement in the society is premised largely upon
the existence of the nation.327 In addition to their traditional roles, African women do, however,
uncompromisingly claim membership in modern society, as well as to a modern identity, visible
in the case of Amina through the association and its activities. Mariama Bâ’s comment on the
character of African women is perhaps helpful in this regard. Answering a question put to her
during an interview with Barbara Harell-Bond in 1980 who commented: “One thing which seems
to set African women apart from many women in western society is their confidence in their
femininity,” to which Bâ replied: “Yes, that is true. We do not imitate men. Yes, African women
are fulfilled as women.”328 If one is to trust Bâ’s point of view, then it would be, perhaps, more
appropriate to regard women’s struggle, in the postcolonial context, as an attempt to fully enter
into the modern world where African women can find safe ground for self-expression and
individual and collective growth, rather than a determined move to compete with their male
counterparts. This phenomenon actually reflects Jean-Marc Moura’s argument that Francophone
societies are engaged in the construction of a new locus, where cultural interaction with the West
remains constant, and creates new meanings.329
As I close this chapter, my attempt to discuss education and nationalism has sought to show
how changes in the postcolonial society has altered much of the colonial dynamics, and, has set
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postcolonial societies off in new directions. Education, in this regard, comes to play a critical role,
as it becomes one of the most viable means to instill a sense of belonging, and thus build cohesion.
However, as I showed, this seeming “contract” between society and the State has become deeply
compromised. On the one hand, the unfulfilled expectations the people have had of their
postcolonial leaders has contributed to alienate postcolonial intellectuals and society at large, who
view the trend as evidence of a continuation of the former colonial ideology. On the other hand,
the maintenance of colonial educational paradigm has equally contributed to widening the gap
between the privileged and the poor. In this context, the adoption of a nationalistic approach
becomes not only reflective of sociopolitical transformations, but it appears clearly as one of the
most effective ways to reveal the true identity of the postcolonial leaders. By painting them as
“Other,” meaning not belonging to the nation, the nationalist is equally able to foster and propagate
a new identity that is consistent with, and reflective of, the structure and values of the reshaped
society.
In the second part of this chapter, my discussion of the women’s association in Amina
sought to establish how the functioning of the association as a collective unit reflects on women’s
awareness of their overall condition. I further argued that the association represents a platform
whereby women of different backgrounds are able to bond over a non-physical, virtual space in an
attempt to free themselves from traditional patriarchal constraints and be fully functional in
modern society. Here, I showed the paradoxical role the State authorities play, as they, themselves
have emerged as the main obstacle to women’s integration into society and political emancipation.
And finally, my elaboration has shown how, despite major restrictions, women have remained
major agents of change both in their immediate environment and on a larger scale.
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THE WEST AFRICAN WRITER AND THE SECULAR
QUESTION

In his essay on secularism and Islam in Senegal, Roman Loimeier quotes Article One of
the Senegalese constitution, which reads: “The Republic of Senegal is laicistic, democratic and
social.”330 Perhaps in his desire to shed light on the Article’s historical context and background,
Loimeier further points out that this was “a formula that was taken over from the French
constitution of 1958 which was again based on the ‘Law of the Separation of Church and State’ of
5 December 1905, where the French state defines itself as ‘non-confessional.’331 This portion of
the constitution, if anything, adds a significant official caché to the role of secularism in the
constitution of Senegal and how it is interpreted. Despite limited and unpopular protest in the case
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of Senegal,332 elsewhere, particularly in Nigeria, there have arisen growing tensions and divisions
within this ethnically and religiously divided country. If the term “laicistic” survived in the first
Senegalese Republic, in Nigeria, however, the trend was quite different. As described in Toyin
Falola’s work,333 the ultimate solution to the debate and controversy over the inclusion of the term
“secular” in the Constitution, was simply to remove it, and define Nigeria as a “religious country
without an official religion.” Thus, if the secular political model was viewed within the political
class as the most effective model to maintain Nigeria’s territorial unity, it goes without saying that
religion, especially in West Africa, had continued to play a significant role in the lives of a
predominately poor population.334 This has been demonstrated through the studies of Debra BoydBuggs who examines the importance of Sufi brotherhoods in postcolonial Senegal, while Paul
Gifford stresses the impact and influence of Christian fundamentalism in Sub-Saharan African
politics particularly in the post-independence years. 335
The malaise, as it manifested in the political realm, equally reflected at an individual level,
especially among literary practitioners. It had, in fact, become a trend among writers and novelists
appertaining notably to the Islamic faith to continue the discussion, carrying it over, certainly, from
the political arena, seeking possibly to anticipate the debate within the deeper entrenchments of
postcolonial society, where the subject was certainly bound to continue. In this particular context,
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Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s novel, L’aventure Ambiguë, 336 emerged as an exemplar within this
literary

category,

since

the

novel’s

protagonist,

Samba

Diallo,

appears

clearly

defeated/incapacitated in the face of a world fully geared towards modernity, and for which his
religious training had visibly not prepared him. Other writers such as Amar Samb, and Ousmane
Sembene have also placed religion at the center of their fictional works. 337 Thus, following this
period of major political transformation attendant upon independence, this present chapter
attempts to show how this momentous post-independence period has in fact set the stage for, and
contributed to the development of, the “African Literary Renaissance,” which, when looked at
more closely, does, very much, compare to Europe’s Enlightenment philosophical movement. It is
my assessment that the writer, or to be more accurate, the men and women of letters, has become
quite conscious of this new secular atmosphere, which, their nations’ respective constitutions, had
either implicitly acknowledged or laid out quite plainly as in the case of Senegal.
It is equally important not to conflate the concept of African Renaissance with the
Negritude movement. Indeed, the historical context sets clear differences and shows the Negritude
movement rather as “Black Diasporic” or “Universal Black Renaissance.” As Abiola Irele
shows,338 the movement’s direct and crucial inspiration from the Harlem Renaissance is informed
by a certain uniformity in themes and approach, as well as by its overall vision for a global
awakening of the Black race. Moreover, the changed political situation on the African continent,
has, without doubt, scaled back the literary scope and concern of the postcolonial African writer,
who has, thus, become sharply focused on his society and people. In fact, the same had become
Cheikh Hamidou Kane, L’aventure ambiguë (Paris: Julliard, 1961); Ambiguous adventure, trans. Katherine Woods,
African Writers series 119 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1972 [1963]).
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equally true for the Caribbean writer. In their co-authored work, the three Caribbean writers, Jean
Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Raphaël Confiant, seem to stand apart from the Negritude bond
when they write: “Ni Européens, ni Africains, ni Asiatiques, nous nous proclamons Créoles. ” 339
Thus, it seems, the era of global cultural affinities and associations had just come to an end as
individuals and societies began to view themselves differently.
Now, some may argue that the African writers had always viewed their subject matter from a
secular perspective, as was, in fact, the case with such writer such as Mongo Beti, born Alexandre
Biyidi (1932-2001), whose depiction of the European Christian mission in one of his well-known
novels340 reveals a significant dose of criticism towards the missionaries’ paternal attitude vis-àvis indigenous populations. The difference, as I perceive it here, is that now has appeared a greater
sense of intellectual community among African writers in the sense that they have become fully
aware of, and for the most part, come to term with their role as writers. It is now incumbent upon
them to provide the critical role of enlightening their respective societies that are still grappling
with both a complex past341 and a present, of which the least one could say about it, is uncertain.
On the other hand, however, independence marked a critical moment for formerly colonized
peoples, in general, and even more particularly, for the African writer. This period proved quite
symbolic since these newly independent societies gained their long-denied sovereignty, but also
seemed to have settled on the concept of nationhood and citizenry, which, de facto, encompassed
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traditional African identities as these were placed, henceforth, under the umbrella of the former.
In practical terms, this meant that race, ethnicity, class, and religion could no longer constitute the
basis for the modern political establishment by which society would recognize/define itself, and
which would remain its main features. Thus, rather than going by racial, ethnic, or religious
attributes, the modern African nation had, in this historic period, continued with one broader in
scope, and certainly ever more encompassing.
The combination of nationhood and citizenry had, thus, become the embodiment of the modern
African society. Ernest Renan has, in fact, put it quite rightly in his assessment of the modern
nation when he writes: “Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial
factor in the creation of a nation.”342 Renan’s notion of “forgetting” seeks to highlight the necessity
to bury the past and disregard history, since paying any detailed attention to these two will most
certainly open old wounds and thus awaken rivalry between individuals within the nation, on
account of their origins and the memory of past conflicts and past wrongs.
In the particular context of postcolonial Africa, however, this would certainly not mean erasure
or denial of old identities, but would rather signify disallowing “feudal” elements to emerge once
again as guiding precepts for the postcolonial nation. It is within this context that I view the postindependence era as a period of intense intellectual activity, which proved critically significant as
African intellectuals regarded their stance as that of a party that had established themselves as free
thinkers, and whose primary objective, thus, appeared to be the promotion, and defense of this new
civilization.

Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” trans. Martin Thom, Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (London:
Routledge, 1990), pp.8-22 at 11 (first published in French, 1882).
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It is important, however, to keep in mind that this period of both literary Renaissance and
Enlightenment was far from bearing any sign of uniformity either in content or form. The pull 343
was rather multidirectional as exemplified by the works of the selected authors in my discussion.
Much of postcolonial literary production does, in my view, fit within the parameters of this
Renaissance literature. The fact that the novelist, playwright, or poet, stands on the forefront, and
plays the first roles by informing and awakening the masses, on the one hand, and criticizing the
excesses of power and the threats to democratic rule, on the other hand, converge to establish the
African postcolonial writer as the defender of civilization, a role which must remain consonant
with the vision of an African world driven toward progress. Thus, my discussion of this literary
phenomenon, following my selection of authors, is also a way to reflect on the variety of the
authors’ interests, what they perceive as valuable, and what they consider important and worthy
subject matter on which to employ their intellectual skills. On some occasions, as is the case with
Wole Soyinka, the move becomes personal and forceful.
Reason which in the West is considered the most remarkable feature of intellectual and
philosophical movements,344 also plays a significant role in the postcolonial African context. If
barbarism and religion, as Peter Gay345 shows, were perceived respectively by Greek philosophers
and European Enlightenment philosophes as counter to civilization; in the African context, in
general, reason was, for the most part, used as a means to criticize political mindlessness, tribalism,
and social injustice, to name just a few matters. Obviously, religion, given its central place within
the African society, remained still a matter for concern to some, whichever side of the spectrum

I am referring here to what the writer would consider as “enlightening” in their subject of discussion.
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point that reason, in both Greek Antiquity, and later in the European Enlightenment has been utilized as the principal
medium to set differences between opposing entities; see p. 4.
345
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism (Toronto: Alfred A. Knof, 1996)
p. 33.
343
344

164
they had placed themselves on. Moreover, the situation of postcolonial Africa contrasts
significantly with general context of Greek Antiquity and that of the European enlightenment.346
In the aftermath of independence, despite existing differences in religion, ethnicities, and
sometimes race, the African writer belonged to a very mixed society. And, thus, unlike their Greek
and European counterparts who were much at ease in their isolated/ withdrawn position, the
African writer, by contrast, is very much implicated in the specific issues highlighted above, and
which are characteristic of the continent, as a whole. This situation, consequently, put the African
writer and intellectual in a difficult situation since s/he is not immune to the accusation of bias, or
discriminating another entity on grounds that s/he may seek to defend their own party’s interest.
In this respect, the notion of the African writer as a luminary may, at times, lend to controversy.
However, as I attempt show throughout this chapter, it is fundamental to keep the general context
in mind in order to understand and truly appreciate the value and merit of this “controversial”
African Enlightenment and Renaissance cohort.

5.1

Wole Soyinka in the Framework of Renaissance Literature.

Christiane Ndiaye’s criticism347 of scholars of African literature who view the African writer as
authentic witnesses of their culture clearly shows her determination to debunk those theories built
upon the concept of African literary narratives as constituting factual or historical data on the
continent’s many experiences. In fact, there is no mistake that Ndiaye’s eagerness in this regard
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reveals something of a desire to foreground the artistic talent and imaginative skills of the African
writer at the expense of that scholarship that is only obsessed with the search for truth. Now,
whether her argument is totally accurate or not, I am aware that other African scholars have
discussed the topic elsewhere, and it can only further enlighten the reader to consult their work.348
For my part, however, it is significant and telling that an African writer of the caliber of Chinua
Achebe (1930-2013) would confess that he was concerned with the search for the truth, and that
he is not an exception. During an interview he gave in 1962, he made the following affirmation,
“also reading Cary349 impelled me to show what was false in him and brought forth a desire to
write that I’ve had for a long time.”350 It stands out, here, that accuracy, or representation of the
true image of society has taken up lot of Achebe’s artistic endeavor.
Now what does all this have to do with Soyinka and the discussion of the relationship
between the African writer and the secular doctrine? In reality, any elaboration of Soyinka’s oeuvre
and personal philosophy will necessarily place the concept of reality, accuracy, and genuineness
at the heart of the discussion. Furthermore, as I highlighted earlier in regards with African
renaissance literature and enlightenment, the literary domain has been circumscribed, and has
become, therefore, much restricted and significantly oriented. This situation has, thus, “compelled”
the African writer to understand the contours of his own reality in terms of both its theoretical and
practical components. In the introduction to his book on Wole Soyinka, Gerald Moore writes: “He
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wrote and directed two revues, formed two theatre companies, published an important novel and
a fine volume of poems, contributed critical articles to numerous reviews, was a tireless
controversialist and twice landed himself in jail.”351 Clearly, the only missing piece of information
to this profile that anybody else would remember to add nowadays is the Nobel Prize for Literature
the Nigerian writer won in 1986. Moore certainly makes no mistake in describing Soyinka as a
controversialist. But it does certainly not amount to much to remain at the level of facile statements.
Instead, one should, rather, investigate what are the actual ramifications of the controversies
Soyinka took part in such that it becomes possible to predicate them, and understand what they
aim to achieve. In my view, these constitute important elements that must be addressed earnestly.
A good entry point in the discussion of Soyinka could well be Biodun Jeyifo’s observation when
he writes:
Before Soyinka arrived on the scene from his five-year sojourn in England on the eve of
the country’s formal independence, there was an older “pre-independence generation” of
writers and artists already active in Nigerian literature, theatre, and the visual and plastic
arts and laying the foundations of the Nigerian “renaissance” which was to reach its apogee
with the generation of Achebe and Soyinka. 352
The coincidence of Soyinka’s return to Nigeria with the shaping and emergence of a Nigerian
“renaissance” movement must have had a significant impact on him in the year before
independence. The sentiment of patriotism that was woven into most of these renaissance
movements was, indeed, powerful, and contributed to define the African writer whatever his
nationality was. As Jeyifo observes:
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This in itself was only a national expression of a general cultural and political “awakening”
in the twilight of colonialism in the West Africa region with important counterparts in
countries such as Senegal and the Cameroon, Ghana and Sierra Leone.353
It is this sense of uniformity among the pre-independence literary movements that has perhaps
crystalized itself further and contributed to fashioning a certain image of the African writer. The
direct or indirect impact of colonialism seems to have left untreated sores upon the African writer,
in particular, and the African peoples in general. Thus, the rise of this literary renaissance among
formerly colonized African societies should also be understood as a discourse articulated against
the West. Moreover, this renaissance movement did not pit itself only against European
colonialism. In fact, it was equally not receptive of any previous subjugations of the continent and
its people by other foreign agents. And Soyinka, for one, has certainly embodied this image of the
African renaissance writer whose strong secular views place no limits on him on his path toward
the revival of Africa’s true identity.
In what follows, I divide my discussion into two separate themes. The purpose, here, is to
ensure clarity and cohesion with respect to some of the major questions which I perceive to have
occupied the mind of this multivalent writer and taken up a lot of his reflection time.
5.1.1 Wole Soyinka on Culture.
For our purposes here, I wish to use the following definition of the word culture from
Merriam Webster online: “the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial,
religious, or social group; also the characteristic features of everyday existence (such as diversions
or a way of life) shared by people in a place or time.” 354 This definition features, in my view, two
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aspects, both of which, as the definition highlights, remain prominent in understanding and
defining culture. However, by the same token, these two aspects must be differentiated whenever
it is clear that that the two do not intersect at all, or very little. Thus, on the one hand, “religion”
more so than “race” can create a certain culture, for, the uniformity of belief and practices among
the followers of a religion does cut across geographical lines. 355 The consideration of race as
purveyor of culture can be possible within the limited context of a racial group inhabiting a specific
region, with the particular characteristic of unity of experience and action.356
The way and context in which Soyinka had addressed the cultural question is both
significant and symbolic. In the early years of the post-independence era, as Obiajuru Maduakor357
shows, quoting Bernth Lindfors’ summary of Soyinka’s attitude with regards to the Negritude
movement:
[T]he real mark of authenticity in African writing was indifferent self-acceptance rather
than energetic racial self-assertion. Early African writing…was dishonest because it either
imitated literary fashion in Europe or pandered to European demands and expectations for
the exotic and primitive. The first West African writer to produce truly African literature
was not Léopold Senghor but Chinua Achebe.358
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At this particular point one should make no mistake as to what Soyinka considers authentic, and
what he, in contrast, highlights as dishonest. And it is perhaps judicious to put it in more plain
terms. In other words, to be an authentic African writer, to rephrase Soyinka, the latter must not
place themselves in Europe’s literary paradigm, and therefore, the African writer is not to utilize
the latter’s literary fashion. Thus, for anyone to claim to be an African writer and do what the
African writer is exactly not “supposed” to do becomes, in Soyinka’s judgment, a dishonest act.
The ramifications, although implicit here, remain real. And the word authentic or authenticity
becomes the vector that connects all sides. The “authentic” African writer, a title which is denied
to Senghor but approvingly bestowed on Achebe, is one who, according to Soyinka, delves deep
into African society and gives voice to the latter rather than setting themselves high above it in
order to sing their self-inspired melancholic song. The other question to answer, then, becomes,
why is it that Soyinka seeks to “subject” all African writers to such a rigid literary regimen, and
why does he believe that every writer or society adhere to his characterization of authenticity. A
part of the answer to the first question is one that Kwame Anthony Appiah359 has pointed out in
his article in terms that suggest that Soyinka’s making of the myth of “metaphysical solidarity”
emanates from his wish for an endogenous account. One can certainly add to Appiah’s observation
that this endogenous account is one that reserves for traditional African societies the exclusive
lineage of African culture; and which following the same logic, would equally deny the
contribution, impact, or influence of any outside entity to that very culture. As for the question
why is Soyinka attempting to “subject” all writers who are claiming to be African writer to his
literary ideal; the answer is no more complex than the fact that post-independence renaissance
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literature had vested in itself the responsibility to pull the various peoples of Africa not only out
of the colonial morass, but most importantly, the task for this new generation of literary illuminati
was to celebrate the authentic African “experience” no matter whether this experience was
laudable or repugnant. Indeed, in Soyinka’s view, this was to be done in complete disregard of the
European viewpoint. On this specific condition, Soyinka remains quite unequivocal and
uncompromising. In fact, both Jeyifo and Maduakor refer to Soyinkas’s famous utterance in the
early years of his career when, in his criticism of the Negritude movement, he came up in 1960
with the image of the duiker, which he transformed two years later at a conference in Makerere,
Uganda, into to his famous quip: “A tiger does not have to proclaim his tigritude,” 360 Soyinka’s
recourse to imagery is perhaps a way to give a vivid representation of the abstract character and
uselessness of the Negritude movement. At any rate, I shall retain from the imagery of the tiger
and duiker a certain idea of naturalness. And when this is applied to or against the Negritude
movement, one based mainly on intellectual reflection, in both form and content, one cannot but
imply that Soyinka is questioning the two. Maduakor has shown that Soyinka’s criticism clearly
takes issue with the literary forms of the Negritude poets. It will be helpful to see what Maduakor
himself had to say about it: “Apart from his objection of Negritude on the basis of its addiction to
self-glorifying narcissism, I detect in Soyinka’s opposition to that movement the beginning of later
aversion to literary ideology in general”361
The disdain Soyinka displays towards literary ideology must be understood within the
specific context of the coming of age of the African writer, of his historic moment of expression,
In an early essay, Soyinka made the following comment: “The duiker will not paint ‘duiker’ on his beautiful back
to proclaim his duikeritude, you’ll know him by his elegant leap.” Quoted in Lindfors, “The Early Writing of Wole
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West African Writing,” The Horn 6 (1960): 10-16. The “tigritude” comment is quoted from the same place in Lindfors’
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of fashioning of his own literary and intellectual vehicle. To achieve this, though, the African
writer must draw inspiration absolutely and exclusively from their African societies and cultures
rather than relying upon those elements considered appropriate by western intellectuals. Thus, in
the eyes of Soyinka, the Negritude movement had simply failed to fulfill a mission that any African
intellectual, within that period, should understand and embrace wholeheartedly.362 By adopting a
style quite akin to the European romantics,363 the Negritude poets, and Senghor specifically, had
failed to fulfill an important part of their mission because, the attitude and philosophy of the
European writer, as Appiah has clearly put it,364 seems very much centered on the individual. Their
style or literary forms of the Negritude writers become equally the very means by which they
convey their specific preoccupations, which are no less individualistic. Thus, the narcissistic and
self-centered attitude of the Negritude poet remains, in Soyinka’s judging eye, incompatible with
any African identity. In a sense, the argument emerging from Soyinka’s criticism of the Negritude
movement’s aesthetic forms is that the movement commands the African writer to indulge in selfintrospection in order to come to a full appreciation of his social being. Put differently, the African
man and woman remain, inescapably, the product of their culture, and must consequently utilize
that culture as means of expression, not only in the intellectual field, but in all departments of
life.365
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The resurgence of culture as a key component in this period of literary optimism had indeed
become pervasive. Ngũgĩ’s contention, in this regard, helps paint a clearer picture as to what were
the actual implications of culture for this generation of writers. He observes: “But right from the
start, military and subsequently political domination went hand in hand with cultural repression.
The route to effective control lay through cultural dominance.”366 And, at a level that affected him
personally and, perhaps, profoundly, he makes the following confession: “For instance, in the
school I went to, Scottish country dances were allowed even as the so-called tribal dances were
banned.”367 Chinua Achebe seems to be on the same wavelength. In an interview conducted with
Biodun Jeyifo, the latter commented on the linkages between cultural renaissance and that period
of literary aura. This portion of the conversation appears as follows:
Jeyifo: Almost a sense of renaissance—apart from the political independence, also cultural
renaissance.
Achebe: Oh yes, we were rediscovering ourselves. We were about to take our lives into
our own hands again. You see, we were going to take the initiative again in our history,
because this is what colonialism and all that meant: a loss of initiative and you just have
no say in who you were your own self-development and all that. 368
The possibility of recovering that lost “initiative,” to use Achebe’s own words, is one that
informs the important stakes of the renaissance project, and the privileged place it gives to
culture in both the elaboration of form and content. It is in this particular context that its
evocation seems to make sense vis-à-vis the point of view of Achebe. Style, then, cannot be
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subtracted out, to be replaced, instead, with or preferred over a European form, while it is clear
that it is, in fact, Europe’s cultural hegemony that the African writer must deny and reject. And
Maduakor’s assessment is, once again, vital since, concerning Soyinka’s preoccupations, he
writes: “he is fascinated by myth as a phenomenon that exercise an unlimited appeal for the
human imagination, manifesting itself in the literature, culture, folklore, and worldview of a
people.”369 It is, it seems, this cultural wealth that Soyinka had been eager to exploit, and which
he makes his principal reference point both as a thematic reservoir and a stylistic model to
replicate in his own work. By extension, and albeit in a propagandist move, he also wishes to
compel any number of African writers engaged in the battle for Africa’s cultural revival, to
utilize an “African” style.
The introduction of culture as constitutive of the creative literary imagination was very
much in vogue, and Soyinka, for one, had certainly given it a whole new dimension. In one of his
quotes cited earlier, which I reproduce, here again, his criticism of Negritude does enlighten on
his position: “Early African writing… was dishonest because it either imitated literary fashions
in Europe or pandered to European demands and expectations for the exotic and primitive.”370
The difference appears clearly set at this point, and shows, indeed implicitly, Soyinka’s stand
vis-à-vis the nature of African literary production. His criticism of Negritude as catering to
“European demands and expectations for the exotic and primitive” is one that unmistakably
rejects Europe’s invention of a certain image of Africa, and which, concretely, appears in Joseph
Conrad’s infamous novel, Heart of Darkness.371 The use of culture, then, following this muchMaduakor, “Soyinka as a Literary Critic,” p. 265.
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distorted image of Africa, should be executed in a manner that reflects the writer’s knowledge of
external discourse upon Africa. Consequently, the African writer, to protest this situation and
show originality, must divorce completely from these “caricatures.” Moreover, it seems,
Soyinka’s focus on the actual problematic present, shapes and directs his use of culture within
that particular context. And thus, his criticism of Negritude as exotic and primitive could be
sensed perhaps in Senghor’s poetic lines extracted from “Nuit de Sine”372 where description of
the night is evocative of an African paradisiac realm: “C’est l’heure des étoiles et de la nuit qui
songe/ Les toits des cases luisent tendrement, que disent-ils, si confidentiels au étoiles.”373 For
Soyinka, one can presume, this type of poetry is not relevant given the colonial morass in which
Senghor and his peers were engulfed. The acceptable usage of culture in this situation would
have commanded the selection of what Senghor’s culture possesses in the most disruptive
qualities, which the poet should use in a most creative manner since it is his task to determine
what is most fitting in attaining set objectives. And, Ngũgĩ, once again, serves as a good example
of how to do this. In his account of the resistance movement in Kenya, the author writes: “The
oral tradition has always been very rich and it is not surprising that it was the one most utilised
by the anticolonial forces to make statements of resistance.” 374 The following excerpt is even
more convincing of the need to link culture and artistry as Soyinka would certainly approve of
the procedure here:
For instance in 1921, Harry Thuku, a leader of the workers’ movement, was arrested and
about 150 people killed at a march demanding his release. This confrontation was
recorded in songs that in turn became very popular. One of the song was called
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Kanyegenyūri. It was very beautiful, very well constructed, with very strong, colourful
and erotic images describing the arrest of Harry Thuku and the demands for his
release.375
Although the author of the song, Kanyegenyūri, remains unknown, it is certainly safe to say that,
in the eyes of Soyinka, the latter will have fulfilled the demands of the moment; that he was,
undeniably, an accomplished artist who had learned the rules and metrics of folkloric
composition. His activity and activism had provided him both the opportunity and inspiration to
compose a new song for the benefit of his/her community.
What Soyinka is attempting to establish, in all likelihood, is a transformation of the
African intellectual and writer in ways that they not only inform their readers about African
philosophical thought processes, but most importantly, to attempt to convince their peers to
embrace them. Because if one is to trust Isidore Okpewho’s assessment of African traditional
songs, then, one cannot but notice the similarity between oral and written literatures: “A piece of
oral poetry or narrative may appeal to us in the same way as a similar piece of written literature
would,” the difference, though: “But that oral piece was performed (…) and, if properly recorded
and examined, is likely to reveal some of the effort made by the performer to please that
audience…”376 The performance aspect that characterizes most African oral narratives is what, to
a large extent, changes much of the narrative configuration. The narrative aims not only to
transmit a message, as most modern texts do, on the contrary, traditional African narratives
oftentimes are performed in ways that they invite interaction between the griot (performer) and
his audience. In other words, the oral text becomes a means to instigate action through an artistic
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medium. Ruth Finnegan, in fact, goes even further in her evaluation of African oral literature: “A
further essential factor is the audience, which, as is not the case with written forms, is often
directly involved in the actualization and creation of a piece of oral literature.” 377 One cannot
but acquiesce to Finnegan’s viewpoint since the existence of an audience is a sine qua non
condition to oral performance, and, therefore, its absence does, quite simply, void the
performance project given that the oral artist cannot conceive of any work, which s/he envisages
for strictly personal usage. Thus, the audience in traditional oral performance ceases to be a
uniquely receptive entity that takes in all that which the performer narrates; rather, the audience
must take action, both in participating during the narrative, and in implementing the values
presented outside of it in their own lives.378
In an interview with Biodun Jeyifo, Soyinka relates the circumstances that surrounded the
writing and production of his play, A Dance of the Forest.379 Soyinka’s artistic process shows
significant similarities with the traditional oral artist, and shows how his appropriation of
traditional cultural device seems to have taught him theoretical and practical rigors. The
following is a lengthy but illustrative excerpt:
Now the change when it came, it was an abrupt change, a total change. I took one look at
our first set of legislators…you know partial self-government at the time… when they
visited the U.K. and talked to students. I listened to them, watched them, and I
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knew…that instant, I think I received what the Japanese might term “political satori,” you
know, I just had illumination. I realised that the first enemy was within. If there was any
shadow of doubt left hanging, it was soon removed by the pattern of thought which
developed among my erstwhile “comrades” for whom all thought of Southern Africa, etc.
suddenly disappeared. They could not wait to return home to get a slice of “independence
cake,” because that is all independence meant to them…step fast in the shoes of the
departing whites before other people got there. It was then that I began to write A Dance
of the Forest, writing first the lyrics, the verses there. 380
It is indeed interesting to note that Soyinka’s sense of urgency in drafting the lyrics and verses
seems to take precedence over the rest of the play’s work. And, after all, it is, perhaps, not
surprising that those lyrics and verses reflect the playwright’s actual effort to either capture those
words professed by the visiting legislators or the students; or, simply, they might have been
Soyinka’s own attempt to craft “lyrics” and “verses” with the objective of fulfilling the artistic
compositional demand, and, at the same time, to remain faithful to the mission of the African
artist, which, in this particular context, takes the form of warning and criticism in the face of
looming political chaos. Culture as content, in this instance, re-establishes the traditional
relationship between the artist and his audience. The circumstances of their coming together or
association is one that is predicated not upon a mere desire to display artistic skills. But what
renders such moments unique is the expectation that the artist brings in new truths, realities, or a
message. Thus, content as culture, as Soyinka’s criticism seems to suggest, does, unmistakably,
reject the notion of art for art sake. The Senegalese art critic, Iba Ndiaye Diadji, seems to be on
the same wavelength since he himself criticizes the Dak’Art Biennale of Contemporary African
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Art mainly because it is held inside museums and galleries, and, thus fails to engage and involve
the public at large.381 Pathé Diagne’s assessment of African sculpture equally underscores the
importance of the societal element in the making and maintenance of sculptures. To this effect,
he writes:
Sculpture in itself has no existence. Only the form a statue in Ife, Karnak or Nok displays
is relevant. From site to site, this form varies, in those variations lies its originality.
Specificity expresses a culture’s means, its ability to forge its own tools and its own
languages, its power to assert its own vision.382
Diagne’s use of the word “form” must not mislead us, here; or be understood in its purely
aesthetic semantic. Form, as I perceive it here, suggests a materialization of an idea or concept
made to bear a certain “shape” that is not only representative of a phenomenon as understood by
society but most significantly, these sculptural forms embody power in ways that are socially and
spiritually recognized by communal psyche. It, then, becomes clear that Soyinka’s attempt at
setting culture at the heart of the renaissance movement informs his desire to urge his African
peers to reconnect with their true cultural identity, which, in his view, is secular and markedly
utilitarian.
5.1.2 Soyinka on Race and Religion.
I should perhaps expound, however briefly, on the association between race and religion with
regards to Soyinka. To a large extent, the Nigerian author appears to have very clear position,
which, to say the least, marks him as an exception. But the race—religion association can make
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sense only within a historical perspective. For, it is important to highlight that Soyinka makes a
significant difference between what he refers to as “world religions,” on the one hand, and
“African religions” or “African spirituality,” on the other. This is clearly where the race factor
comes into play. Soyinka believes, and indeed quite rightly, that Islam and Christianity did not
originate from the continent; that these two were imported, respectively by the Arabs and the
Europeans. On the basis of this historical fact,383 and considering his disregard of the
contribution of Africans themselves to these religions, Soyinka perceives the idea and
philosophy of Islam and Christianity as inherently unconducive to, and irreconcilable with an
African philosophy and worldview. And, in the eyes of Soyinka, history has provided sufficient
evidence that belief in the religious superiority of these two world religions not only provides
them with the justification for both their missionary endeavors and their disregard of local
religions, but, most dangerously to Soyinka, it underlies their “fanatic” and “dogmatic” stance
that constitute a threat to African societies and, by extension, to the world as a whole.384 And for
Soyinka, the very fact the Black people had been subject to slavery by both Muslim Arabs and
by Europeans provides irrefutable evidence that race had always been the backbone of religion
and a number of other destructive human adventures, making Black Africans the prime victims.
In fact, Soyinka has highlighted this point quite plainly, since he writes: “As if the continent did
not have enough on her plate, enter a shadowy but lethal force determined to reenslave385 a
continent with its chains of fundamentalist theology!”386 It is, therefore, important to show how
Soyinka uses “slavery” as a common reference point the White and Arab races share. The fact
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that both Europeans and Arabs have enslaved African peoples constitutes, for Soyinka,
undeniable evidence that their belief systems and philosophy are absolutely inappropriate for
those individuals that had once been their victims. This brings us, then, to the utility and
timeliness of Soyinka’s discussion of race and religion.
In their respective discussions of Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria, Ibrahim Gambari
and Don Ohadike highlight what appears, clearly, to be a complex situation. 387 It is certainly not
my intention, here, to rehearse Nigeria’s religious history, nor do I have the intent or
qualifications to recast that history. Rather, my objective is to show how Soyinka’s discussion of
religion in general is closely geared to Nigerian post-independence religious turmoil. And, as I
mentioned, at the start of the chapter, Soyinka’s strong stand and intrusive intellectual attitude on
a number of questions must not be viewed simply as a penchant for gratuitous challenge. Rather,
his literary activism must be placed and examined within the general context of African
renaissance literature. As a literary figure as vocal politically as the Cameroonian, Alexandre
Biyidi (Mongo Beti), Soyinka had, certainly, no doubt that it was the mission of writers of his
generation to stand as avant-gardist to a new civilization that the African continent was bound to
embrace. It is, in this respect, that it equally makes sense to consider the movement in general,
and Soyinka, in particular, as embodying a new era of African enlightenment thinkers. Thus, his
articulation against religious fundamentalism and ideology on both a political and literary
platform shows, indeed, his determination to guard the Black people of the continent against
dangerous tyrannies, and to urge them, instead, to embrace again what could be considered as
African humanism. His speech in the United Nations in 1988, “Religion and Human Rights” is,
without doubt, the ultimate height Soyinka could have wished to reach to ensure his message
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gets across.388 The rest of my discussion will, then, attempt to expound further, examining
Soyinka’s discourse within both the field of literature and politics.
Perhaps, Soyinka’s point on religion has not been anywhere as clearly laid out as he has
done in Of Africa. Therein, the discourse, although fashioned to warn against the dangers of
dogmatic rule and religious fanaticism, does, at times, exhibit what appears as a markedly racial/
ethnic phenomenon with respect to African spirituality. The following remark illustrates this
well:
Despite an upbringing of some of us in a Christian environment, the world of the Orisa,
fortunately, has provided a tangible backcloth and context of daily existence, often
patchily, always palpably. It was a world –formerly forbidden—that cast its spell on my
childhood imagination.389
There is a strong sentiment that Soyinka and the other children who were born or who grew up in
a Christian environment, have found ultimate redemption in the presence and guardianship of
Orisa, a traditional African religious belief. It is important to establish, in this regard, the
correlation between the individual, his/ her space, and the divinity or religion. It is as though the
establishment of Christianity and its development have not been significant enough to extinguish
Yoruba traditional belief, or push it outside its primordial space. On the contrary, there is a
strong sense that the Orisa spirit pervades this space, as it continues to maintain a strong
influence upon the people as exemplified by Soyinka and the other children immersed in their
Christian environment. The sentiment becomes, indeed, palpable that the Yoruba religion, and by
extension, most other African traditional belief systems seem to maintain infallible links with the
people with whom they have entered into a contract. This contract, concurrently, takes into
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consideration the milieu, otherwise, the space in such ways that it becomes incumbent upon the
African deities and spirits to remain present right where the contracted people live, and, in other
circumstances, to where they have migrated. John S. Mbiti did, in fact, stress the importance of
space when he notes: “Each society has, at least traditionally, its own geographical area, its own
land, its own country.” 390 This affirmation, might have more profound implications to Soyinka.
One of these could suggest that the African societies have developed an acute sense of their
physical environment to such a degree that a member of the society is not only physically
attached to his/her immediate environment but most importantly the individual is part and parcel
of the cosmic universe of his/ her society/ group, which the latter has come to fashion at a given
point in its existence. Sulayman Nyang has provided an enlightening account of this
phenomenon when he writes: “In the cosmological scheme of traditional African man, the fusion
of the profane and the sacred has implications for the relations between the individual and the
spiritual world, as well as the individual and his communities.” 391 It appears here that the
individual in traditional African societies is ideally in total, if not near complete harmony with
their environment since they learn to live by the rules the society/group has adopted and
implemented in different areas of life. Thus, when Soyinka evokes certain aspects of the Orisa
religion, one cannot fail to notice a clear attempt on his part to show the specificity of African
religions, while seeking to demonstrate, in the process, that religion among Black Africans had
always been conducive of life, and reflective of what could otherwise be termed the philosophy
of being. The following are Soyinka’s own words:
The compendium of Ifa, which may be counted as the equivalent of the Moslem Koran
and Christian Bible, is replete with numerous pronouncements including ethical precepts

390
391

John S. Mbiti, African Religion and Philosophy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p.102.
Nyang, Islam, Christianity p.21 (emphasis mine).

183
that guide—again, not dictate!—individual and communal choices in virtually all aspects
of life.392
Soyinka goes even further since he adds:
The curative science also happen to illustrate the intervention –more accurately
integration of deities in the basic concerns of humanity, in this instance spelling nothing
more mystical than the harmonization of the universe of the human body and mind to the
external universe.393
Soyinka gives the impression that the deities that preside over the Yoruba environment belong to
a distinct category that contrasts sharply with the image of a single Godhead that claims absolute
control of the universe, whom Arab Muslims and Europe’s Christians worship. Moreover, in
Soyinka’s viewpoint, it seems that the wisdom, knowledge, and care for the living, allows
African deities, in general, and the Yoruba ones, in particular, to hold exclusive prerogative to
operate within the African space as they, alone, understand the reality of the milieu, and the
aspiration of the Black peoples therein.394 Additionally, Soyinka’s strong belief that African
deities and African religions are markedly secular, allows/encourages him to vow allegiance to
the latter at a critical historical moment when the Black peoples of the continent hold, once
again, a unique chance not only to head to the right direction, but also to remain true to their
racial/ethnic heritage. It, thus, seems that repeated negative experiences of racial encounters
between the black Africans and the Arabs,395 on the one hand, and with the Europeans, on the
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other hand, have, undoubtedly, caused physical and psychological damage so much so that the
African intelligentsia, as represented by Soyinka, has grown quite distrustful as to the possibility
of finding in racial dialogue and exchange an adequate answer, or to view it as the way forward.
Thus, elaboration of the question of religion, especially at a crucial postcolonial period shows the
resolve of the renaissance writer to address critical issues of the moment in order to enlighten his
people and race on certain dangers, and, propose, instead, alternative ways through which the
Black peoples of the continent can sustain themselves, and remain free from outside influence
and subjugation.
It is quite remarkable that Soyinka’s determination to purge African societies of foreign
elements has expanded his area of interest and concern beyond Nigeria to encompass the entire
sub-Saharan region. All too often, in fact, the Nigerian playwright has directed open, and indeed
harsh criticism towards his peers. On other occasions, however, he had simply presented himself
as a literary critic with the primary role of assessing/critiquing “questionable” elements within
the work of his African peers. In effect, his heated exchange with Ali A. Mazrui has become,
perhaps, his most infamous, shall I say, unsolicited intervention in the work of another African
intellectual guru of considerable reputation. 396 It, then, leaves much food for thought, especially
when Moore, in what I see as an ironic turn of phrase, had the lucidity to write the following
about the Nigerian playwright: “Soyinka is not a man who often talks about his work in detail, or
about the deepest experiences that have fed it. He combines a talent for society with an equally
marked cultivation of solitude and silence.” 397 Now, it may have been that “silence” was one of
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Soyinka’s traits at an early stage of his career. Nonetheless, it is my view that the Soyinka, who
has come to impose himself as one of Africa’s most acclaimed writers can no longer fit the
description of a man who has cultivated silence. At least, it was not on this basis, nor was it for
that “intrinsic” quality he was awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1986. Quite the contrary.
And Jeyifo’s observation concerning the Soyinka’s scholars brings this element to view:
Certainly, the controversies over the alleged “obscurity,” “difficulty” and “complexity”
of his writing have not notably encompassed elucidation and analysis of figures and
paradigms of aesthetic and political radicalism within his works, precisely because the
matter of the articulation of the political and the aesthetic in our author’s writings has
largely been located outside the work…398
There undeniably arose in Soyinka an unmistakable sense of revolt. One must concede that prior
to Nigeria’s civil war (1967-1970) the writer had focused much attention on culture and cultural
expression, especially in The Lion and Jewel,399 where he sought to portray the social
transformations and the emerging conflict between the old and new generation. However, it goes
without saying that post-civil war Soyinka, had definitively shifted his priorities. The devastation
caused by this internal conflict and the number of lives lost must have made it extremely clear to
Soyinka as to the real dangers targeting postcolonial African societies. Thus religion and
tribalism became for Soyinka the new battles to fight. It must have dawned on the writer that
despite the fact that African cultures were on a transmuting course, which he vigorously
opposed, religion, during and after the war, appeared as the most divisive and devastating
phenomenon. This had, in all likelihood, informed and influenced much of Soyinka’s elaboration
on the question of religion.
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Soyinka’s Myth, Literature, and the African World stands out as an imposing pillar in his
novel intellectual enterprise. Prior to the book’s publication, as Jeyifo records, Soyinka had lived
in exile from 1971 to 1975 as a result of Nigeria’s unsafe political environment. Most
importantly, however, the publication of this book reflects the coming of age of a writer who has
decided to attack headlong what he perceives as the vicious forces threatening African Society..
In an interview with John Agetua, the latter asked Soyinka about his activities as an exilé, and
the prospect of his return to Nigeria, Soyinka’s response is quite elucidating:
You asked me a moment ago what I have been doing and I gave you a brief sketch but I
have also been stock-taking and doing a cold-blooded analysis of Nigeria since
independence and trying to project it into the future […] At the same time I also
recognize if I’m in Nigeria, it is impossible for me to remain a private citizen. 400
Soyinka’s time in exile has clearly provided him the opportunity to reflect on a number of
questions, and the publication of Myth, Literature, and the African World in 1976 cannot be a
random coincidence. Assessing the work’s content, one cannot miss the critic’s general
viewpoint. On the one hand, his criticism of ideological construction could easily be substituted
with a call for nationalism and pan-Africanism (excluding North Africa) as Soyinka cannot put
up with the idea that sub-Saharan African writers could resort to foreign literary models, or seek
to establish/impose views and beliefs that do not find their origins from within the continent.
Thus, even though his critique of Negritude may appear as distinct from the one directed against
the religion-minded African writer, in reality, both are interchangeable if one looks through
Soyinka’s ‘smart’ lenses. Because, if one follows Soyinka’s logic, the bottom line becomes
simply that adoption of literary/intellectual ideology is as useless/ pointless in the African
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context as attempting to coat a work of literature with religious symbolism could be fraught with
deceit, regarding African identity, and devoid of utility, because dark in essence. Let’s consider
Soyinka’s views in both cases for a strict comparison and contrast. His remarks on Negritude
appear thus:
Language, therefore, it does appear, is not everything, and we may bear this in mind in
attempting to place emphasis on the peculiar circumstances that made the Francophone
writer respond to the colonial experience through literary tools and an artistic movement,
unlike his Anglophone counterpart. It was not simply that Negritude appeared, in the
main, to have created a philosophical divide between the two;401 what is interesting is that
“Negritude,” or indeed any school or creative manifesto, was born in one, but not the
other. 402
And of the religious, or more accurately, Islamic-propagandist writer, among whom he considers
Hamidou Kane as one, Soyinka has the following to entrust his reader:
The quality of the language of the Koran which Kane describes as a “sombre beauty” he
tries consciously to capture in his own prose. The quality comes out even in translation,
cleanly sculpted yet mysterious and often elusive, suggestive of much that is left
unspoken, layers of perception that need paring away. No criticism of the manic excesses
of the Teacher of the Text is permitted to creep into the writing…403
A close comparison, as I attempt to show in the highlights, brings to the fore elements of race
and religion in ways that suggest that the adoption of ideology, whether in a squarely intellectual
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framework, as exemplified by Negritude, or in religion, with those writers imbued with, and
championing the ethics of religious discourse, constitutes, in both cases, a betrayal. In the
former, the charge against the Negritudinists is one that reproaches the movement’s poets for
their selfish and unfulfilling preference of unsound European artistic device(s) over a utilitarian
and society-inspired and influenced literary discourse and form. It, thus, appears that despite its
call for the rehabilitation of the Black race, the Negritude movement stands in complete denial of
the Black African reality as it chose a European artistic medium to vehicle its message. To
Soyinka, then, the poetic expression of the Negritude movement appears to be quite elitist,
whereby the Black poet seems more concerned with his own image as an educated/refined
individual than he is truly preoccupied with his indigenous base. Thus, the adoption by Negritude
poets of European ideology, which Soyinka considers to be a European fabrication,404 becomes
blatant evidence of intellectual dishonesty and the poets’ disgrace to their societies and race. In
the latter case, however, Soyinka’s criticism is most perceptible as he decries the language and
posture of Kane. Soyinka appears quite repulsed at the idea of turning the literary language of the
African artist into an expression, the meaning and understanding of which transcends the average
level of everyday speech and communication. Holding Kane to his own words, Soyinka vows to
demonstrate how religious discourse, even when rendered in a most sophisticated artistic form
remains a deeply incongruous form and must be purged from African literature, just as nonAfrican dogmatic religions must be expulsed from all spheres of African life.
It is significantly important to understand the distinction Soyinka seeks to establish
between the modern writer/author, or the performer/artist in traditional African setting versus the
religious ideologist which is how the Nigerian playwright would refer to such writers such as as
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Kane and Hampathé Bâ. The resolve of the African artist and author for challenged creativity
and his defiant stance are characteristics Soyinka traces back to Ogun, the Yoruba deity of
creativity whose singularity among other Yoruba deities lies in his will to return to his
anthropomorphic original form, that is, to descend down into the realm of the humans where,
once, all the deities enjoyed their homes in communion with humans. Soyinka recounts Ogun’s
tragic passage thus:
Yoruba tragedy plunges straight into the “chthonic realm”, the seething cauldron of the
dark world will and psyche, the transitional yet inchoate matrix of death and becoming.
Into this universal womb once plunged and emerged Ogun, the first actor, disintegrating
within the abyss. His spiritual re-assemblage does not require a copying of actuality in
the ritual enactment of his devotees.405
Thus, the Yoruba ritual performance of Ogun’s willed attempt to recover his original whole,
meaning the assemblage of divine essence and physical shape, becomes the very episode that
demonstrates how awareness of his agency and power to create lies fundamentally in Ogun’s
belief in the power of the will. And thus, Ogun, the god of transcendence, who refused to live in
seclusion, becomes the first actor/creator by breaking out of the divine status quo. By re-enacting
this tragedy, the Yoruba actor, undoubtedly, enter into Ogun’s world, where both achieve
communion within that “chthonic realm,” where both reciprocally completes each other,
becoming, thus, transcendental forces: “He, the actor emerges still as the mediant voice of the
god, but stands now as it were besides himself observant, understanding, creating.”406 It is from
this cosmic event of Yoruba mythology, which marks the genesis of the creative mind that
Soyinka regards as, and bases the foundation of, artistic expression and creation. Therefore,
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despite the variegated forms of modern art, Soyinka might still argue that the writer, author, or
creator cannot, under any circumstances, be appreciative of “sombre beauty,” or find it laudable
to such a point that he prefers to trade his/her creative talent with silence, and surrender to an
absolute God and his earthly representatives. Thus, ideology, for Soyinka, becomes synonymous
with individual in-sufficiency, and a willingness to opt for inaction, and a state of perpetual
denial of one’s race, culture, and social practices. The established linkage between the gods and
their human counterparts, thus, in their common vision for transcendence is one that
suggests/shows, quite plainly, how spirituality for both have to involve worldly elements despite
their opposite movements. As such, for Soyinka, spirituality and religion in Africa, and among
true Africans must remain secular in that it constitutes the very foundation that upholds their
racial uniqueness as well as their overall world view.
5.1.3 Le Coran et la culture grecque: The Stakes of a Secular Reading
It has almost become an established pattern in the Senegalese media, especially in
television, to broadcast religious programs late Thursday evenings, featuring Imams and other
learned Islamic scholars discussing issues or interpreting the Qur’an. It seems one cannot exert
such tasks without fulfilling satisfactorily some form of learning and training in the subject of
Islam and its jurisprudence. Thus, the advent of media, radio and television does not seem to
have shifted societal paradigms vis-à-vis management of Islamic knowledge.
The publication in 2014 of Le Coran et la culture grecque407 and the controversy that
followed had become a test grandeur nature on Islam and the Senegalese society, which had,
constitutionally, been defined as secular. To place my discussion of this book and its author
within its proper context, it is certainly important to provide some background information. To
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begin with, Oumar Sankharé (1950-2015) is presented as, “un helléniste doublé d’un
arabisant,”408 and the author has racked up greater credentials since he stands, also, as an “agrégé
de Lettres classiques, agrégé de Grammaire,”409 and one who, in his early academic career, had
done a comparative study between the Greek and the Arab rhetoric as the subject of his master’s
thesis followed by a Doctorate on Homer and twelfth-century Byzantine literature. In light of this
sketch, Sankharé, a Muslim born, appears to have maintained his scholarly priorities intact,
which has culminated in his most recent and by far, most controversial book a contemporary
Senegalese scholar has written.
The controversy that accompanied Sankharé’s book can be best understood within the
author’s statement regarding the Qur’an. In Sūrah 7, Al A‘rāf (The Heights), verses 157-58,
mention is made of an “unlettered Prophet” whom the faithful “find mentioned in their own
(Scriptures)’ (157) and “who believeth in Allah.”410 Or as the new translation in The Study
Quran of verse 157 puts it:
[T]hose who follow the messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find inscribed in
the Torah and the Gospel that is with them, who enjoins upon them what is right, and
forbids them what is wrong, and makes good things lawful for them, and forbids them
bad things, and relieves them of their burden and the shackles that were upon them. Thus
those who believe in him, honor him, help him, and follow the light that has been sent
down with him; it is they who shall prosper. 411
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This Prophet has traditionally been interpreted as Mohammed. As the commentary to verse 158
in The Study Quran makes clear, the concept of an illiterate Mohammed is an important tenet in
the Islamic tradition: “That the Prophet was unable to read and write serves, in the Islamic
tradition, as a fundamental proof of the miraculous nature of the Quran.”412 Other interpretations
are possible, but they have never been given much credence. Sankharé wades into the fray by
asserting that not only was the Prophet literate, but he was steeped in the work of the Greek
rhetoricians and their influence can be found in the Qur’an: “Même l’Envoyé de Dieu a été taxé
d’illettré par suite d’une interprétation fallacieuse du Coran qui parle plutôt d’un Prophète de la
‘Umma’, de la communauté.”413 The seriousness of such a statement, which consequently caused
general uproar among Senegalese Muslims, is that by denying Mohammed’s illiteracy, Sankharé
also appears to be denying the miraculous and divine origin of the Qur’an itself.
The fundamental question which demands further reflection is to examine and understand how
Sankharé’s discourse constitutes a novel approach to the interpretation of Islam. One important
point, which the scholar himself underscores is his determination to establish the legitimacy of
the Western-educated scholar and the validity of his/her viewpoint on the Islamic religion. In
fact, Sankharé writes:
Le temps est maintenant révolu de laisser aux prétendus religieux le soin de théoriser des
inepties sur le Coran qui représente l’un des plus beaux chefs-d’œuvre de la littérature
universelle. La compréhension de la Révélation exige la maîtrise d’une culture
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encyclopédique qui n’a rien à voir avec l’étroitesse d’esprit des gestionnaires de l’Islam
plus préoccupés par l’édification de leur palais que par celle de leurs fidèles.414
There appears here a manifest effort on the part of the scholar to redefine the Qur’an and to raise
the study of Islam to a level that requires greater rational thought and intellectual endeavor. As
textual highlights suggest Sankharé’s denigration of those so-called religious men goes in fact
hand in hand with a redefinition of the Qur’an as “one of the most beautiful masterpiece of our
universal literature.” The consideration of the Qur’an as constituting universal literature
becomes, indeed, consequential. Because the fact that Qur’an has become suddenly part of the
universal literature shifts the focus of Islamic exegesis from the traditional literal word by word
exposition, to a broader more comparative approach that finds items relevant to the interpretation
of the Qur’an in other cultures and texts. This suggests that much of Islamic scholarship is
therefore invalid because it is too narrowly focused. The text of the Qur’an, at this point, as
Sankharé seems to characterize it, becomes something almost out of reach; one cannot begin to
approach its meaning without studying/acquiring the peripheral knowledge with which the
Qur’an is intrinsically connected. In a sense Islam and the Qur’an becomes tightly integrated into
a system of world knowledge; in other words, the acquisition of secular knowledge becomes
indispensable in order to understand the Holy Text.
In his study of the representation of Islam in Senegalese literature and film, Mbye Cham
finds two distinct categories. 415 On the one hand, there are those writers who zealously and
vigorously support Islam as providing the most effective way to bring the individual into
Sankharé, Le Coran et la culture grecque, p.16 “That time is now long gone when those so-called religious men
were allowed to make absurd theories about the Qur’an, which represents one of the most beautiful masterpiece of our
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completely integration into society; on the other hand, Cham identifies a different group of
writers who view Islam as “colonial in nature” and an “impediment to secular individual and
society fulfillment.”416 A point of particular importance with regard to Sankharé’s work is that
these two groups of writers have resorted to fictional narrative devices, in the form of the novel
or semi-autobiographical narratives, or through motion pictures, both full length and short films.
Thus, it is important to keep in mind that their viewpoint is one that is filtered through the artistic
medium, and may therefore be perceived just as a work of art. As a result, the author’s work may
equally fail to clearly and explicitly convey his/ her message. Whatever assessment one makes of
the work of these writers and film-makers, the fact remains that their work marks a significant
step in initiating a counter discourse and can be regarded, therefore, as a first attempted response
to addressing the implementation and manifestations of Islam within the Senegalese society.
The position of Sankharé is in a number of ways clearly demarcated from the Senegalese
intellectual and scholarly tradition up to this point. In fact, Sankharé’s project appears to be
greater in scope, and seeks to effect broader and deeper changes to the status quo. For Sankharé,
it is clearly not enough to question/criticize the ways and methods of Islamic religious men in
both their theories and practices, which, in his view, reflect their inaccurate understanding of the
Qur’an. Sankharé seems more interested in redefining Islamic knowledge in such a way that it
allows him to pare away the self-serving and narrow-minded religious men whose inability to
conduct rational inquiry and whose failure to acquire encyclopedic knowledge serves as a basis
for their disqualification.
The juxtaposition, on the front cover of the book, of a page of Qur’anic script set beside
to the head of male figure in Greek Classical style, seems to reflect on the scholar’s motivation to
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establish a rapprochement between these two segments, Islam and the Classical World. In fact, in
the preface to his book, which appears indeed quite unusual, Sankharé inserts, clearly with the
permission of his colleague, the words of retired professor of classical literature, Amadou Samb,
who, in issue 519 of Le Quotidien (September 15, 2004), recounts his encounter with Sheikh
Abdoul Aziz Sy Dabakh (1904-1997), the third Khalif of the Senegalese Tidjaniyya brotherhood
(1957-1997). In his testimony, Professor Samb expresses surprise at finding that the Sheikh was
a well-read and cultivated man:
J’ai rencontré pour la première fois notre Cheikh en 1954. Nous voyagions côte à côte
dans l’autorail qui nous menait de Dakar à Saint-Louis (…) Il a commencé par évoquer
Platon et Lucrèce avant d’en venir au Coran. J’ai été agréablement surpris de la culture,
des qualités d’esprit et de cœur de cet homme de Dieu qui n’était pas encore Khalife
général des Tidjanes. Mon interlocuteur connaissait parfaitement le Phédon de Platon,
dialogue dans lequel celui-ci traite de l’immortalité de l’âme. 417
This encounter between the scholar and the religious figure was not a trivial thing considering
the spiritual responsibility the latter was to play in the lives of millions of adherents. Their
unexpected and improbable meeting on a train, seems to have prepared the way for an open
discussion and subsequent discovery of what, hitherto, was unknown about this religious man.
Furthermore, it seems, following Samb’s own testimony, that the aura of respectability and near
reverence that surrounds the Sheikh, in particular and the brotherhoods’ leading cohort, in
general, suddenly finds a pertinent explanation. Thus, the spiritual blessing, which almost all
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adherents to Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods believe their Saints to impart,418 becomes visibly
linked to a wider web of world knowledge of which the Sheikh becomes one of the few
privileged depositaries. It is, therefore, not surprising that Sankharé would consider Samb’s
testimony a treasure-trove for his scholarly project. His choice to preface his book with the
Samb’s own account of this meeting shows how consequential this episode was. In all likelihood,
Sankharé must have considered the event a major turning point, and one upon which he premises
his reappraisal of the Qur’an, in particular, and of Islam, in general. Sankharé’s approach, despite
the differences in context, reminds very much the attitude of Voltaire (1698-1774).419 In 1725,
after he was provoked to a duel by the Knight of Rohan, young Voltaire was exiled to England
where he met other philosophers. There, he finds, the intellectuals enjoy greater moral and
intellectual liberty than those in his native country. The publication of his Lettres
philosophiques,420 wherein he criticizes French religious and social traditions by contrasting
them to the liberal English model, caused the French Parliament to burn the book as they found it
scandalous. What Voltaire was seeking to accomplish with the publication of his book was, one
can imagine, to change the status quo in a way that would allow les hommes de lettres in France
to think and write freely as their counterparts in England were already accustomed to.
Sankharé’s project to consider the Qur’an as part of world heritage, by pulling it out of,
and away from, the exclusive guardianship of Islamic scholars, does, also, reveal his desire to
reconstruct a global society that finds its roots in the commonality of mythic references that both
Western and Eastern civilizations have in common, and for which the scholar had set out to
demonstrate throughout his book. Because of the misconceptions that have been introduced into
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its interpretation, as Sankharé plainly put it,“L’occident s’est toujours imaginé que le Coran était
un produit étranger à la civilisation hellène,”421 many have come to believe that the Qur’an is
alien to Western civilization. This purported notion, in the author’s mind, has created a divide
between the two civilizations along with their respective religions, namely Christianity and
Islam. It thus becomes clear that this has enormous implications. That the scholar’s resolve to
bridge the cultural gap between these two world civilizations is one that equally informs his
willingness to work towards religious reconciliation, which could ultimate create a culture of
peace, mutual acceptance, and tolerance between, what has come to be regarded as divided world
populations. In a contribution to a Senegalese newspaper,422 further to the controversy that
followed the publication of Sankharé’s book, the Senegalese scholar, Gorgui Dieng, perhaps in
an attempt to defend and support his colleague, maintains the following: “Ma profonde
conviction est que le Professeur Sankharé est un chercheur incompris! Qu’il faut relire et
interroger. Avec moins de passion.”423
Being misunderstood or rejected seems to be the common fate of most progressive and
unconventional writers. Sana Camara’s seminal study of the Senegalese Sufi saint, Sheikh
Ahmadu Bamba (1853-1927) does highlight a similar phenomenon with respect to the Sufi saint,
who seems genuinely preoccupied with the reception of his odes among native Arabs. As he was
certainly aware, Sheikh Ahmadu feared that racial difference and prejudice may affect the way
other scholars interpret his poems, or the value they ascribe to his work. On this specific point,
Camara would write:
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Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba was a scholar of acute discernment, who feared that the
evaluation of his work would fall into the hands of authoritarian critics who would reject
it out of hand, based on the preconceived judgement of their mental superiority over
black Africans. 424
The now well-known Amadou Hampathé Bâ, also, seems to have had a similar reaction with
regard to the writings and teachings of his spiritual guide. Prior to the publication of his
hagiographic work on Thierno Bokar, he relates the fortunate circumstances that made it possible
for the work to get published. To this effect, he writes:
Après avoir minutieusement étudié l’ensemble de ces notes, Marcel Cardaire vint me
trouver et me dit “ce serait commettre un crime contre la science et contre l’esprit que de
ne pas publier l’enseignement de Thierno Bokar. Cet enseignement est un véritable
message.”— Mais vous savez bien, lui répondis-je, qu’un “Hamalliste” ne parviendra
jamais à se faire éditer!— Eh bien répliqua Cardaire, mettez par écrit la vie de Thierno
Bocar et son enseignement, j’y ajouterai mes appréciations personnelles et nous serons
coauteurs. 425
Sankharé’s conception of the Qur’an as an item of universal literature adds two elements with
significant implications. His reference to the Qur’an as literature does, very much, downgrade
the religious/spiritual component to such a low level that all that may be left to it is a plethora of
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mythic symbols, references and stories. Thus, despite the fact that the latter may have had some
religious bearing, they constitute, for the general public, the residues of our shared and rich
humanistic heritage, which deserves wider dissemination426 and unorthodox study. In other
words, Sankharé seems to place the Qur’an within the same category as those authored and
authorless ancient mythologies that were present both in Ancient Greek and the Arab
civilization, among which one could include Plato’s Phaedo.
It is, as I highlighted earlier, significant enough that Sankharé’s main objective, despite
his controversial claims, is to construct or reconstruct a global culture, which premises itself on
the communication and exchange between the Western and Eastern civilizations. However, for
this global culture to thrive and impose itself, it is fundamental to lay the groundwork for it. It
makes sense, in this context, to understand Sankharé’s reference, albeit a subversion of the
traditional view, to the Qur’an as literature as a way to allow the Western educated Muslim
scholar, just as Sankharé is, to take the lead. For the complexity of such project is one that
requires the scholar to be knowledgeable not only in Islam and the Qur’an, but also well-read in
western literature and know its history. It, thus, makes sense that Sankharé considers the
traditional Islamic scholar ill-fit for such a task hence his bold yet logical call for a new
generation and breed of Western-educated Islamic erudites to spring forth in order to:
“démontrer que la religion de Mohamed est celle qui a le plus cultivé les lumières de la culture
grecque.”427
As part of the constitutive components of literature, at least in the modern sense, writing
becomes, in this particular context, the means through which the scholar is able to transcend the
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language barrier. In the brief sketch I gave about the author of Le Coran et la culture grecque, I
highlighted the fact that the scholar is presented as “un arabisant.”428 This detail, on the one hand
contributes to give him some form of legitimacy given that it implies that the scholar can read
the Qur’anic scriptures and understand their meaning, while on the other hand, and most
importantly, his literacy in one of the western languages, in this case French and Greek, becomes
the means through which he can effectively communicate his interpretation of the Islamic
religion by showing how, in fact, its truth/message delves deep within Greek culture, which
stands, in the scholar’s mind, as the pedestal of modern European culture.
Qur’an as literature, definitely, introduces rational thinking as an intrinsic element to
apply to the text, and which Sankharé believes the Islamic text to be receptive to. In fact, it
would be difficult to conceive of, let alone, accept any work as literature that would deny
reasoning, or the implication of rational inquiry as part of its core nature. It would equally be
senseless to imagine Sankharé rejecting this aspect vis-à-vis his novel project given that part of
the criticism directed against the inhibitors of Qur’anic evidences/truths appears to be their lack
of reasoning, rational inquiry, and dedication to the acquisition of broader knowledge: “Pour ce
faire, nous avons réexaminé le Coran avec un esprit neuf dégagé des pseudo-certitudes de la
féodalité ‘ \maraboutique’.” 429 Clearly, Sankharé’s choice for a clairvoyant and dialectical
approach through which one should seek answers to their own questions by avoiding taken-forgranted ‘dogmatic’ verities, differs absolutely from the approach and ways of the self-sufficient,
reclusive “marabouts” (the Muslim clerics).
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The turning of the Qur’an into a literary text informs to some degree Sankharé’s
conviction that the reliance on rational inquiry constitutes, on the one hand, a most effective way
to communicate the content of the Qur’an through delicate and well-reasoned exegesis; while, on
the other hand, the process stands as the most effective to bring western intellectuals to
appropriate the Islamic text, as a rich document of world heritage. In fact, the French philosopher
René Descartes (1596- 1650) has made an interesting point with regard to reason, since one can
read:
Common sense is the most equitably divided thing in the world, for everyone believes he
is so well provided with it that even those who are the hardest to please in everything else
usually do not want more of it than they have. It is not likely that everyone is mistaken in
this matter; rather, this shows that the power to judge correctly and to distinguish the true
from the false—which is, strictly speaking, what we mean by common sense or reason—
is naturally equal to all men. 430
For Descartes, then, reason, something he equates with common sense, is an attribute that is
inherent to all humans. Their ability to judge correctly and to distinguish becomes the most
common trait that human beings share given that even those “that are hardest to please,” claim to
possess enough of it. The implication of Descartes’ claim about the ability of humans to “judge
correctly” and to “distinguish” is one that informs of the predisposition of the individual to
communicate with their peers, to understand, and convince each other on the basis of the
evidence that society’s individuals are endowed with reason, and, therefore, are able to make
sense of facts and evidences. In this regard, it seems, Sankharé holds a different view than his
predecessor, and one who stands as his countryman. Leopold Sédar Senghor, one of the
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champions of the Negritude movement, had the belief that the particularity of the Black race lies
in its acute development of internal feelings (emotion) in opposition to the rational analytical
activity of the Hellenic civilization. In fact, in a 1956 article on Black African Aesthetics, he
further elaborated on an affirmation, which appeared in an earlier article in 1939 where he
maintain: “l’émotion est nègre, comme la raison hellène.”431 The correction Senghor applied to
his initial statement, as he considered his words were being misinterpreted, did not bring much
change to the distinction since the corrected/edited version reads, “La raison européenne est
analytique par utilisation, la raison nègre intuitive par participation.”432 Despite the fact that
Senghor had substituted the word “émotion” by “raison” (reason), the difference, by all
considerations, lies in the very process by which one is equally able to differentiate between the
two. The fact that Senghor assimilates European reason to analytical practical usage is clear
enough for one to perceive the intuitiveness of Black reason, still, as emotional. What matters
with regard to Sankharé, as I mentioned earlier, is his rejection of Senghor’s approach of
intuitive reason. As a result, Sankharé’s preference for a reasoned, and intellectual approach
towards Islam and the Qur’an becomes the very reason that justifies the exegesis/explanation of
the Qur’anic text through a logical and analytical methodology. For, there is no doubt that if
Descartes’ reason implies a mental/ psychological predisposition. It goes without saying that the
magnitude of Sankharé’s project and the complexities of modern society require such an
undertaking to be conducted in the most elaborate discursive form to ensure a successful
communication outcome. Thus, text, intellect, and scholarship become the ultimate assemblage,

“Ce que l’Homme noir apporte”(What Black Man Brings), Cardinale Verder et al., L’homme de couleur, (The Man
of Color) (Paris: Plon, 1939), pp. 291-313 at 295.
432
Quoted in Xavier Garnier, “La notion de raison intuitive” Léopold Sédar Sengehor. Africanité, Universalité. Ed.
Jacques Girault et al., Itinéraires et contacts de cultures 31 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002), pp. 115-.20. This reformulation
first appeared in Senghor’s essay, “L’Esthétique négro-africaine,” Diogène 16 (October-December, 1956): 43-61 at
56.
431

203
and ones that have come to represent the most convincing elements among different peoples in
today’s society.
Now, it is, perhaps, fair to show, following Mamadou Tounkara’s contribution to a
Senegalese news website, where he accuses openly Senegalese society for having caused the
death of Oumar Sankharé whom, Tounkara argues, had been falsely accused of being an apostate
among other equally false accusations. Let’s consider a segment of his bold statement:
Son ouvrage ‘Le coran et la culture grecque’ a été vilipendé, censuré; lui-même traîné
dans la boue, traité de mécréant, d’apostat, de franc-maçon, d’ennemi de l’Islam. Il a été
agressé physiquement et psychologiquement, nécessitant même une protection policière
tellement les appels au meurtre étaient ouverts. 433
In light of Tounkara’s vivid description, and the circumstances that surround Sankharé’s death,
although I cannot support nor deny Tounkara’s claim, there seems to emerge a clear disconnect
between the Western-educated scholar and his people. Dieng’s point that Professor Sankharé is
poorly-understood and that one must read his book, without emotion, therefore with much reason,
is one that painfully questions the possibility/ability of the scholar to stand as the spokesperson of
his/her society and be the champion for all that which it cherishes. The drive and aspiration for
universalism seems to have been the main motivation of Sankharé, to such an extent that the
immense gains of a world of peace, which finds its common heritage deeply grounded in a past of
shared mythic symbols and references seem to have motivated his work, notwithstanding possible
misinterpretations and alterations. In a sense, if it is verified that there have been major flaws in
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Sankharé’s text, one can certainly not deny that his work was a genuine attempt to bring the peoples
of the world’s two major religion ever closer at a time when violence and religious fundamentalism
are on the rise, and contributing to further divisions among nations and peoples. If a good number
of eighteenth century European philosophers could not suggest any better solution than to remove
religion from the political sphere, Sankharé, a Muslim scholar, argued instead, that a secular, rather
than a dogmatic, reading of a religious text should and ought to help bring about cohesion between
the two great religions, and therefore contribute to global peace.

5.2

Ahmadou Kourouma in history

The qualities of Ivory Coast novelist, Ahmadou Kourouma (1927-2003), especially the aesthetic
and linguistic innovation of his novels, have been discussed at length.434 However, in the context
of my discussion, my objective is to show, rather, how Kourouma’s Les soleils des
indépendances435 marks the beginning or revival of a communication form that structurally reflects
the African postcolonial situation.
The destruction of African traditional structures resulting from Western colonial conquest
and the establishment of Europe-inspired political structure have, doubtless, weakened most of the
traditional apparatuses. And, the African oral artist, as a major agent in the art of collecting and
disseminating information, has seen his role significantly reduced within the colonial and
postcolonial political context. Additionally, the introduction and promotion of European languages
to the detriment of local ones has further jeopardized the chances of the oral artist to regain lost
ground, relevance, and prestige. It is in this context that I evaluate Kourouma’s novel as an attempt
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to rekindle and revive this traditional function and its effective form of communication, especially
at a time when the masses in postcolonial society are subjected to all forms of exploitation. As one
who understands both the reality of traditional Malinke society and that of postcolonial reality,
Kourouma not only takes advantage of his Western education, but, most importantly, becomes a
self-invested artist whose work and mission covers a wide geographical area, which, henceforth,
makes up the postcolonial society. To demonstrate this fully, I show in my analysis how
Kourouma’s constituted model reflects this in the choice of characters and their relations.
Moreover, my analysis also shows how the differences and contrast of depicted spaces and their
respective realities, as well as the cocktail of narrative and communication devices employed,
contribute to show the preoccupation of Kourouma’s message to remain whole, that is, to function
as a mirror in which the concerns and issues of postcolonial society are reflected, and where the
unfolding story, itself, becomes the artist’s message, the diversity of which does in fact reflect the
modern (secular) society.
5.2.1 Defining Kourouma’s History.
In an interview with Yves Chemla, Kourouma explains the circumstances that led to the
publication of his first novel, Les soleils des indépendances and the general artistic trend of his
oeuvre. He maintains:
Les soleils des indépendances était avant tout un roman de circonstances. J’avais des amis,
des camarades, en prison. J’ai voulu écrire quelque chose pour témoigner. Il y avait un long
passage- qui a été supprimé- dans lequel je critiquais ouvertement le régime de Houphouët.
Ensuite, je suis remonté dans le temps pour poursuivre. Dans Monnè…, j’ai repris la
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rencontre avec les Blanc et le troisième roman traite de la guerre froide. J’ai travaillé cette
continuité. 436
In that same interview, Kourouma would add:
J’ai toujours voulu témoigner. J’écris et je dis: voilà ce que j’ai vu. Vous savez quand j’étais
jeune par exemple, on me racontait comment s’était passé la rencontre avec les Français.
Cette fois, j’ai pris la guerre froide et c’est moi qui l’ai vue. L’axe principal du roman est
pour moi témoigner. C’est ma vision de l’histoire qui est déterminante, dans mes romans.437
What Kourouma refers to here as history should not be mistaken for what is generally understood
as a subject or its field of study. Rather, the use of the term in this particular context must be placed
in a direct relationship with his person, that is, Kourouma turned novelist-historian. The
spontaneity of the events that led to the imprisonment of friends and comrades provided no time
for, nor did it incite or motivate, Kourouma to learn how to become a historian. Instead, these
events precipitate his decision to stand as one who would make it his duty to record those facts
that are worthy to write about and to communicate them to a wider audience. The likeliness of this
situation is one that is strongly supported by Kourouma’s own confession that, “on me racontait
comment s’était passé la rencontre avec les Français.”This valuable piece of information, then,
sheds light on his disposition or predisposition, as a result of repeated exposure to story/history
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telling. Thus, what is described here as history needs perhaps to be understood not as history in
the modern academic sense, but rather and indeed quite accurately as history in the African
traditional sense, where most major event becomes history right from the inception. This is
certainly what Isidore Okpewho alludes to when he writes:
In traditional African society, there were no such schools organized for general
instruction…So how is it possible for the citizen of a society to acquire, on a general or
collective basis, information concerning themselves…Obviously such information is
contained in the various forms of oral literature practiced in the society—songs, narratives,
proverbs, riddles, and so on—which are delivered privately…or publicly. 438
It is significant that the different forms of literature listed above require various degrees of memory
activity. For the oral artist to successfully complete their work, s/he must necessarily weave facts
into a sustainable expressive form, which in turn demands meticulous treatment of details, as well
as the maintenance of emotional momentum. Timeliness becomes then fundamentally important,
and justifies the need for the oral artist to ensure his work actualizes the event in such a way that
the vividness of the narrative not only encapsulates the essence of the story, but also seals off the
narrative moment in a continuous present. In fact, this appears to be the trend with most African
traditional epics where the narrative reveals accurate details of places and individuals. In Sundiata:
An Epic of Old Mali, for instance, the griot of the child hero, Balla Fasseké, appears to be the prime
witness of the formidable feat of the young hero, as well as the first, among countless other griots,
to relate the story (history) of Sundiata. 439 No doubt, the words of Djeli Mamoudou Kouyaté serve
as a living testimony of what appears to be an African traditional concept of history. In the opening
of the epic, Kouyaté maintains the following: “Ma parole est pure et dépouillée de tout mensonge;
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c’est la parole de mon père; c’est la parole du père de mon père. je vous dirais la parole de mon
père telle que je l’ai reçue.”440 Thus, the events that the griot Balla Fasseké recorded originally as
facts, which were then woven into a story and first recounted by the griot himself since Balla was
the attendant figure of the child hero, has become history not as a result of the passing of an
extensive period of time, or truths that are unearthed subsequently in the process of archival
research. Rather, it had become history owing to the nature and prominence of the events, which
had necessitated the direct intervention of the oral artist. In fact, Senghor points to the supremacy
of the spoken word in traditional African society when he writes: “Au commencement de l’art,
comme de toute vie, nous disaient autrefois, les sages africains, il y a la Parole.” 441 The importance
of the word, as Senghor aptly put it, is one that shows its predominance and the various functions
it fulfills within traditional and even modern society. Sana Camara tells us that in order to come
up with a text of Sirifo Camara’s version of The Epic of Kelefaa Saane, he had first to transcribe
it from the two cassettes on which a performance of the Epic was recorded in 1987.442 These
instances further demonstrate how verbal expression and the art and science accompanying it
remain still a significant feature of African society. It then comes as no surprise, that Kourouma
would refer to his novels as history. For, on the one hand, the events Kourouma relates in his work
are considered very significant in terms of the newly constituted nation and its people. On the other
hand, however, the narrative techniques and the different linguistic devices Kourouma utilizes in
his work show him working very much within the tradition of the griot, reflecting similar attitudes
and attributes. In my discussion of his characters, I show how Kourouma’s choice and treatment
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of typical figures in society sets up his work as a new type of discourse that finds its raison d’être
in and inspiration from his vision of a postcolonial society that strives towards prosperity for all
and the rule of justice. In an interview with Stephen Gray, speaking about his novel, Les soleils
des indépendances, Kourouma affirms:
So the critique was that, having thought so hard for independence, when it came it brought
us nothing- rather a severe view. But you must remember what happened to Marxist and
intellectuals and writers—they were all sent to prison. At one stage, I was the only one at
liberty, and I felt, absolutely as a matter of principle, that I had to write something. It had
to be a fictional form, as a direct criticism would have been proscribed.443
At this point, one can make no mistake as to what appears to be Kourouma’s chief motivation.
What should have been a direct criticism, if circumstances permitted, had thus been worked
(woven) into the novel form. His avowal becomes, in this regard, almost an invitation to investigate
the symbolism and metaphors behind each of his characters.
5.2.2 Characters: Multiplicity of Purpose.
A close examination of the characters in Les soleils des indépendances shows, indeed, the
novelist’s effort and intent to paint an accurate picture of African postcolonial society, which
features a range of realities and phenomena, which have become part and parcel of society. I show
these oppositions in the following discussion of select characters.
5.2.2.1.1 Fama Doumbouya:
As the novel’s main character, it is significant that Kourouma chose a high-ranking
individual within the Malinké traditional society. One learns in fact that the name Fama is directly
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linked to the Malinké word/title faama (military leader), which the nineteenth-century Malinké
Muslim Emperor of Wassoulou, Samory Ture (1830-1900) self-proclaimed himself to be.444 Thus,
the narrator’s description of Fama as “dernier et légitime descendant des princes Doumbouya du
Horodougou”445 points to the latter’s rank within the Malinke social hierarchy. In fact, through
Fama, Kourouma projects us directly into the reality of a world upon which colonial and
postcolonial political structures have eclipsed and about which not much is known. Fama then
becomes quite symbolic, not only of traditional life, but, most specifically, he becomes a
metonymical figure for the Malinke community.
It very much seems that the characterizing sentiment of pity about Fama’s downfall is
neatly accompanied by the narrator/author’s (unidentified) unhidden criticism of what could
unmistakably be characterized as repulsive practices among the Malinke. Standing as the “dernier
… descendant des princes Doumbouya”, Fama’s loss of honor and prestige has become most
critical given that this prince has transformed into “un ‘vautour’.”446 As I mentioned earlier, it is
important to keep in mind the linkages between Fama and the Malinke community. The
implications of such degradation, one can assume by extension, become symptomatic of the plight
of the whole community, and therefore the story/history of Fama represents the crisis of an entire
community whose substitution of a quest for easy material gains for intrinsic traditional values and
morals has contributed to the degeneration of the community as a whole. And consequently,
Fama’s shameful practices are a direct reflection of those mishaps found within the Malinke
community as one can perceive here:
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Comme toute cérémonie funéraire rapporte, on comprend que les griots malinké, les vieux
Malinkés, ceux qui ne vendent plus parce que ruinés par les Indépendances (et Allah seul
peut compter le nombre de vieux marchands ruinés par les Indépendance dans la capitale!)
“travaillent” tous dans les obsèques et les funérailles. De véritables professionnels! Matins
et soirs ils marchent de quartier en quartier pour assister à toutes les cérémonies. On les
dénomme entre Malinkés, et très méchamment, “les vautours” ou “bande d’hyènes.”447
The large-scale professional conversion of “les griots malinké, vieux Malinkés”448 into habitual
funeral attendants is quite significant, especially with regards to the political context. There
appears here an implicit parallel between these practiced professions and their distinct political
structure as they were once in traditional society and as they find themselves now situated in
society since “Independence.” In fact, it seems that the establishment of the western political
model, as symbolized by “Independence,” has played a significant part in the transformation of
traditional identities. There is no doubt that the professions of praise-singer and merchant have
significant socio-cultural implications. Thus, for instance, Hampathé Bâ, in describing the Islamic
military campaign of the Tall dynasty, adds the following comment: “Un beau jour de 1890,
Amadou Chékou, fils de El Hadj Omar et ancien souverain de Ségou, arriva à Bandiagara suivi
d’un cortège composé de ses fils, de ses cavaliers, et de ses griots.”449 The role and utility of the
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griot in this context is tightly linked to the traditional institution itself. Isidore Okpewho highlights,
in this regard, a similar phenomenon when he writes:
On ceremonial occasions such as the installation of a new chief, the king of the community
would come out in all his pomp and circumstance, preceded by his court singer or singers.
The main duty of the poet on such an occasion would be to recite, in praises, the family
background of the king and the greatness of that family.450
The merchant profession had, on the other hand, brought wealth and prestige to the community.
In fact, historical records testify to the involvement of Muslim merchants known as Wangara,
Dyula or Yarse of the Upper Niger region in the gold and kola trade of the southern regions in the
late fourteenth to early fifteen century. 451 Furthermore, it had seemingly been a long standing
tradition that Muslim merchants had always doubled their mercantile activities with those of
Islamic clerisy. If one is to trust the Cordovan Muslim scholar, Al Bakri (who died in 1094), the
king of Mali had converted to Islam following the request of a Muslim missionary and trader,
whose successful, yet conditional prayer for rain at time of drought, convinced the king to accept
Islam and subsequently to ban idolatry from his kingdom.452 The importance of this profession is
even more revealing since the Prophet Muhammad (c. 570- 632) exercised a similar function when
he was hired by the rich merchant, widow Khadīja whom he later married.453 Thus, through Fama,
Kourouma is able to bring into view the reality of an entire community, whose glorious past in
precolonial times is heavily contrasted to their decadent condition under Independence.
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5.2.2.1.2 The President and the Marabout.
The inclusion of the figures of the president and the marabout in Les soleils des
indépendances is no random coincidence. In fact, it had become a part of a growing trend among
a number of African novelists in both pre and post-Independence era to incorporate these
figures.454 In her study of the phenomena of “maraboutism and maraboutage” in the Senegalese
novel, Debra Boyd-Buggs notes: “All African literature is said to incline towards realism,” and
concerning the adoption of the novel among African writers, she adds “and when it was adopted
by African writers in the twentieth century, it related to society in much the same way it had done
earlier in Europe.”455 Kourouma had, certainly, never abandoned this tradition. In fact, when asked
about his 1998 novel, En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages, he gives the following explanation:
It’s really a satire on dictatorships, and my particular is, let’s say, somewhat like president
Eyedèma456 of Togo. When he’s asked if he might lose a certain election, he replies there
is no possibility whatsoever because, even if he did lose by magic, he’d call all the wild
animals out of the bush too, and all of them would vote for him unanimously. So no
problem, even if the human beings dare to let him down.457
As I highlighted above concerning Kourouma’s motives for writing Les soleils des Indépendances,
it seems that a certain image of the African president has come to be consolidated throughout his
oeuvre. Thus, the fictional representation of this political figure reflects, to a large extent, actual
practices and what appears as the inherent belief and vision of a new breed of political leaders
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along with their functioning apparatus. Thus, in Les soleils des Indépendances, the mention of the
president is linked up to the following events:
Le président et le parti unique réprimèrent. Deux ministres, deux députés et trois
conseillers furent ceinturés en pleine rue, conduits à l’aérodrome, jetés dans des avions et
expulsés. Un conseil de ministre extraordinaire fut convoqué, délibéra tout l’après-midi et
se termina par un grand festin à l’issu duquel quatre ministres furent appréhendés sur le
perron du palais, ceinturés, menottés, et conduits en prison.458
To fully understand the logic of the situation here and get a better sense of the image of the
president, one has to resort to word association and take into consideration the political context.
For, it seems, the authoritativeness of the president is largely predicated on the “parti unique,”
which can also be read metaphorically as the very symbol of individualism in all its negative or
destructive aspects. In fact, Kourouma seems to invite for comparison between traditional power
structures and those of the post-Independence period. The narrator’s assertion that “Dans toute
l’Afrique d’avant les soleils des indépendances, les malheurs du village se prévenaient par des
sacrifices. On se souciait de deviner, de dévoiler l’avenir.”459 In this remark, it is quite clear that
the whole community is so determinedly involved that one can barely perceive the presence and
role of central power. In reality, the issue, or should I say perhaps, the difference, lies in the
philosophy of power itself. Traditional African rulers, as historians have shown,460 never had the
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pretense of being the depositary of all knowledge, nor had they seen it their exclusive role to act
unilaterally for the good of the nation. I have discussed this, indeed, in my first chapter. The
contrast with the concept of the “parti unique” or “ parti au pouvoir,” is one that installs the ruler
as the focal point of social and political power. Therefore, what was traditionally done on behalf
of the people and the community is here transformed and made to serve the selfish desires and
aspirations of a single person. Thus, the acts of repression, expulsion, and imprisonment are not
only authoritarian in nature, given that they were enacted upon the orders of an all-powerful
individual (the president), but also, and most significantly, these decisions were in no way
connected to the community such that one could imply that their implementation would benefit
the community or the society at large. Usman Tar and Abba Gana Shettima found, in fact, that:
“In most African states, the postcolonial era has not resulted in the much-anticipated development,
much less democracy.”461 As for Lamin Sanneh, he sees the problems in contemporary Africa as
resulting from having unquestioningly accepted the legitimacy of the secular state, and the
separation of public and private spheres. Granting the secular state the absolutist prerogative to
organize life this has the consequence of denying religion its raison d’être. He thus believes a good
way to address contemporary social and political malaise is to find a way to reintegrate religion
into the body politic.462
In Les soleils des indépendances, the intervention of the marabouts seems to take place, for
the most part, in the strict contexts of power mismanagement. Just as Boyd-Buggs’ study
highlighted the differences within the marabout group, those marabouts depicted in Kourouma’s
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Les soleils des indépendances fulfill different functions and stand in varying relationships to the
main action. However, despite these differences, the religious figures appear very much in the
guise of service providers, and therefore driven by material gains and financial profit. In
consequence, they show little interest in maintaining Islamic orthodox practices or seeking to
provide Islamic knowledge or promote learning. In fact, it is interesting to note the circumstances
that provoke the marabout’s intervention in Les soleils des indépendances. For instance, after years
of marriage with Fama, Salimata is still unable to conceive and is seized with growing despair. In
her desperate situation of a barren woman in a society where a women’s worth is closely tied to
her ability to bear children, she is condemned to a perpetual quest for remedial treatments. It is in
this context that Salimata makes the acquaintance of the marabout, Hadj Abdoulaye, whose
reputation and prowess is well encapsulated in the following description: “Longtemps avant de se
voir, et de loin, Salimata avait entendu parler du marabout sorcier Hadj Abdoulaye. La sorcellerie
et la magie coulaient sous sa peau comme chez d’autres la malédiction.”463 The characterization
of Hadj Abdoulaye as “marabout sorcier” becomes a major indication about the nature of his work,
as well as his identity. In fact, concerning this category of marabout, Boyd-Buggs made the
following observation:
The marabout-prêtre in the Senegalese novel embodies in human form the syncretism
between traditional African religious practices (fetishism, sorcery, divination, magic,
traditional medicine, polytheism) and certain elements of Islam (prayer, the Koran,
monotheism). His main function is to facilitate the accomplishment of supernatural
operations known as maraboutage.464
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It is true that religious syncretism (mixing of Islam with traditional practices) had, to a large extent,
developed in response to societal demands at a time when Islam and the Islamic clerisy had taken
ascendency over African traditional religions, and the Muslim cleric had come to play a central
role in responding not only to religious questions, but also to social matters in general. 465 The
difference as it appears with Hadj Abdoulaye and others like him seems to have much to do with
the political context of independence. For one can read “La seule petite chose qui avait coupé
l’espoir et l’enthousiasme était qu’Abdoulaye maraboutait cher. Marabout pour député, ministre,
ambassadeur et autres puissants qu’aucune somme ne peut dépasser.”466 In a sense, it looks as
though Hadj Abdoulaye and his profession are clearly dependent upon the emergence of this new
cohort of powerful leaders, whose individualistic stance clearly determines their very relation with
the marabout sorcerer. The fact that they are willing to pay for his exceedingly expensive services
very much informs their attitude towards power. This is all the more evident given that Hadj
Abdoulaye’s preference of the city over his hometown of Timbuktu reveals a shift in priority.
Where once one could imagine his Timbuktu hometown as a place of authentic practice and
communal service, the city becomes a metaphor for hardships, individualism, and the location par
excellence of deceit, and self-gratifying actions.
A second category of marabouts is presented in the narrative under the heading of “des
prestigieux” (prestigious ones). The implication here suggests that this group is characterized by
its higher ranking, and is, therefore, to be distinguished from the former category. In fact, the
difference is, equally, reflected in their specific denominations given that “Hadj,” in the West
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African region, is commonly used as proper name, or combined with another, while the second,
“El Hadji,” which is derived from the Arabic word “Hajj” (pilgrimage), is typically used as a title
to refer to an individual who has performed the pilgrimage in the holy city of Mecca.467 Thus while
these practical differences help explain a certain sense of prestige, it is evident that on the basis of
their social and communal involvement that the distance between these prestigious marabouts and
those of sorcerer type such as Hadj Abdoulaye is not that significantly great, as the former appear
to be involved in rewarding transactions as well although of a different kind. While the sorcerer
marabout is less prestigious, due to his hollow Islamic knowledge (syncretism), the prestigious
marabouts, even as they dwell in Togobala468 or its surroundings, seem more interested in offering
their services to noble and prestigious families on account of their wealth and other material
property. For instance, the death of Fama’s cousin, Lacina, illustrates the phenomenon fairly well:
“Les marabouts – des prestigieux! – il y avait même deux El Hadji – s’accroupirent au centre, à
un pas des plats et se mirent à feuilleter des papiers jaunis.”469 Later one reads: “Vint le moment
des présents; chaque grande famille en offrit. Merci! Merci à tous!” 470 It becomes then quite
significant that, despite their characteristic differences, the marabouts in both groups seem to have
become migrant workers whose chief preoccupation, under the independence suns, has simply
become the acquisition and accumulation of wealth. However, despite Jeff Haynes’s observation
that “the state-society relationship is nearly everywhere in Africa moulded by a network of
clientelist interest”471 (including the interests of the marabout), it seems, indeed, that the impact

For more details on this, see Gätje, The Qur’ān and its Exegesis, pp.100-01.
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and influence of the marabouts continue to grow, making it consequently difficult to draw a clear
line between politics and religion. This, then, brings us to the question of the legitimacy of the
secular state, as Tar and Shettima have rightly interrogated it in their specific case study of
Nigeria.472
5.2.3 Language.
Kourouma’s Les soleils des indépendances had encapsulated his tumultuous debut as a
novelist since Parisian publishing houses refused at first to print his work.473 The excuse provided
was the inappropriate use of the French language rather than the political content of the novel.
Eventually, its first publication was made possible with the Presses de l’Université de Montréal,
which published the novel in 1968. Only then did the Editions du Seuil in Paris decide to publish
the novel two years later in 1970.
The observation that Kourouma’s language reflects the Malinke imaginary and universe is
not to be denied. However, it is my perception that despite all the references to Malinke linguistic
subtleties, Kourouma’s language reflects/depicts, above all, the realities of a particular region,
whose common heritage make it significantly easier for their readers to understand the novel in its
general articulations and movements. Thus, as I mentioned at the beginning with Kourouma’s
notion of history, it becomes equally important to highlight that his “noncompliant” use of the
French language becomes also a way to fully assert the condition of the French language among a
once “dominated” community of beings whom the imposed French language and culture had
clearly failed to fashion into proper French citizens. On the other hand, it also demonstrates the
readiness of individuals in former colonized societies to reject their local languages and choose,
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instead, to think as, and speak like, metropolitan Frenchmen and women―albeit after their own
fashion. Frantz Fanon made an enlightening remark in this regard since he notes:
Tout peuple colonisé — c’est-à-dire tout peuple au sein duquel a pris naissance un
complexe d’infériorité, du fait de la mise au tombeau de l’originalité culturelle locale — se
situe vis-à-vis du langage de la nation civilisatrice, c’est-à-dire de la culture
métropolitaine.474
In this context, Kourouma’s linguistic touch/adaptation becomes doubly symbolic. On the one
hand, it stands as a stark denial of colonial (French) linguistic achievements, this being the
ostensible excuse for initially refusing to print the novel, due to its perversion of the original
structures of, and cultural element within, the French language. On the other hand, rather than
continuing with the novel’s bourgeois tradition of realism, that is describing reality as it appears,
Kourouma complicates its structure with so many Malinke cultural and linguistic specificities that
it makes sense just to view Les soleils des indépendances as hi(story), and not a fluid narrative that
remains accessible to any and every individual. Referring to Kourouma’s language, Makhily
Gassama observes: “Au vrai, il s’agit moins dans Les soleils des indépendances, de la pratique
traditionnelle de la langue de Racine que de l’usage du langage malinké,”475 However, it is once
again my belief that full consideration of the language context and modality would allow us to see
in Kourouma’s linguistic twists not only an acknowledgement of the Malinke linguistic universe,
and its continuing validity, but also, by extension, a symbolized form of what has almost always
been considered a propensity of the colonized person, despite his or her proven linguistic ability,
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to misuse the civilizing language―a belief which had, indeed, been a chronic attitude of the French
in both their colonies and in metropolitan France. 476 Thus, Kourouma’s “improper” use of the
French language 477 becomes, naturally, a self-identifying approach (for a large community of
beings) whereby the novelist’s message becomes both a celebration of surviving cultural and
linguistic specificities, as well as an acknowledgement and a taking into account of the realities of
a vast geographic region. The story/history of Les soleils des indépendances could quite easily
describe the experience of individuals any one of the former French African colonies for whom
the same characteristics, and attitudes would be familiar. Because, if one is to take into account
Thomas Hale’s informed view, 478 then it becomes imperative to avoid confining Kourouma’s
anthropological novel strictly to the Malinke community, while the commitment of our
novelist/historian and griot to tackle complex questions in contemporary society (not just those of
his country or community) has made it abundantly clear that Kourouma’s vision transcends the
artificial boundaries and reflects, rather, the conditions of specific societies in general.
In conclusion, the examination of the views and perspectives of the West African writers
with respect to the secular question appears to be a necessary process in order to investigate and
question the writers’ own views and philosophies. Thus, my discussion of Wole Soyinka, Oumar
Sankharé, and Ahmadou Kourouma is just a sample study, which, I am certain, could be extended
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to include other African writers who have equally shown great interest in questions about the
pertinence of religion and the problematics of the secular establishment.
With Soyinka, as I have shown, much of the elaboration of the secular question was
influenced and shaped by a local literary movement, which had very early invested much of its
artistic energy in cultural revival/renaissance. In addition, the belief that independence was a
period that provided former colonized societies with the opportunity to change the status quo
informs, to a large extent, Soyinka’s overall posture. His intervention in politics, literature, and a
number of other critical issues shows his determination to urge all active agents to turn back
towards African original cultures, as they encapsulate not only the very essence of their individual
and communal selves, but also remain, in Soyinka’s view, very much committed to a secular vision
and towards being progressive.
My examination of Le Coran et la culture grecque, on the other hand, shows the need and
relevance to further examine the role of Islam in the modern State, and study its ramifications as
well. I have shown in my analysis how Sankharé’s Le Coran et la culture grecque remains, in
fact, an attempt to craft a discourse on unity, which in my view, is the scholar’s response to
religion’s global phenomena. The question then, further to the book’s polemic, is the need for
Muslim scholars to engage in a discussion about their role and prerogatives within their own
modern/secular, religious/Islamic societies, as I believe Sankharé’s book has already launched. It
then perhaps remains to see what will be the outcome of the debate, if it is to produce anything at
all, or have any impact.
And finally, I have attempted to show how Kourouma’s Les soleils des indépendances
represents a significant innovation. His alteration of the novel from a basic narrative tool into a
coded sociocultural text has allowed him not only to pervert the French language by subjecting it
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to Malinke linguistic devices, but even most critically, Kourouma has, quite neatly, fit himself in
the role of the griot. This makes it relevant to consider Les soleils des indépendances less as a
novel and more as the utterances of a bard, and therefore, a genuine indigenous phenomenon. Thus,
the sense of history becomes the very element that informs/implies witnessing and impartiality in
the modality of communication, and therefore significant feature of a dialogue between composer
and the intended audience.

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN LA ROUTE DES
CLAMEURS.

On Sunday October 29, 2017, I took a trip down south to Noblesville, Indiana to visit a
countryman whose wife and mother-in law had just returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca a few
weeks earlier. Although an overcast sky with menacing clouds was looming, I decided to go
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because, at that point, I could no longer cancel my visit. After half an hour drive on the highway,
I am caught in a heavy downpour. As a result, traffic slows down, since almost every motorist is
exercising maximum caution. The temptation to pull over to the shoulder and wait for the rain to
subside is there, but my desire to reach my destination before dusk as daylight is beginning to
wane is even greater. I finally arrive and am greeted by Amina, my friend’ sister-in law. Soon, her
mother, Yaay479 Khady comes downstairs. We shake hands and I pay my respects to her and
inquire about her pilgrimage. I make the supplication that God accept her act of worship at the
holy site. A few minutes later, her second daughter, Suzanne, with whom she had travelled to
Mecca, walks in. I repeat almost the same words to her, while making sure to address her as
hajja.480 Despite the usual light and relaxed environment in the house, there is a noticeable spiritual
aura, as Yaay Khady, seated on her prayer mat, is saying her rosary, while the television is turned
to a Senegalese Islamic channel showing a teenage boy reciting verses of the Qur’an. I am soon
informed that the latter, Senegalese-born, was the winner of 2017 International Qur’an Reading
Contest organized in Malaysia. His success was, allegedly, met with significant financial reward
from both government officials and private individuals in addition to the receipt of numerous
material gifts. And as if to further validate the teenager’s highly valued status, Yaay khady remarks,
“ki ku ko dul may sa doom.”481 After about an hour, Suzanne’s husband, Younous, finally arrives,
and I, to lighten up the general mood, made the observation that Younous had better perform the
hajj soon least he run the risk of never earning the title al-hajj.
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Pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of the Islamic religion, appears to many as the
most challenging act of faith to fulfill, and the greatest act of sacrifice. For the majority of Muslims,
Mecca remains a symbolic place in Islamic spirituality given that it is the very place where the
Prophet Muhammad and his companions spent most of their lives, and also where the Qur’an was
sent down the first time. In Senegal, in particular, performing hajj (pilgrimage) has become almost
the ultimate dream for most adults. While some spend years working in order to save enough
money, others, instead, rely on their sons and daughters to fund their trip in the event the latter get
better opportunities in life, and better financial situations.
The idea that African societies are no longer isolated following their encounter with Europe
is certainly undeniable. However, all too often, this is taken to suggest a parallel between African
and European societies. Indeed, this tendency to assimilate the two may indicate that African
societies have accomplished significant development in terms of identity. Nonetheless, it is
important to highlight that despite the modernization of numerous African societies, there still
remain significant vestiges of traditional life and beliefs, which continue to inform and inspire
many on the continent.482
To begin with, religious fundamentalism has emerged recently as a common theme in West
African creative writing. 483 And, as is often the case, consideration of the social context is
important, if not critical in order to fully comprehend its nature and implications. Ousmane
Diarra’s 2014 novel, La route des clameurs,484 in no way, emerged from a vacuum. In an interview
with the blog magazine, ChezGangoueus, the novelist states:
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Ce qui a donc déclenché l’écriture de La route des clameurs, c’est la douleur de cette
invasion du Mali, la destruction de notre patrimoine humain, culturel, historique, celle des
liens séculaires qui nous unissaient, liens humains […] Car voilà que malgré notre Islam
presque millénaire, d’autres venaient nous dire que nous n’étions pas assez musulmans et
prenaient cela comme prétexte pour détruire notre pays, le démembrer, le dépecer. Il ne
s’agit pas d’Islam, mais d’une nouvelle entreprise coloniale qui ne dit pas son nom, d’une
invasion impérialiste sous le couvert de l’Islam.485
It is important to highlight the connection Diarra establishes between his own identity (used here
rather collectively) and Mali’s society. His use of the terms “patrimoine humain, culturel,
historique,” as well as his reference to “liens séculaires” suggests, in some ways, an entire historic
process of traditional communal interaction,486 which resulted in the foundation of Mali. From that
historical standpoint, it seems all the elements that came to be considered as part of Mali had
consequently a historical dimension; hence Diarra’s reference to them as “patrimoine.” It is equally
in that light that one should understand his assertion of “liens séculaires” in his evocation of Islam.
Because, in this context, religion “notre Islam” is intrinsically tied to Mali’s historical and religious
development,487 and is, thus, deeply ingrained in the local society, as well as in the collective
identities. Thus, Diarra’s criticism of individuals who seek to dismiss Mali’s millennia-old Islam
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reflects, in some ways, his resolve to safeguard his society’s collective past, that is, the human,
cultural, and historic patrimony in which “notre Islam” is inextricably woven. With regard to
Islamic fundamentalism in La route des clameurs, this chapter discusses the critical role modern
religious discourse plays in creating distinct identities whose cultural, historic and human
patrimony, to use Diarra’s own words, may no longer be located within local societies and cultures.
It is, therefore, important to underscore the role and impact of modernity in regards with the
identity question. On the one hand, the transformation of African traditional societies into modern
nation-states with their attendant secular ideology has certainly been a significant factor given that
the fundamentalists in La route des clameurs consider depravity and other societal evil as direct
consequences of secularism. On the other hand, however, technical advances have not only made
movement and interaction between individuals much easier, but the advent of modern devices of
communication has, without doubt, removed significant obstacles within societies where
communication has traditionally been part of a complex apparatus.

488

Overall, religious

fundamentalism seems to reflect a much-changing “Muslim world” where global communities are
gradually and speedily gaining ground and competing with local ones, thus posing a genuine threat
to local communities as well as to “national identities.” Despite Samuel Huntington’s defiance489
of the concept of a universal civilization where Western consumption pattern and its popular
culture would function as a defining measure, I must draw attention to the fact that Islamist
fundamentalism, as chronicled in Diarra’s novel, shows how the emergence of global religious
ideologies constitutes a threat to local societies and their cultures. Eventually, even though one
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particular ideology may not dominate every society or emerge as universal civilization, the fact
remains that local cultures are increasingly threatened in the modern era whether through invasive
cultural items or other powerful phenomena such as religion.490 Diarra’s notion of a collective
national identity seems to indicate a dichotomy where, on the one hand, local, communal and
national identities are grouped together to mean one and the same, and are thus opposed to a rising
modern-day global Islamist community, on the other hand. The same dichotomy equally suggests
that those identities rooted in their local hearths are, in essence, more salutary and fitting to local
communities and modern nations, while the harmful nature of global ideologies must be found in
their strict disregard of all that which is local in nature. Finally, Diarra’s positive view of the “liens
séculaires qui nous unissaient”491 reflects his stance in regards to the pertinence and necessity to
uphold a secular ideology. For Diarra, then, secularism constitutes a significant part of Malian492
historic identity and should not, therefore, be considered as exclusively European despite the fact
it was with the rule of the Europeans that secularism came to acquire its official approval.
La route des clameurs tells the story of a family and a community that comes to grips with
Islamist fundamentalism as the result of the establishment of new mosques led by Imams (religious
leaders) who came from Gulf countries where they received both religious training and the
financial support with which to build their own separate mosques and to start preaching their own
version of Islam. These new figures play a significant role as more individuals subscribe to their
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religious ideology. Ultimately, the invasion of Maabala493 by the jihadists of the Calife, Mabou
Maba, upsets the entire community, while the family of the protagonist, Bassy, is torn apart since
his brother, mother and two sisters finally join the gamins imams (Muslim religious leaders) in
their newly formed religious community (new mosques). Bassy, who sides with his artist father,
refuses to surrender, and chooses, instead, to fight what they see as an invasion of community,
country, and their own identities. It seems, however, as the child narrator points out, the imam’s
uncompromising stance on the need to implement the Sharia494 as the only solution to end misery
in society and the use of violence to expel evil, have finally convinced many that this remains the
only way to remedy societal depravity and inequality. In the following segment of the chapter, I
show the critical role small spaces play within the larger postcolonial secular society. I argue here
that the deep sense of communal belonging coupled with a quasi-perpetual search for spiritual
meaning has made it, indeed, possible for modern religious discourses to resonate with a growing
number of individuals in the face of a fractured postcolonial society.

6.1

Islam in the Postcolonial Space.
In La route des clameurs, one can clearly distinguish two types of spaces along with their

respective scope. The larger space appears to be represented by the nation or country, whereas
smaller spaces are represented through the nuclear family, the neighborhood, the town, as well as
its constitutive elements, animate and inanimate such as mosques, and communal and family
figures. The difference between the two can be perceived through the impact both have upon
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society and its members. My choice to discuss elements from these spaces follows their critical
role in shaping or affecting individual, as well as collective identities.
6.1.1 Mosques, Imams, and the Spiritual Affect.
Religion’s central role in building communities has long been a reality.495 In the particular
context of West Africa, as I showed in chapter one, community-building is just as old and certainly
predates the advent of world religions on this part of the continent. However, today, religion stands
as one of the most crucial factors in the creation of distinct communities either within a larger
group or outside it. It is equally symbolic that the Islamic religion places greater emphasis on the
community aspect, where Muslims, despite their racial, regional, or linguistic differences must
consider themselves as forming one umma (nation/ community) placed under the leadership of the
Prophet Muhammad.496
The featuring of mosques and imams in La route des clameurs is significant since they
inform the reader about the role of Islam and the identity of the featured society. Furthermore, the
critical role of the imam within a Muslim community and the symbolism of the mosque informs,
to some extent, the nature of the relationship between local communities and Islamic figures. In
fact, this explains in part why individuals within Muslim communities developed close ties that
are essentially grounded on the Islamic concept of brotherhood and communal responsibilities.
Additionally, on account of his social responsibilities, the imam is often personally invested in
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different respects of communal life given his numerous interactions with other community
members. Nonetheless it is important to highlight that among West African traditional societies,
spirituality has always played a central role in communal life.497 Additionally, the relationship
between the religious leader and his community has often been one of trust, where, rather than
fulfilling individual responsibilities, community members often expressed their faith through
religious agents.498 Thus, it seems the fact of linking oneself directly or indirectly to a Muslim
leader, while fulfilling non-burdensome responsibilities had been enough to maintain membership
among West African traditional societies.
In La route des clameurs, the changing relationship between the Islamic religious leader
and the community can be observed through the description of the community’s reaction to the
refusal of the protagonist’s father to attend service at the new mosque:
Mais la peau de mon vieux papa n’était pas à la portée de n’importe qui. C’est pourquoi
personne n’avait pu se la payer. Ni les voisins qui lui en voulaient à mort parce qu’il n’allait
jamais à la nouvelle mosquée du quartier, ni ses cousins, cousines, frères, sœurettes, oncles
et consorts pour la même raison.499
One can perceive, here, the changing social dynamic between what could be termed a traditional
paradigm and another more recent form of religious expression:
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Pourtant il y avait déjà plus de quinze mosquées dans le quartier. Et mon papa, il n’en
fréquentait aucune. Il n’en avait tout simplement pas le temps. Son travail était sa prière et
était accepté de tous. Les gens qui nous aimaient alors disaient que la marmite était plus
ancienne que la mosquée. Et la marmite, c’était d’abord le travail.500
It is significant that the father’s decision not to attend any one of the fifteen established mosques
in the neighborhood did not alter his Muslim status and identity. Instead, the fact that he was
accepted as such is a clear indication of the socio-cultural dynamic reflected through “la marmite”
(food/cooking pot) over Islamic exigencies. If it is indeed expected of the male Muslim adult to
attend religious service,501 it seems here the imperative to work and feed one’s family is given
equal, if not, greater importance. Thus, while Islam plays a significant role within the community,
social responsibilities are given significant consideration to the extent that one’s inability to attend
prayer at the mosque does not invalidate their membership within the community. On the contrary,
the prevalence of the traditional community and its cultural dynamic do, in fact, reflect through
the fifteen mosques since none of their imams expresses criticism or concern with respect to the
father’s comportment. In fact, these fifteen mosques appear to be embedded in the local community.
Thus, despite their fairly large number, they have clearly not altered the overall functioning of the
community and its guiding precepts. Rather, these “traditional” local mosques seem to carry on
with the traditional social model preferring it to a strictly exclusive one.
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Michael Lambert’s study502 of the Diola community of Mandégane503 highlights a similar
phenomenon. Indeed, upon conversion to Islam, the king of Mandégane sought, first and foremost,
to hire the services of an imam who would help with religious duties. Interestingly, the king showed
no intention to exclude, or separate himself from, the non-Muslim majority, nor did he resort to
any form of coercion to compel the latter into accepting his newfound faith. Rather, traditional
family and social ties proved critical in expanding the Islamic religion in the village as early
Muslims not only continue to live in the village, but also maintained ties with other fellow villagers.
For the most part, it appears that the traditional religious leaders, as exemplified in La route
des clameurs, have opted for a rather passive stance whereby they serve, rather than disrupt, their
own communities. Amadou Hampathé Bâ has made an enlightening assertion when, in reference
to Mali, he writes:
Ce pays de savane est celui des traditions bambaras, peules, dogons et malinkés…avant
que leur rencontre et parfois leur fusion avec l’Islam n’ai fait apparaitre un nouveau type
de comportement traditionnel vis-à-vis de Dieu, d’avantage en prolongement d’ailleurs
qu’en opposition avec le précédent.504
In reference to religion, Bâ adds: “L’homme noir africain est un croyant né. Il n’a pas attendu les
Livres révélés pour acquérir la conviction de l’existence d’une force suprême.”505 Bâ’s point is
relevant in precisely two regards. On the one hand, it argues for the existence of a belief system
among constitutive peoples of Mali, as well as the belief in the existence of an ultimate Being who
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presides over all forces. And thus, what seems to have added/changed with the advent of Islam,
for instance, is rather the way those concepts are dealt with, while a whole set of new rituals506
came to supersede traditional practices. At the same time, the idea that there is continuity between
traditional and Islamic practices is equally enlightening. In the particular context of La route des
clameurs, as I mentioned earlier, local traditional mosques situate themselves within the
established community. In a sense, traditional communities are, seemingly, a sine qua non
condition to the religious entity. As such, the imam in traditional mosques appears to bear similar
traits as those one would expect from a traditional priest whose primary role was to serve his
community as a member in his own right and also as a respected spiritual agent. Thus, while lack
of reference to the religious leaders is noticeable in regards to the fifteen mosques, it should not be
considered weakness or failure on the part of the religious leaders to fully enforce religious laws
and precepts. Rather, one should deduce from the statement, “Son travail était sa prière et était
accepté de tous,” 507 the manifestation of the community understanding/agreement, which
subsequently grants a waiver to the protagonist’s father and, presumably, to any community
member whose communal responsibilities make it impossible to fulfill religious or spiritual
obligations. Additionally, the father’s proven generosity certainly adds to his credit as the
community comes to view him in a comparatively benign light:
Les œuvres de mon papa voyageaient dans le monde entier et se vendaient comme des
petits pains. Notre famille était riche et généreuse. Et tous les parents proches et lointains
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venaient chez nous, mangeaient chez nous, dormaient chez nous. Et même que certains se
débrouillaient pour venir crever chez nous.508
Moreover, use of general reference, (tous), 509 informs of the primacy of the community over
specific individual roles and responsibilities despite the fact that specific mention of the religious
leaders’ viewpoint would have provided further clarification. It should, indeed, be highlighted that
absence of reference to religious leaders, in this context, shows how communal unity has taken
precedence over social and religious particularities. Such community valuation does, in fact,
minimize the ability for existing social agents and sites to garner strength and recognition beyond
that of the general community. Consequently, the validation of the father’s spiritual state is not
solely predicated upon the judgment of the local imams, but is rather left to the community’s
general consensus, which must take into consideration the views of the religious agents, as well as
those from the representative dignitaries, who, traditionally, play an important role. Overall, with
regard to these traditional mosques, it very much seems that the Islamic religious sites have become
fused into the local traditions, and thus while Islam has brought forth new beliefs and established
new practices in replacement of previous beliefs, the fact remains that a traditional vision of society
seems to have guided both the community and local Islamic practices to a large extent. As such,
non-evocation of the traditional religious leaders in La route des clameurs reflects this liminal
space between the religious, on the one hand, and the profane, on the other. Hampathé Bâ, once
again, highlights this fact when he writes: “Il n’y a pas le sacré d’un côté, et le profane d’un autre.
Tout est lié, tout met en jeu les forces de la vie.”510 The idea of a pervasive spirituality certainly

Ousmane Diarra, La route des clameurs p. 25 “My dad’s art pieces used to be displayed all over the world and
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helps us understand the connection made between individual social contributions and spiritual
fulfillment. In specific terms, the traditional concept of spirituality encompasses almost the entire
community sphere where the maintenance of community religious sites as well as participation in
certain specific ceremonies are generally considered part of the whole spiritual experience. 511 In
this regard then the establishment of mosque within a deeply traditional setting, as exemplified by
the fifteen mosques of the neighborhood, does little to change the community structure in any
significant ways.
In Senegal, a diligent and hardworking subgroup of the Senegalese Muridiyya brotherhood,
known as Baay Faal,512 is notorious for their abstinence from prayer. Sheikh Ibrahima Faal (18501930) by whom the movement was inspired, and to whom it looks up to as a model, is reported to
have been excused from carrying out the prescribed Islamic daily prayers by Sheikh Ahmadu
Bamba (1853-1927), the founder of the Muridiyya brotherhood as a result of his outstanding
dedication. According to Murid popular accounts, the Sufi saint vowed to intercede for this most
dedicated and loyal follower of his. Thus, contemporary followers and sympathizers of Sheikh
Ibrahima Faal, have not only adopted his work ethic to fully serve the brotherhood, but they also
believe that they too, just as their leader and founder, Sheikh Ibrahima Faal, do benefit from the
exemption from obligatory prayer.
Religious fundamentalism in La route des clameurs appears to be accompanied by sociopolitical transformation as illustrated in the following: “Mais les choses ont commencé à changer
avec l’apparition des nouvelles mosquées dirigées par les gamins imams à la barbichette de bouc
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nain et l’annonce des morbidonnes 513 aux frontières lointaines du pays” 514 There is a strong
impression that both the community and the entire country of Mali (pays) have entered a new era
with the establishment of new mosques within a space where other mosques had previously been
established (symbolized by the fifteen mosques mentioned earlier). The eruption of new religious
sites (l’apparition des nouvelles mosquées) along with their atypical immature religious leaders
(gamins imams) is a clear indication of ongoing social transformations. Moreover, this new
religious expression is characterized by vigorous militancy (gamins imams) and violence
(morbidonnes), which emerges in a political context where what happens in the community
(quartier) may be considered a direct reflection of what is happening in the country (pays) as a
whole. In a way, questioning or criticizing the religious practices within the community does
equally jeopardize or delegitimize the overarching political structure given that unsound religious
knowledge and lack of application of Islamic religious judgment, according to religious
fundamentalists, leads society irretrievably to perdition. It is in this particular context that the new
mosques and the gamins imams seem to place themselves and justify their socio-religious action.
In a sense, the objective of religious fundamentalists in La route des clameurs appears to be one
of sociocultural reform, which would, consequently, involve re-structuring and redefining society
while questioning the foundations of communal and social life.
The intention of the gamins imams to establish the new mosques as a the sole legitimate
religious authority in the community appears to be doubly motivated. On the one hand, its
discourse seeks to subvert long formed communities or societies given that a number of individuals
This phrase seems to derive from the association of the French verb “donner” (to give) and of word “mort” (death),
which translates in English as “givers of death,” and appears to be an alteration of another French word “moribond”
(the dying person), while the coined term, here, is used in a rather active form, which should then translate as purveyors
of death rather than one inflicted by death.
514
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led by short-bearded immature imams and the announcement that the morbidonne [jihadist] fighters were stationed
on the far borders of the country.” (translation mine)
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have become direct victims of its alienating discourse. On the other hand, it keeps each individual
aspiring to become a ‘true’ Muslim connected to its rhetoric while the latter is gradually uprooted
from their original space (neighborhood/society) and located, instead, in a much narrower space
(the new mosques). This transformation process leads each adherent to adopt a distinct behavior in
order to validate their transition and to demonstrate that they now embrace cardinal fundamentalist
values, which, thus, make up the whole of both their new religion and identity. The following
passage where the protagonist explains the circumstances that led to her mother’s departure from
the family compound is quite telling, and shows how consequential religious fundamentalist
discourse has proven to be. In fact, the mother’s decision to abandon the family home is a direct
effect of the fundamentalist discourse since the gamins imams consider the work of an artist an
evil profession due to the fact that the latter attempts to imitate Allah (God). For the individual to
find no better profession but imitate God is, in the view of the gamins imams, a clear manifestation
of vice and societal degeneration. Moreover, the mother’s departure from the family home is a
clear sign of social dislocation especially when the protagonist’s two sisters, Nématou and Kany
decide to follow their mother to the new mosque while Bassy, the protagonist decides to remain
with his father. There should be, however, no ambiguity regarding the move of the women to the
new mosque because it marks, indeed, a clear shift. As a community and society unit, the family,
reflects community and social values. As a result, one can assume that a number of changes have
taken effect within both the community and, to some degree, the larger society as well. For,
presumably, had such not been the case, it would have proven difficult if not impossible for the
mother to proceed on her own with such a momentous decision. Rather, as exemplified in the
following quote, it seems that a whole new identity is in making; one that clearly predicates itself
upon a strict interpretation of “religious behavior and interpretation.
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Mais ma mère malgré son amour pour mon papa, elle ne pouvait plus faire marche arrière.
Parce que maintenant tout le quartier y515 allaient et aussi parce que ses meilleures copines
lui avaient dit qu’entre Allah et le mari, si le mari n’est pas sur le chemin d’Allah, donc
musulman, il fallait savoir choisir. Et à temps, hein! “Et tu ne vas quand même choisir un
mortel au risque d’aller brûler en enfer avec tous tes enfants!” qu’elles avaient conclu.516
It is worth noting how the new established community contrasts sharply with the traditional
community ideal. Where the local community had initially been founded on religious diversity and
broad social practices, the gamins imams of the nouvelles mosquées have set up a strictly binary,
an almost Manichean view, whereby the new mosques have come to represent not only the center,
the location par excellence of the new Islamic community, but have equally become the very site
of socio-cultural training, individual metamorphosis, and ultimate success (good) in contrast to the
outer space (peripheral space of the new mosques) (evil). More specifically, such novel discourse
establishes a societal divide, which affects both the community (quartier) and the larger society
(le pays) given that its established rules and laws aim to correct what religious fundamentalists
perceive as evil. In a way, the new mosques appear as an antidote to, and a fortress against,
galloping evil, embodied in a general secular environment of laissez-faire517 which thus renders
strict application of religious ruling or conformity to it almost impossible. Thus, in their opposition
to the wider community and to secular society, the restricted space of the new mosques, by virtue
of its spiritual importance, has clearly expanded to the point that it functions as the locale for its

“[T]here” refers here to the new mosque.
O. Diarra, La route des clameurs p.39. “ Despite her love for my dad, my mother could not backtrack. Now that
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going to choose a mortal [over God] at the risk of going to burn in hell with all your children’ that they [or: the women]
decided” (translation mine).
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own self-contained society. For instance, in addition to his deserting the family workshop, the
protagonist’s brother, Zabani Zabata elects to find his home in the new mosque in the
neighborhood as the narrator explains:
C’est pourquoi j’ai décidé de mener ma propre enquête pour avoir le cœur net sur les
raisons qui poussaient Zabani Zabata à abandonner l’atelier de mon papa. Et c’est ainsi que
j’ai appris que c’est parce qu’il a trouvé gîte et couvert dans une des nouvelles mosquées
des gamins imams barbus, débarqués frais émoulus des pays du Golf…518
The following further informs about Zabani’s motivation: “Et Zabani Zabata, il m’a dit que l’imam
de la nouvelle mosquée lui avait appris que tout ce que mon papa faisait allait conduire notre
famille dans les pires flammes de l’enfer éternel!” 519 Zabani’s decision to leave the family
compound and discontinue his father’s profession is, unmistakably, an act of disavowal since his
interaction with the gamins imams has not only led him to disapprove of his father’s work, but also
his choosing the new mosque as his new home has major social implications. By dissociating
himself from his father on account of the latter’s professional errancy, and his embrace of the
gamins imams, Zabani Zabata has clearly severed ties with his biological father, and has chosen to
substitute the latter with a spiritual father in the person of the gamin imam. In this regard, the new
mosques do represent new communities in miniature whose vision and purpose, unlike that of the
traditional community and society, is to embark upon the attainment of a spiritual otherworldly
success. Consequently, Zabani’s professional shift constitutes tangible evidence, which reflects
clearly on the difference between the former traditional community and the “modern” spiritual
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community. As a result, the act of vacating the family home is an evidence of social disruption
where the very foundation of the society (the family unit) is upset by means of the implementation
of different values and a societal model that has historically been much limited in scope and
popularity.520
In his study of religious crisis in Nigeria, Toyin Falola highlights the critical role religion
played in creating what appeared to be an identity distinct from the rest of Nigerian society. Falola
writes with respect to the Nigerian Islamist sect, the Maitatsine:
The Maitatsine violence can be explained as a consequence of Islamic fundamentalism on
the one hand, and of the political decadence and economic troubles of the 1970 on the other
(…) The instigators of the riot tapped into Islam looking for an alternative solution to the
decadence and materialism that had infected Nigeria and that they believed endangered
Islam itself.521
It is important to highlight the similarity in both instances. While the gamins imams in La route
des clameurs advocate strict Islamic rule (beginning with the implementation of Sharia) and
removal of all signs of modernity (seen as depraved/ immoral), the Nigerian Islamist sect views
modernity (materialism and politics) as incompatible with cardinal Islamic values such as social
justice and strict observance of all divine precepts or ordinances. As a result, the implementation
of modern political leadership522 and the pervasiveness of a materialistic doctrine supported by
secular values have come to be viewed as anti-Islamic and appear as a major threat to the ability
of Muslim societies to attain religious fulfillment and gain divine salvation. In a sense, the Nigerian
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fundamentalist sect, the Maitatsine, does to a large extent compare to the gamins imams of the new
mosques in La route des clameurs as both present themselves as alternative leadership figures to
self-identifying Muslims as they invite the latter to join what they describe as the only legitimate
Islamic society where they should allow themselves to live and, which must remain the only power
structure to govern and organize their lives. Fuad Khuri made an enlightening remark with regard
to the standards that define Islamic societies when he writes:
This is an understanding which makes the presence of formal, sovereign Islamic authority
imperative for the application of religion—in other words, divine law. The implications
here is that the Islamic umma is not that which simply implements the shari‘a, but that
which does so under Islamic sovereignty.523
Indeed, the eighteenth century Islamic reformer, Ibn abd al-Wahhab (1702-1791) appears to have
held a similar viewpoint. Natana Delong-Bas’ seminal work on Ibn abd al-Wahhab and his reform
movement, commonly referred to as Wahhabism,524 and generally portrayed as a fundamentalist
movement, is critical to better understanding some of the ideas advanced by religious
fundamentalists. It is interesting to see how some of Ibn abd al-Wahhab’s views, or perhaps what
looks like its clichés, have become prominent among contemporary fundamentalist movements.
In her description of the reformer’s view on leadership, Delong-Bas writes: “Rather than the
typical worldly values of power, prestige, wealth, and birth, Ibn abd al-Wahhab declared
knowledge to be the critical factor in determining leadership of the Muslim community.” 525 It is
important to be precise and note that the type of knowledge referred to here is Islamic knowledge.
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Consequently, one can assume, the absence of such structure in Maabala has certainly prepared
the ground and given a sense of legitimacy to the gamins imams as they consider the target society
as one inhabited by Muslims, and which must remain, therefore, under strict Muslim leadership.
There appears equally a strong sense that Islam functions here as a supreme overarching identity
to the extent that acknowledging its presence within the society becomes sufficient enough to
supersede all other existing identities, and makes it the one defining characteristic of that particular
people. The breadth of the fundamentalist ideology and its large-scale effects on communities and
societies is not limited to the political spectrum, rather, it encompasses all aspects of life, which,
consequently influence and shape individual and communal identities. With regards to Ibn abd alWahhab’s views on the role religion is to play, Delong-Bas further writes: “He believed and taught
that religion necessarily has a public dimension because what one believes and the values to which
one adheres are not and should not be limited to private life.”526 The central role religion plays
among religious fundamentalists certainly explains the gamins imams’ attempts to entrench
themselves more deeply in society in order to ensure the successful outcome of their mission. This
perhaps accounts for their widespread involvement in both the social and political spheres. As such,
criticism of secular political figures―“Un gamin imam, il était au-dessus de tout le monde même
du président de la République qu’il pouvait sermonner et insulter à sa guise”527―is accompanied
with that which the fundamentalists view as its attendant consequences within a morally and
spiritually decadent society: “Ils pourfendaient les idolâtres et imitateurs d’Allah […] Par
imitateurs d’Allah, ils visaient les peintres, sculpteurs, dessinateurs.”528 As highlighted earlier, the
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fundamentalists’ Manichean view of the world imposes a two-fold division on to society, each
categories with its own particular function. Thus, as the voices of authority who set themselves up
as the representatives of divine will, the gamins imams depict themselves as the forces of good
who, therefore, call individual Muslims to join the religious/spiritual community (new mosques)
in order to achieve greater success. By contrast, the forces of evil are the secular powers with the
concomitant insidious effects appearing in the form of moral depravation and un-Islamic attitudes
and practices. In this regard, it is important to note that the establishment of a secular social and
political apparatus appears as significant evidence of a Muslim identity that is very much in
jeopardy, and one which the fundamentalists see as their duty to rescue, re-build and restore, even
though so far as West African identities are concerned, there is hardly any significant historical
evidence of the successful implementation of any such attempt even among the Fulani jihads of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.529 Moreover, there is the presumption, on the part of the
gamins imams, of an existing global or globalized Muslim identity to which all “Muslim” societies
must embrace. In this regard, it seems, “les pays du Golf”530 have become the center where such
global Muslim identity has been defined and from where it has also been propagated to peripheral
regions of the Muslim world. In that particular regard, the new mosques do transcend the traditional
symbol of Islamic religiosity and appear to encompass what could be described as a response to
global phenomena, which would include both colonialism, imperialism as well as the emergence
of conflicting religious ideologies. In this context, the new mosques represent essentially an
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attempt to do away with what fundamentalists such as the gamins imams regard as major threats
to Islam531 and contemporary Muslim societies.

6.2

Culture and Religious Fundamentalism.
On November, 17 2015, the Senegalese President, Macky Sall took an unexpected decree

banning the Burqa due to growing security threats. Interestingly, however, President Sall added
the following remark: “le port du voile intégral ne correspond ni à notre culture, ni à nos traditions,
ni même à notre conception de l’Islam,” he added further, “nous ne pouvons pas accepter qu’on
nous impose des modèle d’habillement venus d’ailleurs.” 532 The idea that the Burqa does not
represent Senegalese culture, religion, and traditions highlights the importance of culture and how
it has come to be associated with a number of societal phenomena. Although safety measures were
invoked as the primary reason for banning the Burqa in Senegal and most other West African
countries,533 it is equally important to underscore that the majority of women who wear the Burqa
or similar clothing belong often to religious groups that are directly or indirectly affiliated to
foreign religious organisations. However, rejection of the Burqa on the grounds that it does not
reflect the Senegalese culture does certainly not suggest any form of uniformity in the way the
Senegalese people dress or the implementation of a dress code. On the contrary, there appears a
wide variety of differences within the Senegalese society. A number of factors such as European
cultural influence, Western education, religion, and local culture, as well as social and economic
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status are key factors that often determine how most individuals choose to dress. Overall, however,
despite these differences, there seems to exist what could be more or less characterized as social
cohesion, which, in a way, impels the Senegalese social individual to act in accordance with the
uncodified yet internalized societal norms. Thus, the controversy over the Burqa may be related
more to how this dress style upsets the Senegalese social norm, which places the individual both
as a member of a private unit (family) as well as that of a collective/ communal one (broader
society). It is in this particular respect that the Burqa seems critical. The fact that the Burqa makes
it practically impossible to identify the individual does, without doubt, impede social interactions
and restricts, to a greater extent, the Senegalese Muslim woman in her ability to perform certain
tasks and undertake her social responsibilities.534 As a result, the fact that the Burqa is castigated
may have less to do with religion, and religious adequacy, and, instead, more to do with social and
customary demands. It is important, therefore, to place President Sall’s remark within the context
of a postcolonial secular society where women’s economic contributions have become vital and
their role in national life has proven critical.535
In my undergraduate years at University Cheikh Anta Diop, I had witnessed, and
experienced, albeit mildly, what was acknowledged campus-wide as Wahhabism. The one campus
mosque had become for most students and the neighborhood residents a convenient prayer site
given its proximity to campus residences. However, early on, as I began frequenting the mosque,
I could not but notice something that appeared to me quite unusual, although not bizarre. A number
of those students attending religious services were dressed, for the most part, in a white outfit, with

534

Women in Senegalese society play an active role both within the nuclear family and the larger society. See, for
instance, Eric Ross, Culture and Customs of Senegal (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008).
535
Dorothea E Schulz has discussed the role of West African women and their contribution in contemporary life in
her book, Muslims and New Media in West Africa: Pathways to God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).
especially in chapter 2 “Times of Hardship: Gender Relations in Changing Urban Economy” pp. 47-72.

247
the notable characteristic of strictly keeping their trousers at ankle length. It was also around the
same time that I began to notice women wearing the Burqa. To most non-members of this group,
including myself, there was a general sense of acceptance and respect, especially when we knew
the religious symbolism of the dress. However, it was equally clear to the large majority of campus
students that these types of outfits do not reflect our “way of dressing” for either gender. As a
result, it seems, our failure to accept such “imported” dresses as part of the local cultural norm has
certainly led most of us to characterize them as signs or symbols of Wahhabism.536
One particular incident that took place in one of the residence halls came to set a dangerous
precedent. The incident involved two students who shared the same room. Their argument began
when one of the roommates, who is a Murid disciple, decided to hang a photo of a Murid religious
patron up on the wall. The second roommate, an adherent to the campus Wahhabi group, opposed
this decision, which led to a heated argument and eventually to physical confrontation. Fortunately,
other residents stepped in to keep them apart. Although physical confrontation was not unusual on
this campus, this particular confrontation had rallied student members of both groups to defend
their stance. What proved perhaps more critical was the demand on the part of the Murid students
for an equitable management of the campus mosque, while others demanded the construction of a
completely separate mosque. To this day, no other mosque has been built.
In La route des clameurs, the particularity of the new mosques is equally emphasized by
the adoption of a distinct culture. Diarra’s criticism of religious fundamentalism in Mali highlights
the cultural significance given that destruction of culture―“la destruction de notre patrimoine
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humain, culturel, historique”537―further removes a whole set of values that makes up, as well as
defines, the identity of a people. Thus, the fact that the gamins imams uphold separate cultural
values from those of the local community and society certainly has broader implications. In fact,
the conversation between the father and Tonton Ngoloni is enlightening in this regard: “Notre Mali
nous échappe! Les gamins imams des nouvelles mosquées l’ont vendu aux pays du Golf contre
deux dollars et un séjour à la Mecque! Les ‘Bin-Ben’ le transformeront bientôt en terrain de chasse
à l’outarde!”538 Tonton Ngoloni’s remark provides critical information about the gamins imams.
For, one can assume that the latter’s sojourn in Mecca has brought them in contact with different
societies, cultures as well as their religious practices. Additionally, the very idea that Mali is sold
to Gulf countries suggests some form of power and hegemony on the part of the Gulf countries, as
well as a seemingly imperial mission. As I highlighted in Diarra’s quote, Mali’s Islam is not only
intertwined with its culture(s), its particularity reflects indeed in the very nature of Malian society
and its modern nation. Tonton Ngoloni’s reference that the gamins imams have sold Mali to the
Gulf countries does suggest that the latter, for financial gains or as a result of cultural assimilation,
have traded their religion (as implemented in Mali), culture, and most critically, their identity for
an imitation version of that found in those of Gulf societies whose religious history and cultural
development may be quite distinct from those of Mali. It may actually prove more compelling to
place Tonton Ngoloni’s words in the context of global religious development, which witnessed the
rise of a number of reform movements from the eighteenth century,539 whose influence became
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significant in the twentieth century as movement of individuals and goods became
commonplace.540 Lucy Behrman contends:
Wahhabism541, for example, was brought to Mali by wealthy Dioula traders returning from
Mecca in the late forties. The Dioula used Wahhabi ideas as bases for asserting themselves
against established social and ethnic groups which were tied to traditional Sufism. The
traders took some of the most important mosques and installed Wahhabi imams, they also
sponsored young Wahhabi teachers, who created schools to teach a reformed version of
Islam.542
Furthermore, Khuri’s assertion: “The incorporation of dogma, culture543 and history into the body
of Islamic jurisprudence can be seen as the logical product of the comprehensiveness of religion
as well as of understanding religion as din, a matter of public policy,”544 underscores culture’s
critical role in achieving a wholesome implementation and application of the Islamic religion. The
fact that the gamins imams consider local Islamic practices as corrupt seems to have provided
grounds for them to equally question the community cultural practices as well as other constituent
religious elements or their interpretation within the broader society of Maabala. Thus, the
implementation of a “correct” form of Islam by “des gamins imams barbus, débarqués frais
émoulus des pays du Golf,” carries with it, albeit implicitly, the idea that the Arab culture (Gulf
countries) constitutes de facto the norm and standard for all Muslim societies despite the fact that

540

See, Lansiné Kaba, Evolution of Islam in West Africa: The Wahhabi Movement and its Contribution to Political
Development 1945-1958 (Unpublished Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1972), pp. 56, 59; also Ousman M.
Kobo, Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reform p. 127.
541
Wahhabism is defined as a Reform movement initiated by Muhammad Ibn abd al-Wahhab (1702-1791) who ran a
vigorous campaign for the restoration of Islamic Tawheed (unity of God) in Arabia. For further reading, see, DelongBas, Wahhabi Islam.
542
Lucy Behrman , The Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1970), pp. 158-59.
543
My emphasis.
544
Khuri, Imams and Emirs, p.33

250
the latter may present their own specificities. In this particular context, the Gulf countries not only
appear to form a homogenous geographic unit, but most importantly they seem to represent a
hegemonic power whose influence upon other Muslim societies is exerted primarily through
religion (Islam) with significant financial backing. Furthermore, the importance fundamentalists
attribute to culture reinforces the idea that the Islamic religion has become a medium for
domination within the Muslim world in a way parallel to the use of the “civilizing mandate”
utilized by the European colonists. Even though a wide range of Islamic practices545 have come to
be incorporated into, and become part and parcel of, local cultures in many Muslim societies, some
practices are, nonetheless, still viewed/understood as the product or making of specific societies
and, therefore, reflecting their own religious practices and/ or cultural development. 546 It is
important to highlight, in this regard, that the fundamentalists’ most significant actions have had a
greater effect on local cultures than correcting any major Islamic religious/doctrinal issues. The
description of the caliphe’s palace gives clear insight into this:
Zabani Zabata renvoya le chauffeur et nous conduisit, à travers les dédales de couloirs
interminables, dans une grande salle aux murs et au sol recouverts de tapis orientaux, avec
de magnifiques arabesques que mon papa, malgré son talent consacré de grand peintre
n’aurait jamais su recopier.547
The abundance of oriental decoration in this context defines, albeit broadly, the cultural
preferences of the fundamentalists. In this regard, as the protagonist actually observes, an apparent
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distinction seems to be set forth between the local cultures, on the one hand, and the Arab cultures
(imperial one) on the other hand. The caliphe’s choice to decorate (cover) the walls and floor with
oriental items appears to be a conscious effort to maintain his otherness; in other words, his status
as an individual belonging to and coming from a higher society, one captured in and reflected
through the artistic items with which he chose to decorate his own private space (the palace). The
protagonist’s own judgment highlights the cultural hierarchy. By acknowledging his father’s
inability to reproduce such foreign artistic work, he validates, albeit indirectly and unconsciously,
the assumption of superiority which animates the Caliphe, and informs his mission, that is, to
establish within the local societies (or a de facto colony, if you will) a finer, sounder Islam brought
from Gulf countries (metropolis). To this effect, cultural differences are not only given greater
importance, but they are magnified to such a degree that they appear to have religious bearing. The
following example illustrates this phenomenon:
C’est au moment où j’allais partir que ma mère me fit signe de rester. Elle le fit de la main
et des yeux et puis d’un grognement. Je compris alors, avec soulagement, que c’était parce
qu’elle n’avait pas fini de faire son chapelet qu’elle ne m’avait pas adressé la parole. Quand
ce fut fait, elle m’expliqua que le Caliphe avait dit qu’il était désormais interdit de
s’embrasser entre mère et fils.548
The ramification of these links between the Islamic religion and culture, as suggested by Khuri,
becomes quite visible here. While it seems that the caliphe’s decision is an attempt to establish a
new life style, morals and ethics in direct imitation of those upheld in Gulf countries, it is surprising,
however, to note the religious justification given to his decree: “Que cela était un inceste. Et que

Ousmane Diarra, La route des clameurs 139 (my emphasis): “My mother motioned me back as soon as I set out to
leave. She managed to do so by using her hands, eyes, and then grunted to me. I, then, understood, with relief, that
she had not talked to me because she had not finished saying her rosary. When she finished, she informed me that the
Caliphe had prohibited mothers from hugging their sons.” (my translation).
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tous les auteurs d’inceste serait désormais décapités publiquement. Ils étaient condamné d’office
aux pires flammes de l’enfer.”549 It appears, here, that the caliphe, as well as his acolytes (imams
and morbidonnes), seeks to cover his actions with the religious mantle, while on other occasions,
prohibited practices are allegedly given an Islamic legal justification (Sharia). By proceeding so,
the calife ensures that his mission remains within the strict spiritual boundaries despite the fact
that it is imperialistic in nature, and therefore, bound to transform local cultures and many of the
social practices. In this regard, the caliphe’s order to ban filial love (mother/son) adds much weight
to his religious mission since in order for the conquered society to become truly Islamic, in light
of the standards of the Gulf countries and in contrast to traditional West African societies, a number
of practices must be banned. In this context, then, religion and culture become quite inseparable
because by dissociating the Arab culture (of Gulf countries) from the religious mission, the caliphe
runs the risk of failing to achieve authenticity as society may not perceive much of a difference
between the old status quo and the new Islamic form. In fact, there appears here an interesting
similarity between European colonialism and Islamist fundamentalism. On the one hand, Europe’s
pretext to bring ‘civilization’ to the peoples of Africa not only meant the beginning of a
modernization project as European nations set out to organize/build their respective colonies in
light of their own societies; however it is also important to highlight that it was part of the colonial
mission to denigrate, if not, disallow African traditional practices within the colony as those
practices were deemed unfit for the new societies. 550 In fact, Césaire’s criticism of European
colonialism encapsulates this situation well: “Je parle de millions d’hommes arrachés à leurs dieux,
Ousmane Diarra, La route des clameurs 139 “That doing so was incestuous. And anybody who committed incest
would, henceforth, be beheaded in the public place. They would be condemned immediately to the worst fires of hell”
(my translation).
550
Ngūgī Wa Thiong’o has highlighted how European colonization has systematically hindered the development of
African cultures through cultural repression and the promotion of European languages to the detriment of those of
Africa. See Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1993),
pp. 30-41, 88.
549

253
à leur terre, à leurs habitudes, à leur vie, à la vie, à la danse, à la sagesse.”551 For Césaire, then,
Europe’s claim of transforming colonized societies and ensuring progress is one that must also
acknowledge its destruction of African traditional life, as well as its cultures.
In his seminal study552 of the city of Djenne, Geert Mommersteeg underscored a major
difference between Sufi traditional marabouts and their Wahhabi counterparts. Their dispute over
the acceptability of the amulet553 came to crystalize their differences. While the former argues that
amulets can be used for one’s protection given that it is permissible to use the Qur’an for one’s
protection, the latter, instead, see amulets as remnants of paganism and un-Islamic practices. The
following encapsulates this tension:
Marabout Moussa Tanapo was known for his sermons(…) One evening while Tanapo was
enthralling his audience with a speech on the names of God… he suddenly permitted
himself… a short digression. ‘Shouldn’t a person be allowed to invoke the name of God?’
They say it’s idolatry! Shouldn’t a person be allowed to wear an amulet? They say it’s a
fetish! Is that true? In the name of God I’m telling you His name is not a fetish!554
Mommersteeg’s own remarks further emphasize this dichotomy when he notes: “I had recorded
Tanapo’s speech, and later, when Boubacar and I were translating it, I asked him who Tanapo had
meant by ‘they.’ We talked about them before, Boubacar said. Everyone knew in this case ‘they’
were the Wahhabi, who forbade the wearing of amulets.” 555 There appears, here, a sense of
estrangement vis-à-vis the Wahhabis. For, it seems, to some extent, the cleric’s intention, by
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referring to the Wahhabis as “they”, is to mark them out as “Other.” In this context, the amulet not
only bears useful properties, it is equally depicted as a cultural/national symbol. Consequently, the
fact that the Wahhabis have come to disapprove of the making/wearing of amulet is significant
enough to set them apart and characterize them as Other.556 Thus the distinctive characteristics
between “us” and “them” is no longer defined exclusively in terms of race, ethnicities, languages,
etc., but rather on the appropriation and acceptance of one’s cultural/national symbols. That the
Wahhabis may be born in Mali and can communicate using local languages is not enough to
guarantee them the Malian identity. Rather, their borrowed and alien Islamic interpretation has
clearly invalidated their claim to Malian identity. Conversely, in La route des clameurs, the
invasion of Maabala by the fundamentalists and the subsequent implementation of a new religious
(political) order has changed the sociocultural dynamic. As the ruler of what is intended to be an
“ultra”- religious society, the caliphe’s order banning filial love, though given a religious
justification, is a clear attempt to establish a distinct sociocultural order (that of the Gulf countries),
as a replacement for the previous one (traditional/ secular one). As a result, the decision taken by
protagonist’s mother to abide by the caliphe’s decree is a clear attempt on her part to fully
(meaningfully) integrate into her new society. Eventually, whether the caliphe’s order has any
Islamic legal justification or not might prove of little relevance. Instead, it is critical to understand
the ongoing transformations in West African contemporary societies that have allowed the
reception/promotion and acceptability of dissonant religious discourses. One possible answer may,
in fact, be found in Schulz’s own observation:
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To grasp the different facets of Islam’s public prominence in Mali, we need to consider the
activities, claims and recent successes of Muslim activists in the context of worsening
economic conditions, men’ and women’s assumption of different responsibilities, and
widespread disillusion with unwarranted promise of democratization.557
The picture Schulz paints here is one that features a very disharmonized postcolonial society. Poor
economic conditions and failure to build an inclusive society (lack of democratization) have
certainly widened the gap between different groups and failed to craft a meaningful postcolonial
identity that is deeply grounded in and reflective of the country’s past.
In La route des clameurs, the same phenomenon is at play. In their effort to build a base
and recruit followers, the gamins imams construct a rhetoric that encourages unattached members
of society to not only join their religious organization, but to also develop anti-social sentiments.
‘Tu n’as pas de travail. Tu n’as pas d’argent. Tu es tellement pauvre et sans espoir que tu
ne peux même pas envisager de te marier un jour et d’avoir des enfants […] C’est pourquoi
tu bois de l’alcool et fumes ton joint dans ton coin et que tu n’es pas un bon musulman,
malgré ta bonne volonté. Eh bien, c’est parce que le monde entier est contre toi, sauf nous,
bien entendu. Et nous, bien entendu, on peut t’aider…’558
The fundamentalists’ recruitment process seems to be two-fold. The first and most critical part is
to bring the potential member to fully realize how his own society has concretely failed him and
subsequently left him to his own fate. Thus, the reality of his life, the lack of a job, poverty, the
inability to marry and have children, etc. are evidence that fundamentalists use to prove to the
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latter that he is unwanted/unwelcome in his own society. The second component of this process is
to impart a sense of meaning, value and a sense of communal belonging to the deprived individual
by promising him all that which his society has denied him. Or as Diarra puts it: “les gaver de
contes de fées venus d’ailleurs, d’outre-désert et d’outre-tombe.”559
It is important to highlight that the ramifications of the connections between religion and
culture have become quite critical in the postcolonial context. If Khuri’s contention about the
inclusion of culture within the Islamic religion seems vague, it is undeniable that a fast-changing
postcolonial society has contributed to a widening of the of the socio-economic gap between
members of society and, consequently, has allowed the emergence of what might be termed
“fractured” identities. In this regard, the emerging postcolonial culture not only has failed to attend
to the cohesive entity of society, but, for those socially marginalized, the postcolonial culture has
proven unfitting for the very fact that it neither reflects their traditional values, nor is it a socially
acceptable form. In the context of religious fundamentalism, this situation is simply attributed to
the rise and dominance of secularism, which, in the view of the fundamentalists, encourages
irreligion and irreligious practices. In La route des clameurs, the caliphe’s apparent success in
introducing new ways of being and behaving (defined as Islamic) can be justified by religion’s
continued relevance to the peoples and societies of West Africa. Moreover, the inability of the
postcolonial society to build a suitable social environment, that is to materially advance the
economic status of large sections of society, has left perhaps no option for those seeking
meaningful identities to see in religious fundamentalism a viable alternative.
In conclusion, my discussion of religious fundamentalism in La route des clameurs has
aimed to show the changing social dynamic in West African societies. As I highlighted at the
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beginning of my discussion, the process that occasioned the modernization of West African
societies (colonization) has been a major factor in both political and sociocultural transformation.
I showed also how emerging global religious discourses have become part and parcel of the
postcolonial identity discourse. My analysis of Islamic elements has underscored the changing
nature of mosques and religious agents (imams) as both are taking on new meanings and
symbolism in the face of a fast-changing modern society. The new mosques featured in La route
des clameurs are manifestations of a global religious development as they appear to represent
alternative spaces for disaffected members of postcolonial secular societies, while the gamins
imams embody a new spiritual militancy.
My elaboration on culture, on the other hand, has sought to highlight the relationship
between religion and culture in the context of religious fundamentalism. The similarity between
religious fundamentalism and European colonialism demonstrates how the imperialistic nature of
religious fundamentalism justifies its rejection of local cultures. For the fundamentalists, the
condition for a successful establishment of an Islamic society requires complete cultural
assimilation within that of the ideal society, and a rejection of all that is local and culturally specific.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this study has been to demonstrate how discussion of the secular question
in West African postcolonial narratives is directly linked to the colonial experience. Although
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colonialism has affected African societies in many ways, its legacy of government committed to
provisions of secularism remains one of its most consequential effects. The fact that African
societies have been fashioned in the image of secular Europe not only pulled the continent’ many
societies out of their respective realities, but, more critically, it appears that such a move equally
caused African societies to enter into the modern era, where they were forced to embrace a
European sociopolitical vision as they moved forward. Thus, the secular discourse, as I have shown
throughout this study, emerged essentially during the postcolonial era, and was, for the most part,
concerned with issues of identity.
The emergence of a secular discourse in West Africa has had significant social
ramifications. The creation of a novel structure of communal life in the form of the nation-state
not only replaced the traditional sociopolitical set-up, but more importantly, its establishment
presented major challenges to individuals and the wider society. Thus, the post-Independence era
marked a critical moment during which formerly colonized societies sought to come together in
order to re-construct their societies. However, differences in perspectives, vision, and experiences
of members of a now highly stratified and diverse society have caused major tensions. My
discussion of Sembene’s Xala and Sow-Fall’s La grève in chapter two has highlighted the role the
urban space has come to play with regards to the phenomenon of postcolonial identity. The urban
space, represented by the city (Ville) in La grève des battù, has become the very symbol of a
modern capitalistic vision, and has equally come to crystallize the social gap, as well as the cultural
sensibilities that have come to differentiate the rich elite from the masses. In both novels, this
situation appears to be quite problematic. As an administrative and economic center that is
henceforth connected to a European-led global system, the urban space has come to reflect the
secular spirit of the postcolonial era. Thus, the consequent tensions between rich and poor, on the
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one hand, and western educated and the non-educated, on the other hand, reflect the existing divide
within West African postcolonial society. To a larger degree, in fact, these social issues reflect the
diverse perspectives within the postcolonial society and become evidence of the challenges secular
postcolonial society has had to come to face. Its characteristic economic feature, as I showed in
my analysis of La grève des battù in chapter two and La pièce d’or in chapter three, makes clear
secular society’s global connections. Thus, unlike precolonial traditional models, postcolonial
secular society appears to be concerned more with maintaining and fulfilling the demands and
expectations of a global secular society rather than taking into consideration or implementing local
values and vision.
Further examination of the question has equally shown how gender and gender issues in
West Africa are tightly linked to secularism, and complicates its elaboration. Traditional societies
were predominately patriarchal, traditional, and religious, and the establishment of a European
value system supported by its institutional model of govenment, failed to make significant
headway in terms of women’ emancipation and full participation in modern society. As discussed
in chapter three with Umar’s Amina, West African postcolonial society continues to maintain
women on the fringes. The challenges that women face in the educational system, for example,
reflect their overall status in society. Economic dependence and assigned traditional roles
constitute a major hindrance for women’s individual and collective growth, as these continue to
determine their role and participation in society. Nonetheless, increasing understanding of the
importance of education among women, and their collective effort to achieve economic
independence and self-sufficiency constitute alternative ways and certainly contribute to
shaping/changing the face of West African societies. In this regard, the concept of the Women’s
Association can be viewed as a consequence of and a reaction to a male paternalistic social
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structure, as well as a manifestation of women’ resolve to break free from age-old societal roles
where they do no longer see themselves fitting in. To West African women, then, the postcolonial
secular State, as established and maintained since independence, has yet to guarantee their rights
as full citizens and to ensure that State institutions remain free of all form of bias.
The direct intervention of the West African writer into the question of secularism, as
discussed in chapter four, shows his/her personal stakes on the question. It appears that diversity
of experience and background among West African writers have, for the most part, determined
their respective positions and perspectives on the issue. While the majority of African writers and
academics have received western education, my analysis has shown that the writer’s social context
and background, as well as his/her personal experience have proven to have a much greater
influence on their views and overall intellectual stance. Thus, his/her elaboration of secularism,
far from being sheer imitation of Europe’s eighteenth century thinkers, is, in fact, a genuine and
unique contribution to a debate that has become theirs. Additionally, political Independence from
Europe has given both context and meaning to the African writer as they come to consider
themselves the literary depositaries of the new society. As such, my discussion of select West
African authors such as Wole Soyinka, Oumar Sankharé, and Ahmadou Kourouma, reflects this
variety of perspectives among West African writers and the distinct nature of the secular debate
among the societies of the region.
My discussion of religious fundamentalism in the final chapter has underscored religion’s
growing importance within modern West African societies, and has equally shown how emerging
global religious phenomena constitute a challenge and threat to the secular society. In the modern
context, in fact, religious fundamentalism is presented as an alternative model to secular society.
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Its apparent success is one that can be justified by the fact that a growing body of disfranchised
populations have not only lost hope, but are also in search of genuine and meaningful identities.
Overall, the study of the question of secularism in West African postcolonial narratives has
made it possible to understand the particular nature of West African secular societies and the
challenges they face. More importantly, evaluation of the question has revealed its multifarious
dimension and the complexities of the issues raised. The particularity and peculiarity of the West
African secular discourse is one that clearly reflects the diversity of its societies from both its
traditional and colonial past. Finally, it is certainly worth adding that issues related to secularism
on the continent will continue to arise, and, consequently, both researchers and scholars should
further investigate African literary narratives in order to better understand what I perceive as
development of an unresolved question.
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